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ABSTRACT 
There are at least two ways to combat the negative effects of low self-esteem: directly 
improve people’s self-esteem, or to decouple the link between low self-esteem and negative 
outcomes (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). Incremental theories are implicit beliefs that people’s 
attributes are malleable. In this thesis I argue that subscription to these beliefs may help 
combat the negative effects of low self-esteem. Incremental theories make individuals less 
likely to make trait attributions as a result of failure and so may prevent low-self-esteem from 
occurring in response to failure. Incremental theories may also make people less likely to 
treat negative self-evaluations as truths that permanently define them, thus decoupling the 
link between low self-esteem and negative outcomes. 
In study 1, I conducted a systematic review to examine the link between incremental 
theories and self-concept. I synthesize the results of 34 studies and found that incremental 
theories and self-esteem were modestly correlated (r = .16; 95% CI [0.11, 0.2]). 
In study 2 and 3, I examined the extent that perceptions of self-malleability moderated 
the link between self-esteem and negative outcomes. I surveyed 489 Australian female high 
school students (age: M = 14.7; SD = 1.5) and a representative sample of 7,884 adult 
Americans of both genders (age: M = 47.9; SD = 16; 52.5% female) respectively. Moderation 
analyses in both samples showed that the links between low self-esteem and negative 
outcomes (lower wellbeing and achievement) were weaker for those with stronger 
incremental theories. While in those with high self-esteem there was little difference in 
wellbeing and achievement regardless of the level of incremental theories; in those with low 
self-esteem strong incremental theories had substantially higher levels of wellbeing and 
achievement. 
xiii 
 
People are likely to experience fluctuations in self-esteem due to success, failure, and 
social rejection. Incremental theories may help people respond to low self-esteem in more 
adaptive ways resulting in improved wellbeing and achievement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 “A man can never be happy without his own approval” 
     -Mark Twain, 1929 
In 1986, Governor George Deukmejian signed legislation which founded “The State 
Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal Responsibility”. The idea behind this group 
was to find ways to solve societal problems through improving self-esteem at a population 
level. This taskforce was the brain child of State Assemblyman John Vasconcellos who went 
on to found similar groups including the National Association for Self-Esteem which is still 
in operation, and lists its primary aim as “…to fully integrate Self-Esteem into the fabric of 
American society so that every individual, no matter what their age or background, 
experiences personal worth and happiness” (National Association for Self Esteem, 2016). 
Vasconcellos, like many others, was impressed by the wealth of research showing that self-
esteem is a primary driver of human wellbeing and behaviour (Guindon, 2009). But this 
intense interest led to over-simplifications of self-esteem research. Rather than being seen as 
a nuanced, multi-dimensional construct (Marsh & Craven, 2006), self-esteem was boiled 
down to merely feeling good about oneself. These oversimplifications led to the production 
of very poor, and unsuccessful interventions (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; 
Guindon, 2009). 
And so, the enthusiasm of policy makers waned. While participation prizes are still 
given to kids, the world has mostly forgotten why. But the research behind self-esteem has 
not abated. While self-esteem interventions are no longer considered a silver bullet, the 
construct of self-esteem is still considered to be a driver of human wellbeing and behaviour 
(Marsh & Craven, 2006). Much research has shown that low self-esteem is related to suicidal 
ideation, problem eating (McGee & Williams, 2000), substance abuse, delinquency 
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(Neumark-Sztainer, Story, French, & Resnick, 1997) and poorer academic performance 
(Marsh & Craven, 2006). 
The centrality of self-esteem to human wellbeing, means that self-views can be useful 
constructs to consider when designing interventions to improve wellbeing and achievement. 
Two main approaches have been taken. Interventions have either attempted to change the 
level of self-esteem (Guindon, 2009), or attempted to decouple it from negative outcomes 
(Marshall et al., 2015). While nuanced interventions have successfully improved specific 
domains of self-esteem (self-concepts) to good effect (Swann Jr, Chang-Schneider, & Larsen 
McClarty, 2007), large scale interventions which aimed to boost global self-esteem have been 
unsuccessful in achieving their broad aims (Baumeister et al., 2003). Critics of the ‘self-
esteem movement’ of the 70s or 80s claimed that self-esteem training programs were not only 
unsuccessful but potentially encouraged anti-social behaviour and narcissism (Baumeister et 
al., 2003; Dweck, 2000; Neff, 2009). 
 Subsequently researchers have identified that self-esteem training in populations is 
difficult to achieve due to the role of social comparisons in building self-esteem (Marsh, 
1986). While self-esteem training is unlikely to be a silver bullet, the problem of low self-
esteem remains and needs to be addressed. Prior research suggests that the negative effects of 
low self-esteem may be moderated by internal contextual factors (Marshall et al., 2015). In 
this thesis I explore whether the extent to which the self is viewed to be fixed or malleable 
affects the relationship between self-esteem and both wellbeing and achievement. 
Implicit malleability theories are sets of beliefs regarding the fixedness or malleability 
of ones attributes (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). People who perceive their attributes as more 
malleable (incremental theorists) tend to respond to failure with stronger desires to remediate 
(Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). In contrast, people who perceive their attributes to 
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be fixed (entity theorists) are more likely to attribute failures to rigid personal defects, and 
rather than attempt to remediate, they may engage in self-sabotage in order to generate 
socially acceptable reasons for failure (Ommundsen, 2001), or engage in downward social 
comparisons (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008).  
Incremental theories may prevent drops in self-esteem by reducing the extent to which 
failures can be attributed to stable aspects of the self (Dweck, 2000). As a result, incremental 
theories may make self-esteem more resilient to failure such that stronger incremental 
theories are related to higher self-esteem. Additionally, incremental theories may change the 
way low self-esteem is experienced. Rather than seeing low self-esteem as a life sentence, 
incremental theorists may be more likely to perceive ways out of their predicament. This 
mindset may improve their wellbeing and help them stay active in remedial efforts. In this 
thesis I explore these questions cross-sectionally. In Chapters 1 and 2, I summarise existing 
research on self-esteem and implicit malleability theories. In Chapter 3, I perform a meta-
analytic synthesis of prior research, to assess the strength of the association between implicit 
theories and self-esteem. Additionally I attempt to find evidence of an interactive relationship 
between self-esteem and implicit malleability theories. In Chapters 4 and 5, I demonstrate 
that incremental theories moderate the relationships between self-esteem and wellbeing, and 
between self-esteem and achievement, in two diverse samples. Finally, in Chapter 6, I 
contextualise the findings of this thesis within the self-esteem and implicit malleability theory 
literatures. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE SELF 
“There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately 
conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; 
and are certain, beyond evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and 
simplicity.” 
      Hume (1738 [2003] pg. 164) 
Introduction 
At the heart of this thesis, is the idea that the effects of self-esteem dependent on 
context. In this chapter I introduce the construct of self-esteem. I discuss the nature of the 
self, how it develops and why it is important. Specifically, I present theories of how self-
esteem may help individuals navigate complex social dominance hierarchies. I go on to 
suggest why low self-esteem is linked to a wide range of negative outcomes such as lower 
wellbeing and poorer achievement. I give a brief overview of different approaches designed 
to prevent the harms of low self-esteem, and conclude that contextual factors are important. I 
draw attention to the need to identify factors that change the way people respond to low self-
esteem. Implicit malleability theories may be one such factor.  
What is the self? 
The feeling of being a self, of being somehow separate from one’s environment is a 
persistent and powerful human experience (Hume, 2003). Notions of the self are present in 
some of the earliest philosophical writings. Greek philosophers believed that humans had a 
core ‘essence’ (Hicks, 2015) and many religions have explored the self through the concept 
of ‘souls’, or an awareness or personhood which is distinct from the body. The self is such a 
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powerful experience that it has led many philosophers and theologians to suspect that the self 
may be so robust it might even survive death (Armstrong, 1994; Hicks, 2015). 
But where does this notion of self, which is at the core of human experience, come 
from? While a sense of having a consistent identity is both strong and ubiquitous, it is 
difficult to pinpoint why we feel this way. For instance, think back to what you were like at 
the age of five; how you looked, the ideas you had, and your relationship to the world around 
you. You have almost certainly changed in every conceivable way since then, and yet your 
sense of self unifies all your life experiences into a single, enduring identity. Some have 
argued that this sense of consistency is illusory. Hume (2003) saw the self as merely a 
container where perceptions lurch into existence and then fade away without a trace: “The 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; 
pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations” (Hume, 
2003; pg. 165). To Hume (2003) the self was not persistent, it ceased to exist when one went 
to sleep or was in a mindless state; and while memories can bind our experiences with a 
narrative structure, memories themselves are impermanent.  
From a dispassionate viewpoint, what we might refer to as a self depends on scale and 
perspective. At a microscopic level, it is difficult to find any trace of a conventional notion of 
self. At this scale it would be easier to describe people as comprised of colonies of 
cooperative cells sharing resources, each responding as individuals to changes in a common 
environment. Smaller still, within each cell more individual actors are found: communes of 
cooperative and warring genes, each ‘selfishly’ striving for a chance to replicate (Dawkins, 
2016).  
There is much one could consider when weighing the existence of selves. And yet, all 
these thought experiments fall flat because, regardless of any academic protests, we 
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profoundly feel like selves. When children are born they do not run to the library and 
determine if they are selves, following a careful weighing of evidence. Instead a sense of self 
appears to arise spontaneously. 
From birth, children spend immense time in self-exploration. Newborns have been 
observed to spend up to 20% of their waking hours interacting with their own faces (Korner, 
1972). Children quickly learn to recognise images of themselves. By 18 to 20 months 
toddlers can recognise and interact with themselves in mirrors. Toddlers will attempt to take 
off unattractive clothing, adjust their posture, or remove blemishes from their faces as 
demonstrated in the ‘rouge’ experiments (Butterworth, 1990). This capacity to recognise the 
self and engage in self-grooming shows that not only do children of this age have a separate 
sense of self, but that they understand that the self can have good or bad qualities. Self-
referential processing is one of the default modes of the human brain (Gusnard, Akbudak, 
Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). In spite of all the distraction in one’s environment, for better or 
for worse, our selves are often the most interesting things in the room. Because the self is 
such a vivid and persistent experience, we bring it into every situation. The world is coloured 
by the way we feel about the self. Our self-esteem has profound implications for our 
wellbeing and behaviour (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005; Rosenberg, 1979). But what factors 
might account for the emergence of a phenomenological self in humans? 
Evolutionary theories of the self 
When exploring the evolutionary origins of any human (or non-human) trait it is 
important that one does not fall into the trap of panadaptionism — the idea that every 
identifiable human or animal trait must have been specifically selected for (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979). Genes invariably have multiple effects. As a result, it is never entirely clear 
if a given trait is driving natural selection, or merely ‘piggybacking’ with another which is 
(Dawkins, 2016). For example, moths tend to fly at a fixed orientation towards light at night. 
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When these light sources have a celestial origin, this trait enables them to travel in straight 
lines. But, this same mechanism has the unfortunate side-effect of making moths spiral into 
burning candles. While this mechanism broadly has a net positive effect, to look at the self-
immolating behaviour of moths in isolation and conclude that it must somehow be adaptive 
would be misguided (Dawkins, 1999). With these ideas in mind, does it make sense to talk 
about the evolutionary origins of the self? Piggybacking traits by necessity are not selected 
for, and so tend to be unreliably expressed (Stein, 1996). In contrast, the experience of self is 
prominent and experienced near universally. As a result, it is likely that it does serve adaptive 
functions, rather than merely hitchhiking with other adaptive traits.  
While we cannot be entirely sure that our sense of self is adaptive, there are clear 
advantages to being able to separate oneself from the environment. Basic survival behaviours 
like eating, sleeping, and reproducing can be managed effectively without self-referential 
processes (Dawkins, 2016). But humans live in complex social environments. These 
environments present unique challenges and require complex strategies to navigate. For 
instance, while most animal species live in small groups, even in our early evolutionary 
history, humans have banded together in groups composed of more than 150 individuals 
(Harari, 2014). This ability to get along and work with others enabled new hunting styles and 
gave Homo sapiens a great advantage over their competitors. For example, the Neanderthals, 
despite demonstrating some capacity for language, showed no evidence of trade and tended to 
travel in smaller groups of fewer than 50 individuals (Harari, 2014). Humans on the other 
hand were able to work together in great numbers to great effect (Harari, 2014) While at a 
group level cooperation at this scale is a great advantage, it also places immense social 
pressure on individuals. Human survival to a degree is dependent on acceptance by and 
cooperation with others. In order to navigate this social terrain effectively, it is necessary to 
occasionally forego one’s own immediate needs. People cannot just eat whatever is within 
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reach without recourse. Sometimes one’s own wants and needs need to be negotiated in 
concert with others. Anyone who only maximised their own resources at the expense of their 
group would risk exile and would likely die and not pass on their genes (Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995). So how might a sense of self help people to operate successfully in 
groups? 
An ability to recognise individual actors is critical for negotiating social terrain 
(Blakemore & Decety, 2001). A sophisticated sense of self may provide a rubric by which to 
identify one’s own needs and desires. For instance, what kinds of social relationships need to 
developed, and what resources need to be acquired? The self may also be a social resource in 
and of itself; a way of presenting a unified front in order to encourage cooperation from 
others (Baumeister, 2005). Perceiving selves may have enabled humans to better understand 
their own needs, negotiate with others, survive, and prosper in highly social environments 
(Baumeister, 2005). 
The importance of language for building self-representations 
The self, almost certainly has many facets which rely on various mechanisms. In 
humans, this process of building stable models of the self, and of others, is driven partly 
through language (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). Language is not only a mode of communication 
with others but also a form of self-communication. Humans engage in perpetual rumination 
which can be thought of as a form of self-narration (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003). It is not clear exactly why humans engage in inner-speech. For instance, if someone is 
running late for work they might verbalise to themselves “I’m running late, my boss is going 
to kill me”. As Harris (2014) observed, if someone is both the origin and the recipient of a 
thought, why have it at all? Did our late-running person not already know that they were 
running late before thinking it to themselves?  
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In fact, it may not be clear what we know before we have these internal conversations 
— inner experiences are complicated. The same emotional sensations can mean completely 
different things in different circumstances. Similar feelings of nervousness can occur when 
people feel unsafe as when they feel passionate love (Dutton & Aron, 1974). Language may 
help people integrate confusing internal states into meaningful narratives. Language is useful 
for consolidating information – understanding the self and reliving past lessons. Language 
can also create psychological distance from problems and is useful for future planning as 
evident in worry and anticipation (Morin, 2005). Language is crucial for building up 
persistent and deep self-models (Leary & Tangney, 2003). It allows individuals to step 
outside the body and view the self from the perspective of others (Schwalbe, 1983). It also 
allows the various aspects of the self to be categorised and known e.g. thin, tall, clever, nice, 
or happy (Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990). 
Knowing one’s own capabilities is extremely useful. In order to safely jump between 
two rocks people need to know their physical limits. Some of this information about the self 
may be discovered in play, but social comparison is also an extremely useful tool. In many 
domains of life people place themselves in competence hierarchies (Marsh, 1990b). This 
gives them a sense of how they stack up against others on tasks they may not have even 
performed before. This gives people a sense of how they are distinctive relative to others 
(Turner & Onorato, 1999). This ability to compare the self to others becomes apparent in 
children at the age they are developing language (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). By 
learning how to describe the self, children are able to go beyond implicit sources of self-
concept (the way interactions make them feel) to explicitly understand their qualities and 
relative worth. This judgement of personal worth, which is made in reference to others, is 
one’s self-esteem. 
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Self-esteem 
Development of self-esteem 
The realisation that there are other entities in the world can be a rude awakening. 
From the age of 2-5, as children are developing language, they begin to understand the extent 
to which the universe is comprised of myriad selves separate from their own (Milligan et al., 
2007). While the infantile self was originally perceived to be boundless, as children grow 
older, their notion of self becomes increasingly differentiated from the world (Nardini, 
Burgess, Breckenridge, & Atkinson, 2006). The self becomes an object in the world with its 
own set of properties, some good and some bad (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). This new 
understanding is threatening. The child’s behaviour and capabilities, their self-worth, can 
now be judged relative to others. While pre-school age children tend to report very high self-
esteem, possibly due to a lack of external feedback (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005), school-
aged children increasingly base their self-evaluations on social comparisons and feedback 
from others. As a result their self-esteem rapidly falls (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). There 
is intense psychological desire to be better than others, but unfortunately that is not possible 
for everyone in every domain. In absence of others to compare themselves with people tend 
to feel better than average, but this illusion is pulled out from under their feet when they are 
confronted by the capabilities of their peers (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & 
Vredenburg, 1995). The way that children evaluate their worth has profound impacts for their 
wellbeing and functioning (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). 
Discriminating self-esteem from perceived self-efficacy 
People need to understand their own limitations so that they can know which 
challenges should be attempted, and which would be better to pass by. But having high self-
esteem is not just about feeling that good at something, it is about feeling that good relative to 
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others. This emphasis on social comparison discriminates self-esteem from self-efficacy 
(Marsh et al., 2015).  
Self-efficacy can be defined as one’s confidence in being able to successfully 
complete a discrete task (Bandura, 2006). Self-efficacy has been shown to predict the extent 
to which individuals invest resources, take risks, and persevere in the face of adversity 
(Bandura, 1982). This can be understood in terms of Expectancy Value Theory (Wigfield & 
Eccles, 2000). When multiple behaviours are possible, people will tend to act in ways that 
they believe will be successful, and achieve an outcome which is valued (Wigfield & Eccles, 
2000). In other words, there is little utility in attempting a task when we think it is unlikely 
that we will successfully complete it, or one in which we do not care about the outcome. In 
fact, doing so may only have negative social consequences (e.g. embarrassment) if we fail 
(Ommundsen, 2001). Self-efficacy is important because it helps people allocate resources 
effectively to situations where they are likely to bear fruit. While self-efficacy is often 
defined narrowly, many tasks require such a broad set of skills that some authors have 
suggested that people may hold a generalised sense of self-efficacy (Scholz, Doña, Sud, & 
Schwarzer, 2002). 
But when it comes to self-assessments of worth (i.e. self-esteem), people are generally 
more interested in social comparisons than absolute levels of competence (Marsh & Hau, 
2003). Consider that, relative to other species, humans are vastly intelligent. Humans went 
from inventing flight (in 1903) to landing on the moon (1969) in less than 100 years. 
Compare this breakneck rate of progress to our 99% genetically identical cousins Homo 
Erectus, who in two million years never progressed from simple stone tools (Harari, 2014). 
But humans do not judge themselves in absolute terms, instead, they compare themselves to 
their close peers (Marsh & Hau, 2003). As such, even though most humans could write a 
better sonnet than a jellyfish, or outperform a sloth in calculating times tables, it is still very 
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common for even average performers to feel bad at English or mathematics. The way we 
evaluate our self-worth has profound implications for wellbeing and behaviour. 
The consequences of low self-esteem 
Feelings of low social worth (i.e. low self-esteem) have been shown to be associated 
with a wide range of negative outcomes (Guindon, 2009). Low self-esteem makes individuals 
anticipate and become sensitive to failure. If someone thinks they are worse than others, then 
facing up to challenges may only advertise their relative weakness to others when they 
inevitably fail. This anticipated failure results in reduced persistence and performance on 
tasks among individuals with low self-esteem (Shrauger & Sorman, 1977).  
In this way low self-esteem can spark downward spirals where negative self-
evaluations lead to poorer performances leading to even worse self-evaluations (Marsh & 
O'Mara, 2008). These behaviour patterns ultimately lead to a wide range of undesirable 
outcomes. Low self-esteem has been associated with problem eating (McGee & Williams, 
2000), mental illness, poorer performance (Shrauger & Sorman, 1977), suicidal ideation 
(Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1997), truancy (Swann Jr et al., 2007) and social isolation 
(Marshall, Parker, Ciarrochi, & Heaven, 2014). 
Given the long list of ills associated with low self-esteem, it may seem surprising that 
it has not been eliminated by natural selection. What is the value in feeling bad about oneself 
if it is only going to result in apathy, which may hamper reproductive success? And indeed, 
the majority of people tend to have a positive bias towards feeling worthy, and even feeling 
better than others (Alicke et al., 1995). And yet people do not walk around feeling great about 
themselves all the time. Why not? There are a few potential explanations for this. The 
classical view, enshrined in the self-esteem movement, is that low self-esteem is merely a 
disorder which needs to be cured (Baumeister et al., 2003). And yet, other theorists have 
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suggested that self-esteem may mirror how other animals monitor and regulate status. This 
has led some theorists to hypothesise that low self-esteem may have adaptive properties 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Self-esteem may help people to track their social, protecting 
them from social exclusion. Analogues to this process can be seen in animals. 
Animal analogues to self-esteem 
Social status is a matter of life and death to many kinds of animals. While all animals 
have intense drives to acquire resources (e.g. territory or food) and reproduce, resources are 
limited. This can lead to fierce disputes when rivals compete for mates, or both want access 
to food or other resources. Monitoring one’s social status is one way of avoiding unnecessary 
conflict.  Rather than fighting to the death over every dispute, most social animals are able to 
recognise a larger rival, and defer (Sapolsky, 2004). Lobsters are a great example of this 
(Peterson, 2018). Male lobsters are extremely territorial animals. When they encounter a 
rival, they face off, sending out chemical signals declaring their size and status. Generally the 
smaller lobster will quickly flee, but if there is a contest over who is more powerful they will 
eventually fight, which can end fatally. The winner will have access to food, shelter, and a 
steady stream of females who only mate with dominant lobsters. This behaviour is partly 
moderated by serotonin (Edwards & Kravitz, 1997). When lobsters come into contact with a 
bigger foe, serotonin levels drop which makes them more likely to flee (Edwards & Kravitz, 
1997). Lobsters who have recently lost face-offs have lower serotonin and can become 
increasingly submissive (Huber, Panksepp, Yue, Delago, & Moore, 2001).  
Lobsters and many other social animals clearly have a rudimentary way of monitoring 
their status relative to rivals. This is an incredibly important skill to have. Without this ability, 
young elephant seal pups may provoke larger bulls and get savaged; or teenage gorillas might 
obliviously draw the ire of silverbacks. This ability is also important for humans. Without the 
ability to sense status, people would not be able to maintain their position in social 
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hierarchies as effectively (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Leary et al. (1995) suggests that self-
esteem may constitute a ‘sociometer’ or a form of social perception. That self-esteem may 
help people perceive dominance hierarchies and keep people safe from threats of exclusion 
(Leary et al., 1995).  
Sociometer theory and the importance of social status 
While feeling good about oneself can be pleasurable, it may not always be desirable. 
Deference to someone bigger or more powerful may help people with lower status to stay 
safe. If an apprentice attempts to humiliate their boss the results are likely to be 
professionally catastrophic. The reverse, while no more desirable, is unlikely to bear the same 
consequences for the aggressor. If people misjudge their social worth and agitate a socially 
dominant rival they may find themselves isolated from the rest of their group. Leary et al. 
(1995) speculated that self-esteem may act as a form of social perception: drops in self-
esteem may indicate a drop in status and a threat of exclusion. Fluctuations in self-esteem 
may help people operate within social structures, similarly to how other species moderate 
their behaviour within pecking orders. Self-esteem may operate like an emotional alarm 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000). When more powerful people are around, it may be beneficial to 
defer to them rather than risking one’s personal safety. 
 According to sociometer theory, people experience high self-esteem when they are 
included and have higher social status (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). High self-esteem has the 
effect of emboldening individuals so they capitalise on their social status. Low self-esteem 
may occur when social currency is low and makes individuals cautious and deferential. Leary 
et al. (1995) claimed that the ability to perceive social status and operate within groups has 
been essential in our evolutionary past. Individuals who were insensitive to social cues from 
others (especially from higher status rivals) were ostracised and, without the shared resources 
of their group, failed to pass on their genes. Those individuals whose self-esteem dropped in 
15 
 
response to social failure may have been sufficiently inhibited such that they did not further 
aggravate dominant rivals and were able to remain in the group, thereby increasing their 
reproductive fitness. Self-esteem would therefore form an essential role in navigating perilous 
social circumstances and make individuals’ behaviour sensitive to their current social status. 
Much evidence supports the sociometer theory of self-esteem. Self-esteem rises and 
falls with perceived rejection, social estrangement (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Leary, 
Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Reitz, Motti-Stefanidi, & Asendorpf, 2016), and is linked 
to social network size (Marshall et al., 2014). The ability to track your social status may be an 
important skill for operating in social hierarchies. This means that low self-esteem can be 
protective in many scenarios. But while self-esteem may be adaptive in some contexts, in 
other scenarios it can cause problems. For example, some individuals have self-esteem, 
which is highly unstable. Labile self-esteem tends to be associated with poorer outcomes 
(Crocker & Park, 2004). 
Self-esteem lability 
While low self-esteem may serve an adaptive social function, excessively unstable 
self-esteem has been shown to predict a wide range of negative outcomes (Kernis, 2005). 
Self-esteem variability is a better predictor of depression than the mean level of self-esteem 
(Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994). Unstable self-esteem tends to be partly caused by a 
tendency to make trait attributions (Hayes, Harris, & Carver, 2004). This tendency makes 
adverse interpersonal events more threatening as they are reflected onto the self and thought 
to be evidence of defectiveness. As a result, self-esteem can vary rapidly depending on 
whether one has recently received positive or negative feedback (Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, 
Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000). 
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The result of unstable self-esteem is a weaker sense of self even at times when self-
esteem is high (Kernis et al., 2000). People with unstable self-esteem tend to avoid situations 
where their self-esteem may be threatened. They have reduced curiosity, increased 
defensiveness and tend to avoid challenges (Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, 2008; Waschull & 
Kernis, 1996). 
Addressing the Harms of Self-esteem 
Self-esteem is not a simple construct. Low self-esteem tends to be associated with 
negative outcomes. At the same time, rigid self-concepts may impede people’s natural sense 
to track social self-worth, potentially leading to social dysfunction and narcissism (Neff, 
2009). By the same token, highly labile self-esteem may also cause problems (Kernis, 
Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993). Boosting self-esteem in individuals with fragile self-
worth could harm the stability of their self-esteem. Increased self-esteem lability may then 
increase defensiveness as they cling to their positive self-concepts and try to protect it from 
harm (Kernis et al., 2008). This presents a challenge for policy makers trying to address the 
harms of low self-esteem. Even if someone’s level of self-esteem is improved temporarily, 
unless their resilience is also improved they may still be vulnerable in the future. 
Additionally, making people insensitive to social rejection may not be a desirable goal. Self-
esteem which never falls could be symptomatic of narcissism, and may prevent people from 
connecting with others (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015; Leary et al., 1995; Neff, 2009).  
Despite these considerations low self-esteem is still related to a wide range of 
negative outcomes. Persistent low self-esteem can be particularly toxic because, people who 
suffer frequent failures become increasingly submissive which prevents them taking action 
which could improve their situation (Shrauger & Sorman, 1977). So while the way to manage 
low self-esteem is not clear-cut, it is clear that it does need to be managed. The most 
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straightforward way that researchers and policymakers have tried to intervene on low self-
esteem is through self-esteem training. 
Self-esteem training: dissecting the self-esteem movement. 
Self-esteem has long been considered a variable of interest for policy makers and 
researchers due to its association with a wide range of negative outcomes (Baumeister et al., 
2003; Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). In a longitudinal study Trzesniewski et al. (2006) 
showed that adolescents with low self-esteem were at increased risk of mental and physical 
health problems, and had lower economic prospects later in life. Researchers and policy 
makers have attempted to address the harms of low self-esteem using two main strategies: 
altering the valence of self-esteem itself (Kahne, 1996) and/or decoupling low self-esteem 
from negative outcomes (Ciarrochi, Atkins, Hayes, Sahdra, & Parker, 2016; Levin, Luoma, & 
Haeger, 2015).  
Historically, researchers and policy makers have sought to directly change the valence 
of self-esteem (Guindon, 2009). This approach targets the content of an individual’s mind, 
their thoughts, and feelings about themselves. The aim is to prevent or reduce the extent to 
which people have negative thoughts about themselves. Interventions aiming to boost self-
esteem were widespread during the ‘self-esteem movement’ (Baumeister et al., 2003). 
Spurred by research into the detrimental effects of low self-esteem, many policy makers in 
the 60s and 70s viewed self-esteem training as a panacea to almost all societal ills (Guindon, 
2009; Swann Jr et al., 2007). Policy makers assumed that if children’s self-esteem was raised 
early on, that they would be healthier, more successful and productive later in life. Self-
esteem training was seen as a way to improve health, educational outcomes and social 
cohesion while simultaneously reducing crime and drug use (Baumeister et al., 2003). These 
good intentions however, did not translate into good results. This was partly due to the overly 
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simplistic models of self-esteem upon which these interventions were built. While nuanced 
self-esteem interventions have shown that improving specific self-concepts can be effective 
for improving specific outcomes (O'Mara, Marsh, Craven, & Debus, 2006), interventions 
designed by educational departments and delivered by teachers, were often generated without 
reference to theory, instead relying on simplistic messages such as ‘every child is special’ 
(Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).  
This crude form of self-esteem training was widely rolled out and yielded inconsistent 
and disappointing results (Baumeister et al., 2003; Guindon, 2009). These mixed results led 
to criticisms of self-esteem as a concept, claiming that any attempts to change the valence of 
self-esteem would be ineffective at best and harmful at worst (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2003; 
Crocker & Park, 2004; Dweck, 2000; Neff, 2009). Baumeister et al. (2003) claimed that 
while self-esteem was a ‘seductive’ construct it has little utility in psychological science from 
an interventionist perspective. 
These cynical reactions may have been symptomatic of frustration with the self-
esteem movement rather than with the science of self-esteem (Marsh & Craven, 2006). 
Despite these strong criticisms, researchers in the field have argued that the failures of the 
self-esteem movement were not due to any weaknesses in the construct, but rather due to 
weaknesses in those specific interventions. Marsh and Craven (2006) argued that the 
criticisms of the construct tended to rely on simplistic models of self-esteem. For instance, 
few of these interventions recognised multi-dimensional aspects of self-worth. 
The multidimensional self 
Self-esteem is often framed as being unidimensional, this implies that people make 
one single value judgement about their worth. In aggregate this is loosely true (Shavelson, 
Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). But humans have complex social lives which means they are often 
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operating in multiple social hierarchies simultaneously. For instance, among someone’s 
friends, they may be regarded as witty and highly respected. At work they could be renowned 
for being bad at their job. And they could be just average at swimming. 
 In order to complete in all these social races, people require a way to track their 
attributes in a wide range of dimensions. This means that we can like certain aspects of 
ourselves more than other aspects. When we make global assessments of self-worth, these 
assessments are generally based on how we view the self in specific dimensions. For instance 
someone might feel that overall they are a good person (global assessment), because they 
make friends easily (social self-concept), they are kind to those around them (moral self-
concept), and they work hard and do well at school (academic self-concept) (Shavelson et al., 
1976). Further down this hierarchy they could have more specific self-concepts. For instance, 
they could feel that academically they are an average student, because while they are 
competitive when it comes to mathematics and physics, they are not at all good at art or 
English. Self-esteem (considered to be a global self-concept) in this model sits on top of a 
hierarchy of more specific yet correlated self-concepts (Shavelson et al., 1976). 
In the Shavelson et al. (1976) formulation, changes in self-esteem can be traced back 
to changes in more specific self-concepts, lower down the hierarchy. While self-esteem is 
reflective of perceived social worth (Leary et al., 1995), we consider ourselves high or low 
worth based on a wide number of domains. A reduction in self-esteem could for instance be a 
function of a drop in one’s academic self-concept which in turn was due to a poor 
performance on a maths test. Conversely the model proposed by Shavelson et al. (1976) 
suggests that in order to change global self-esteem, generally one must target a combination 
of lower order self-concepts. Additionally, to maximise the effectiveness of interventions, 
researchers have argued that interventions should target self-concepts which exist in similar 
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domains to the desired outcome. This is often referred to as the specificity matching principle 
(Swann Jr et al., 2007). 
The specificity matching principle suggests that specific outcomes will be more 
strongly related to self-concepts which are in the same domain (Swann Jr et al., 2007). For 
example, someone’s academic performance should be more influenced by how good they feel 
they are at school (domain matched), than how good they feel about their sporting ability 
(domain contrast), or by their self-worth generally (domain general) (Marsh & O'Mara, 
2008). Evidence for the specificity matching principle has been found across all domains of 
self-concept (Swann Jr et al., 2007). For instance, while global self-concept (self-esteem) has 
been inconsistently related to academic achievement, academic self-concept is consistently 
shown to be strongly, reciprocally related to academic achievement (Marsh & Craven, 2006). 
That is, higher academic self-concept tends to result in improved academic achievement, 
which in turn results in improved academic self-concept. 
Marsh and Craven (2006) claim that part of the reason that the self-esteem movement 
failed to achieve its aims was due to interventionists failing to match self-concepts to 
outcomes. Self-esteem was expected to do too much, and success was measured too 
nebulously. Further, contrary to the predictions made by Shavelson et al. (1976), self-esteem 
is less stable than specific self-concepts. Respondents often rate their self-esteem in response 
to short-term events and mood (Marsh & Craven, 2006). This fits with Leary’s (2000) 
conceptualisation of self-esteem as an internal indicator of social status and security. This 
presents challenges in understanding people’s baseline level of self-esteem from single 
measurements. 
Research into the multi-dimensional self suggests that interventions which target 
specific self-concepts may be more effective than those which target general self-esteem 
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(Marsh & Craven, 2006). But research into how self-concepts are formed and maintained 
presents interventionists with another challenge. Self-esteem and self-concept are made 
through comparisons. This means that it is difficult to raise one person’s self-concept, 
without lowering that of another. 
External frames of reference and the Big Fish Little Pond Effect. 
At its core, self-esteem is social. If you ask someone the question, “How valuable are 
you?” everyone can come up with their own answer to this question as it is not strictly 
defined. For instance, someone could be tall, have nice hair, have excellent yo-yo skills, be a 
smooth talker, or be two standard deviations above the mean at calculus. But all these 
considerations are relative. Without anything concrete people are left to make value 
judgements based on social comparisons which are highly context-dependent. The extent to 
which people feel tall, partly depends on the height of those around them. Even if someone is 
six feet tall, if the average height of their family is six feet and five inches, they may still 
identify as being short. This means that people feel valuable not based on their qualities 
alone, but based on the differences between their qualities and the qualities of those around 
them (Marsh & Hau, 2003).  
Social comparisons drive what has been dubbed the “Big Fish Little Pond Effect”. 
Research into the Big Fish Little Pond Effect has shown that the self-concept and 
performance of students is harmed by surrounding them with other high performing students 
(Marsh & Hau, 2003). Often parents will send their children to selective schools to maximise 
their children’s talents. But this act may actually compromise their self-esteem thereby 
reducing their performance (Marsh & Hau, 2003). For instance, consider a high performing 
child near the end of elementary school. Because they are one of the best in their class they 
are likely to receive a boost to their academic self-concept (Marsh, 1990a). This helps 
improve grades in a reciprocal relationship (Marsh & Craven, 2006); that is academic self-
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concept improves grades which in turn improves academic self-concept. This boost to their 
academic performance increases their chances of getting into a selective high school. 
However, now rather than being in the top of the class they are only average. This may 
compromise the extent to which they feel competent, lowering their self-concept and harming 
their performance. Previously, this child was figuratively a big fish in a little pond. But now 
their only reference point is other academic titans; as a result their self-worth is likely to drop, 
which hampers their performance. Paradoxically, that student may have performed better if 
they went to an average high school (Marsh & Hau, 2003).  
Surrounding a student with other students with high self-esteem compromises their 
self-concepts (Marsh & Hau, 2003). This is a major limitation which must be taken into 
account when trying to design interventions aiming to improve outcomes by targeting self-
esteem. As self-esteem often involves social comparisons, telling an entire group that they are 
all special is unlikely to improve their self-worth. People do not want to be average. For 
instance, if someone is told “you’re below average in attractiveness, but don’t worry because 
everyone is pretty good-looking”, they are likely to still get offended. Stressing to children 
that everyone is valuable will not necessarily make anyone feel valuable. To paraphrase 
Carlin (2008): if we are all special, then the whole idea loses all its meaning. 
Internal frames of reference 
Even in individuals it is difficult to improve self-esteem in one domain without 
harming it in another. Self-esteem is affected by internal frames of reference. That is, we 
judge each of our traits by referencing our other attributes. Our self-concepts do not exist 
within vacuums, they interact with each other. Marsh (1986) noted that although achievement 
across domains e.g. English and mathematics are highly correlated, self-concepts related to 
those domains are not. This is because we make value judgements about our traits by 
comparing them to one another. This means that what makes someone a ‘maths person’ is not 
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just their performance in maths, but also the fact that they are better at maths relative to other 
subjects. This boost in mathematics self-concept tends to improve future math performance 
thereby solidifying this self-concept (Marsh & O'Mara, 2008). 
This means that improvements in one area of self-esteem tend to correspond to 
decreases in others. If someone is an average English student, but also a fantastic maths 
student, they might still have the impression that they are bad at English, due to this internal 
comparison. This creates further issues when trying to raise self-esteem. A successful 
intervention on one domain of self-esteem has the potential to sabotage self-concepts in other 
domains. 
Problems with trying to change the valence of global self-esteem 
The above sections have argued that self-esteem is a complicated and multi-faceted 
construct. While self-esteem is a primary driver of wellbeing and behaviour, it is by no means 
simple to intervene on. After all, self-esteem corresponds to social status. While it may be 
possible to inflate someone’s social worth in the short term, their interactions with others will 
quickly bring them a reality check of where they fall in a given pecking order (Baumeister et 
al., 2003; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). 
Further what does it mean to raise everyone’s self-esteem? Can we really flatten 
social hierarchies? Is that even desirable? While targeting specific self-concepts can be highly 
effective (O'Mara et al., 2006) due to the complexity of self-esteem, and the potential social 
value of fluctuations in self-esteem (Leary & Downs, 1995), it may not make sense to try and 
raise self-esteem in entire populations. As self-concepts rely on internal and external 
comparisons, it is hard to improve self-esteem in one person, without harming it in another. 
Additionally, efforts to praise children with low self-esteem in order to improve their self-
concepts have been found to be unhelpful in many cases. Praise intended to improve self-
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esteem can result in children holding themselves to higher standards resulting in challenge 
avoidance (Brummelman, Thomaes, Orobio de Castro, Overbeek, & Bushman, 2014).  
Despite these challenges, self-views are still critically important. Viewing the self 
negatively can cause depression, and wide reaching problems. Not only does low self-esteem 
lead to a wide range of negative outcomes, but these relationships often include feedback 
loops. For instance, much work has shown that specific domains of self-esteem reciprocally 
predict a wide range of outcomes such as academic achievement, where low self-concept 
predicts poorer achievement and visa-versa (Marsh & O'Mara, 2008). More generally, there 
is evidence that low self-esteem reciprocally predicts lower wellbeing. Ciarrochi, Heaven, 
and Davies (2007) found that low self-esteem leads to increases in sadness, which in turn, 
leads to decreases in self-esteem, forming a downward spiral. While self-concept 
interventions are effective at increasing specific outcomes, the dream of a global intervention 
to improve all facets of life seems unrealistic. Given work into the importance of self-esteem 
in social perception, assuming that high self-esteem is always good and low self-esteem is 
always bad may be overly simplistic (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). 
Decoupling self-esteem from negative outcomes 
It may not make sense to try and alter people’s global self-esteem. But that does not 
mean that the negative outcomes associated with low self-esteem cannot be addressed. 
Persistent low self-esteem is problematic. It makes individuals physiologically and 
psychologically reactive (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981; Peterson, 2018). It also increases 
submissiveness and reduces persistence, which prevents people from making positive 
changes that might improve their situation (Leary & Downs, 1995). Low social status is in 
many ways an emergency, and these sorts of strategies may help people in the short term 
(Leary & Downs, 1995; Peterson, 2018), but chronic stress is harmful. 
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Rather than trying to reduce the source of social stress, is it possible to improve how 
people respond to social stress? To what degree can low self-esteem be decoupled from 
negative outcomes? Prior research suggests that the outcomes of low self-esteem are not 
fixed, but depend on context (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). For example, having more self-
compassion may reduce the strength of the relationship between self-esteem and mental 
illness (Marshall et al., 2015). Similarly, low self-esteem individuals’ depressed reactions to 
failures have shorter durations when individuals tend not to make trait attributions (Metalsky, 
Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993). By finding contextual factors that improve resilience, 
and reduce the harmful effects of self-esteem, outcomes can be improved without having to 
change the valence of self-esteem. Not only does this solution avoid the challenges of self-
esteem training, but it also may reduce experiential avoidance (attempting to avoid negative 
self-concepts), which can be harmful in its own right (Gámez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, 
& Watson, 2011). 
Dangers of rejecting painful experiences 
Many researchers warn against attempts to change the content of experience. 
Research related to Acceptance and Commitment Therapies (ACT) (Hayes, 2004) suggests 
that treating painful thoughts and feelings as pathologies may make people attempt to push 
them away. This can create cycles of struggle which make those painful experiences more 
salient and therefore potentially more intrusive and damaging (Harris, 2006). Pushing away 
experiences is often referred to as experiential avoidance and has been related to a range of 
problematic outcomes (Sahdra, Ciarrochi, Parker, & Scrucca, 2016).  
Animals tend to seek pleasure and avoid pain. These basic drives enable organisms to 
seek out opportunities and avoid threats hence improving the likelihood of reproductive 
success (Dawkins, 2009). When it comes to physical pain, avoidant behaviour is almost 
always protective. By anticipating bodily harm and responding rapidly to pain cues, severe 
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injuries can be prevented (Loeser & Melzack, 1999). When it comes to emotional pain 
however, this avoidant behaviour can have unintended consequences. While physical and 
emotional pain rely on common neurological circuitry (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004), 
emotional pain, unlike physical pain, does not have reliable causes or effects. While an 
intense burning sensation will reliably follow touching a hot pan, and indicate structural 
damage, the causes and consequences of emotional pain are much less certain. In humans, 
emotional pain is often caused or in many cases maintained through thoughts, which are 
predominantly experienced through language (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). Following a life 
and death situation with a lion, a gazelle, without therapy, can quickly calm down and return 
to grazing. Humans, on the other hand, may verbally obsess over even minor life events 
constantly retriggering painful emotions (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). Given a certain event, 
for example, rejection, thoughts can vary on three important dimensions: form, frequency and 
function (Hayes, 2004). ‘Form’ refers to the content of the thought. For example, someone 
could respond to failure with thoughts such as “I am worthless” or “I need to try harder”. 
‘Frequency’ refers to the fact that thoughts can occur at different rates e.g. just once or 
continually for hours, and ‘function’ refers to the fact that an identical thought can have 
various consequences. For example, the thought “I am single again” could cause feelings of 
hopelessness and depressed mood, or enthusiasm and optimism depending on how much a 
person liked their ex-partner, how desirable they perceive themselves to be, and how much 
they are looking forward to dating someone new. As such, while avoiding physical pain is 
often a good strategy, when it comes to emotional pain things are not as straightforward. 
Research has consistently shown that attempts to push emotional pain away often 
make matters worse rather than better (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
Attempting to push negative thoughts and experiences away has a spotlight effect, where 
distressing thoughts become more salient (Hayes et al., 2006). By trying to reject painful 
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thoughts, they can get interpreted as being more threatening, this results in further obsessing 
and rumination (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). Research has shown that attempting to avoid 
negative emotions is linked to mental ill-health and a wide range of maladaptive behaviours 
such as substance abuse (Hayes, 2004). As such, attempts to change the level of self-esteem 
risk unintentionally drawing more attention to feelings of low self-worth, hence reducing 
psychological flexibility and enhancing negative outcomes. 
Defusion 
 Dweck (2000) suggests that overemphasising self-esteem can cause people to cling to 
positive self-concepts. This can cause stress when those self-concepts are eventually 
challenged. If feelings of low self-worth should not be pushed away, how can their harmful 
effects be avoided? Often negative thoughts are seen as problems which need to be solved. In 
many cases, however, it is people’s reactions to thoughts which causes damage rather than 
the content of the thought itself.  
When two people experience an identical thought, it would seem rational to expect 
that these thoughts would have the same consequences. However, the content of thoughts 
does not have intrinsic meaning. Thoughts are interpreted via a deep web of mental 
relationships (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). As a result, we can react to the same 
thought e.g. “I am a failure” differently depending on the time of day, other thoughts we have 
had recently, what we take concepts such as ‘failure’ to mean, and how we view the ourselves 
generally. Relational Frame Theory (RFT) predicts that the function (or consequences) of 
thoughts is dependent on the extent to which they are believed to be literally true (Hayes, 
2004). Hence a thought such as “here comes a shark” results in varying degrees of distress 
depending on whether you find yourself in open water or a bathtub. When thoughts are 
treated as if they were literally true, rather than viewing them as transient experiences, we 
allow them to alter the way we view ourselves. This makes those thoughts more powerful and 
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potentially more distressing. Our thoughts have become “fused” to the self. In this state 
words are not mere language but reflective of the value and worth of the self. 
Various therapies have been developed to try and address cognitive fusion. ACT 
includes a task to reduce the believability and as a result, the negative consequences of 
thoughts (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). Subjects are instructed to continually 
repeat a harmful thought for long periods to time e.g. thirty seconds or more. By repeating 
harmful thoughts, the words which originally evoked pain, now just sound like babbling. The 
thought has been separated from its meaning. With successive trials, repeating a painful 
thought substantially reduces the extent that it causes distress (Masuda et al., 2004). Other 
approaches attempt to reduce cognitive fusion by changing the relationship to experiences 
generally. Mindfulness meditation, for instance, encourages people to relate to their 
experiences in an attentive non-judgemental fashion (Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). 
During mindfulness practice hurtful thoughts are encoded as raw experience. For example, if 
a mindfulness practitioner experiences the thought “I am loveable”, rather than holding onto 
that thought and obsessing over its meaning, they would just watch the sound and shape of 
the thought, and let it go to make room for the next experience. In this way thoughts and 
emotions are encoded as mere abstract experiences devoid of meaning, and ruminative 
downward spirals can be avoided. This perspective promotes a different view of the self. 
Rather than the self being identical to content (thoughts and experiences) the self becomes the 
space where these experiences arise. 
Self as content vs self as context 
Merely walking down the street generates immense brain activity. Our retinas are 
bombarded with constantly changing visual information. Our ears detect a cacophony of 
sounds, and our bodies constantly send a complicated array of nervous impulses to the brain 
in order to provide feedback on everything from balance and posture to temperature. But just 
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a single self-critical thought can be enough to have all of this information filtered out of 
conscious awareness leaving us aware only of the words “I’m a failure”. In this moment the 
distance between one’s thoughts and what they perceive to be the self completely collapses; 
they are not aware that they are thinking about being a failure, they are aware that they are a 
failure. 
It is natural to feel as though the self is identical to our thoughts and feelings as these 
are some of the most powerful experiences we have. In Relation Frame Theory (RFT) the 
experience of being somehow reflected in one’s thoughts and feelings is referred to as “self 
as content” (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). While feeling that your thoughts 
and feelings say something tangible about you is deeply intuitive, it is not necessarily 
rational. If one moment you are thinking about being a failure, and in the next you are being 
proud of an achievement or thinking about pizza, which thought gets to define who or what 
you are? How are we ever convinced that whatever thought is currently crossing our busy 
minds is in some way self-defining? Given that the contents of conscious awareness are 
constantly shifting and changing it makes sense that the self must be bigger and more stable 
than any individual thought or feeling that crosses the ‘theatre of the mind’ (Harris, 2014; 
Hume, 2003). Experiencing the self as a container for experiences rather than those 
experiences themselves is referred to as ‘self as context’ (Hayes et al., 2006). Research has 
shown that viewing the self-more flexibly as a container for experience, rather than individual 
experiences predicts improved wellbeing longitudinally over periods of 6 – 12 months 
(Atkins & Styles, 2016). This orientation allows people to let go of painful experiences rather 
than be caught up with worry that they are deeply meaningful and may say something 
ominous about a personal defect. 
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Addressing low self-esteem by targeting one’s perception of the nature of the self 
The prior sections have demonstrated that multiple contextual factors influence how 
individual thoughts and feelings affect us. Interventions that target the valence of self-esteem 
often assume that the self is identical to thoughts and feelings. If the intervention can replace 
negative self-talk “I am worthless”, with positive self-talk “I am good enough” then the 
quality of the self has in some way changed. Thoughts such as these however are not 
constant; they disappear and appear, and have different effects depending on context (Hayes 
& Ciarrochi, 2015). For most people who would be classed as having low self-esteem, much 
of the day they may be fully immersed in activities, and only engage in negative self-talk 
following contextual triggers like failure (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). If the self is 
identical to the contents of thoughts, in moments of flow (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2014) can anyone be said to have low self-esteem?  
Contextual behaviourists challenge the assertion that the self can be defined in terms 
of contents of thought, instead they describe what we think of the self as behaviour. Thoughts 
of worthlessness under this model are not reflective of any stable aspect of the self, but are 
merely behaviour akin to yawning which is dependent on context. Just as we are more or less 
likely to yawn depending on how tired we and others around us are, we are more or less 
likely to have negative thoughts depending on the context we find ourselves in. Similarly 
context effects the consequences of thoughts just like any behaviour. Yawning is fairly 
innocuous when one is trying to sleep, but during a marriage proposal it is likely to evoke a 
range of interesting behaviours and emotions. Similarly, thoughts of worthlessness may in 
some contexts be harmful, yet in others be relatively benign (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015; 
Marshall et al., 2015; Metalsky et al., 1993) 
Context under this formulation includes not only the external environment, but also 
the internal environment. In defusion interventions, the target is not the thought that is 
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experienced as painful for example, “I am fat”, but rather other cognitions that relate to that 
thought, that is, “this painful thought is meaningful and literally true”. 
In terms of self-esteem interventions, rather than encouraging people to strive for 
positive self-concepts, interventionists can target the internal context where self-evaluations 
occur. For instance rather than targeting the thought “I feel worthless”, it may be just as 
effective to change beliefs about the self (Dweck, 2000) which make that thought damaging 
in the first place. In this way it may be possible to address the harms of self-esteem without 
manipulating self-concepts.  
Changing contextual factors that make low self-esteem harmful has advantages over 
raising self-esteem, as the pursuit of self-esteem can be maladaptive (Crocker & Park, 2004). 
Dweck (2000) has argued that by attempting to raise self-esteem, we inadvertently teach 
people to cling to positive self-concepts. While this may have short term benefits it may 
cause distress in the longer term, when these positive self-views are inevitably challenged. 
Challenging perceptions of self-malleability may be one way to change the internal context 
within which negative self-evaluations occur thereby making them less damaging (Hayes & 
Ciarrochi, 2015).  
Self-esteem and the fixed self 
Failure is inevitable in life. Even if someone has the good fortune to have a childhood 
free of rejection, hurt, or failure, inevitably their luck is likely to run out and their self-esteem 
will, at least temporarily, plummet (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). In that moment, some people 
seem to become trapped by low self-esteem and enter downward spirals where low self-
esteem leads to reduced wellbeing and performance. This feeds back into lower self-esteem, 
whereas others will escape relatively unscathed. What is it in people’s internal context which 
leaves some people vulnerable to low self-esteem and others resilient? 
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 Metalsky et al. (1993) showed that a tendency to make trait attributions leads to 
poorer outcomes in people with low self-esteem. Following a negative test result at college, 
all students tended to have immediate depressive reactions. These reactions for most students 
were generally brief. However, students with low self-esteem who also tended to make 
attribute failures to the self, continued having depressive reactions days later. Can failures be 
prevented from being attributed to stable elements of the self? 
Research has shown that the extent to which the self is perceived to be malleable 
impacts the degree to which people make trait attributions (Dweck et al., 1995; Levy, 
Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). Belief in a flexible self may be one way to decouple low self-
esteem from negative outcomes. Low self-esteem is threatening not just because it is 
associated with increased challenge but because it might be evidence of enduring 
defectiveness. Someone might ask themselves why they are worse than others. What is it 
about them that makes life so hard? They could conclude that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with them that makes them inferior to others. This conclusion, if made, 
would likely be particularly disheartening. Not only is your life currently painful, but due to 
some deep personal deficiency, save for pure luck, it always will be. This perspective may 
also limit a sense of internal locus of control. That is, you may feel that you have little control 
over your current struggles. If the problem you face is something fundamental to your 
character, you may perceive there to be fewer ways to address it.  
By seeing the self as ever changing and malleable, failures may not be attributed to 
fixed aspects of the self. Implicit malleability theories may prevent self-esteem falling while 
simultaneously reducing the harms of low self-esteem. Research into implicit malleability 
theories and its potential role in buffering the negative effects of low self-esteem is discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter summary 
In summary, the ‘self’ is at the core of human experience and facilitates the ability to 
strategize and cooperate with others. Having the ability to perceive one’s own self enables 
social comparisons and for people to judge their worth relative to others. While self-esteem 
may help people operate in dominance hierarchies (Leary & Downs, 1995), it also is strongly 
linked to a wide range of positive outcomes such as wellbeing and performance (Robins & 
Trzesniewski, 2005). Interventionists who have tried to improve these outcomes via 
improving global self-esteem have achieved mixed results. This is partly due to the failure of 
these models to recognise the domain specificity principle, and the fact that self-esteem is 
based upon social comparison, making population-wide interventions difficult. An alternative 
approach to addressing the harms of self-esteem is decoupling it from negative outcomes. 
The consequences of self-esteem are affected by internal contextual factors. Perceived self-
malleability may be one such factor. Chapter 2 examines implicit malleability theories and 
the extent to which they may moderate the effects of low self-esteem. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FIXED AND MALLEABLE SELF 
“Ever tried. Ever failed. No Matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” 
      Samuel Beckett (1983, pg. 7)  
Introduction 
Beliefs shape the world we live in 
Beliefs are important. Often people treat beliefs as if they were private events that 
have little bearing on the external world. Across the dinner table even the strangest of 
theories can be defended from scrutiny with the hasty utterance “but that’s just my belief”. 
But rather than being purely personal events, beliefs are a very real part of our environment. 
Beliefs change the way we see ourselves and the world, and accordingly they have very real 
consequences for behaviour. Take for instance a belief once held by Netsilik Inuits, that 
during birth newborns give off a deadly vapour. Mothers in labour were considered so 
dangerous that they were confined to small huts to give birth in total isolation, so as to protect 
the rest of the community from mortal danger (Edgerton, 2010). This belief cannot be 
considered objectively true, but it changed behaviour meaningfully nonetheless. Beliefs 
change how we interpret things as opportunities or threats and as a result change our 
reactions to internal and external events (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). 
The effects of explicit beliefs such as the example given above are easy to draw 
attention to, but all our conceptions of the world are similarly couched in deep webs of 
meaning (Hayes et al., 2001). The way that we believe different aspects of the world 
function, changes our behaviour. In Chapter 1 I discussed the consequences of belief in the 
value of the self and its radical consequences for behaviour. But there are many ways to 
conceive of the self. These various self-conceptions may not operate in vacuums, but may 
change the outcomes associated with each other. 
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 For instance, just as the self can be viewed on a spectrum of being valuable to not 
valuable, it can also be viewed on a dimension of malleability. Researchers have shown that 
people respond to failures and stress differently depending on how malleable they believe 
their attributes to be (Dweck, 2000). In this chapter, I introduce implicit malleability theories. 
I present research that suggests that the extent to which individuals believe their traits to be 
malleable or fixed, makes them respond differently to failure. I suggest that these behavioural 
patterns may change the way that low self-esteem is experienced and responded to. I end by 
hypothesizing that implicit theories and self-esteem may interact when predicting outcomes 
such as wellbeing and achievement. 
What are implicit theories of malleability? 
Implicit theories of malleability are perceptions of how flexible certain characteristics 
are (Hong et al., 1999). Research into implicit malleability theories places people on a 
spectrum of perceived malleability. On one end of this spectrum are those who believe traits 
are highly malleable. These people are often referred to as incremental theorists (Dweck et 
al., 1995) or are sometimes said to have a ‘growth mindset’. On the other end of the spectrum 
are those who believe certain traits are fixed. These individuals are referred to as entity 
theorists or are sometimes said to have a ‘fixed mindset’ (Dweck et al., 1995). The extent to 
which traits are perceived to be malleable has been shown to have relevance to how 
individuals approach learning and relate themselves, others, and the world (Dweck, 2000). 
Just as self-esteem can vary across different domains, people also hold multiple 
implicit theories. While some people may staunchly believe that anyone can learn to paint if 
they give it a go, they may simultaneously believe that to do well in maths you just have to be 
a certain kind of person (Dweck et al., 1995). As such, implicit theories are measured in 
specific domains rather than globally. For any given trait e.g. intelligence, people differ 
regarding their perceived stability of the trait. Some might feel that intelligence is fluid and 
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can be significantly changed through effort, whereas others believe intelligence is a fixed 
resource; set in stone. Regardless of the objective reality of these beliefs, feeling that 
attributes are more malleable prevents hopeless responses to failure and challenge (Hu, Chen, 
& Tian, 2015). When researchers refer to ‘incremental theorists’ they typically mean people 
who hold ‘incremental theories’ in a particular domain, as opposed to any broader class of 
person. 
Implicit theories as self-efficacy for improvement 
Research into implicit malleability theories arose partly from Albert Bandura’s body 
of work on perceived self-efficacy. Perceived self-efficacy refers to the extent to which 
individuals feel confident that they have the capabilities and resources to accomplish discrete 
tasks (Bandura, 1977). Research has consistently shown that perceived self-efficacy is linked 
to the frequency with which tasks are attempted (McAuley, 1992), the extent to which 
individuals use coping strategies during challenges (Luszczynska, Schwarzer, Lippke, & 
Mazurkiewicz, 2011), and how well individuals perform on tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1998). If someone believes that they do not have the resources to perform well on an 
upcoming test, their efforts will feel futile, they may be less engaged with study and as a 
result their performance could be sabotaged (Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991). Alternatively, if 
they are highly confident in their ability to use computers, they may be more willing to 
fearlessly play around when learning new software. This learning orientation would aid 
mastery and reinforce positive self-concepts.  
But given our innate capacity to learn and acquire new skills, why is low self-efficacy 
and failure so detrimental to our motivation? Even if someone is bad at something now, why 
would that deficit not just motivate them to learn from their mistakes and improve? Dweck 
and Reppucci (1973) noted that failure only seems to lead to feelings of helplessness in some 
37 
 
people. They found that subjects who attributed their failures to stable aspects of the self 
(ability) as opposed to behaviour (effort) tended to be less engaged and did not persist as long 
following challenges. Dweck (1975) reasoned that people may be protected from learned 
helplessness if they were taught to attribute failures to effort rather than ability, thereby 
taking having an internal locus of control. Dweck (1986) suggested that people who believed 
their attributes were malleable would see failure as part of a learning process and so would 
not be discouraged. On the other hand those who saw their attributes as fixed would see 
failures as indicators of personal deficiencies and as a result display helpless response 
patterns. Implicit malleability theories can be thought of as drivers of perceived self-efficacy 
for improvement. According to Expectancy Value Theory (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), 
individuals should be interested in learning and remediation to the extent that they believe 
they will gain things of value by doing so. As learning is only likely to be perceived as 
beneficial to those who believe that their traits can be improved, it makes sense that these 
individuals would be more interested in self-improvement.  
The consequences of fixed and malleable self-theories 
Mueller and Dweck (1998) showed that changing the way children are praised could 
manipulate their implicit malleability theories. The researchers split a group of fifth graders 
into two groups (with a third neutral control condition) and asked them to complete a series 
of ability tests. Through praise, students were implicitly encouraged to believe that talent was 
either innate or malleable. In one group, students were praised for ability (for example, “You 
must be smart at these problems”). In the other group students were praised for effort (for 
example, “You must have worked hard at these problems”). Ability praise was theorised to 
implicitly communicate that talent was innate, whereas effort praise was thought to suggest 
that talent could be developed.  In line with the authors’ hypotheses, students who were 
praised for ability blamed their failures on a lack of intrinsic ability, and were less likely to 
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seek out challenges. Students praised for effort on the other hand did not make trait 
attributions from their failures and sought out harder tasks. Further, despite no original 
difference in ability, by the end of the experiment students praised for ability performed 
significantly worse on even the easiest tasks which they had previously performed at 
competitively. 
This pattern of results has been found in many experiments and across multiple 
domains. Relative to entity theorists (who perceive traits to be fixed), incremental theorists 
(who perceive traits to be malleable) tend to have greater interest in learning and self-
development (Dweck et al., 1995; Mueller & Dweck, 1998), and respond more adaptively to 
failure. Following failure incremental theorists tend to have increased persistence (Kasimatis, 
Miller, & Marcussen, 1996; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Spray, Wang, Biddle, Chatzisarantis, & 
Warburton, 2006), reduced negative self-relevant emotion (Hu et al., 2015), less shame 
(Robins & Pals, 2002), and reduced feelings of helplessness (Davis, Burnette, Allison, & 
Stone, 2011). These effects appear to be partly explained by lay dispositionism i.e. the 
tendency to make trait attributions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997). 
Entity theories lead to trait attributions 
Incremental theorists believe their attributes are constantly changing; who they are 
today does not necessarily say all that much about who they will be in the future. As such, 
failure cannot be reflected directly onto a stable conception of self, as the self is constantly in 
a state of flux. This means incremental theorists are less likely to make trait attributions. To 
an incremental theorist the self is a moving target and any trait attributions that are made 
quickly lose relevancy (Chiu et al., 1997). In contrast, entity theorists have rigid self-
concepts; the self is perceived to be fixed and unchanging. This makes entity theorists’ selves 
like a static target. To an entity theorist, failure becomes a means for diagnosing permanent 
flaws in both the self and or in others. Further, as ability is deemed to be fixed, the 
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identification of flaws does not lead entity theorists to have increased motivation for 
remediation as learning is perceived to be fundamentally ineffective. For entity theorists 
continued persistence is not only perceived to provide no benefit, but can also be highly 
threatening as it may open entity theorists up to embarrassment in front of others (Dweck et 
al., 1995; Stenling, Hassmén, & Holmström, 2014) who may notice their flaws. As a result, 
entity theorists are more likely to have performance orientations (Biddle, Seos, & 
Chatzisarantis, 1999; Erdley, Loomis, Cain, & Dumas-Hines, 1997; Fillmore, 2015; Leary et 
al., 1995; Stenling et al., 2014). They are less likely to approach tasks with a view to 
improve, but rather they strive to appear favourably to the self and to others. Following 
failure, entity theorists will actively avoid opportunities to remediate or receive support from 
others (Hong et al., 1999). Additionally entity theorists may avoid the domain they failed in 
altogether (Dweck, 2000), instead attempting to demonstrate their worth in other areas (Park 
& Kim, 2015). Instead of attempting to improve, entity theorists are more likely to try and 
repair their self-esteem following failure by engaging in downwards social comparisons 
(Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Dweck (2000) has suggested that entity theorists may 
contribute to cultures where high performers are denigrated, and unspoken pacts are made to 
not try too hard.  
While performance orientations may have some utility in avoiding short-term 
embarrassments, they also encourage individuals to avoid situations at the edge of their 
ability where there is greatest opportunity to improve (Dweck, 2000). In fact, in order to 
avoid embarrassment entity theorists have even been found to self-handicap, manufacturing 
injuries or deliberately reducing their effort (Ommundsen, 2001) in order to generate socially 
acceptable explanations for anticipated failure.  
In contrast, incremental theorists pay little attention to individual performances and 
have learning orientations (Biddle et al., 1999; Erdley et al., 1997; Fillmore, 2015; Leary et 
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al., 1995; Stenling et al., 2014). Failure is seen merely as a part of a process of self-
improvement and so is not intrinsically embarrassing. Even if failure is found to be aversive, 
incremental theorists tend to respond to this stress by obsessively focusing on the activity 
with a view to improve (Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Park & Kim, 2015). 
Incremental theories seem to not only promote remediation, but may also enhance the 
ability to learn. Neurological studies show that during learning, incremental theorists tend to 
have enhanced processing of errors (Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, & Dweck, 2006). In 
contrast, entity theorists tend to mentally recoil from errors. This may limit the ability of 
entity theorists to learn from their mistakes, providing further confirmation to an entity 
theorist that one’s level of ability is fixed.  
Implicit malleability theories and social failure 
Implicit malleability theories may also be protective when people experience social 
failures. In a series of experiments, Erdley et al. (1997) took primary school students and told 
them that they had an opportunity to join an international pen pal club. In order to join 
however, they first had to write a letter introducing and recommending themselves. 
Regardless of what the students wrote, all were uniformly given a response saying that based 
on what they wrote the club was not sure they wanted the student as a member and would like 
further information. While this rejection was somewhat ambiguous, for many children with 
stronger entity theories this was evidence of personal defectiveness. Those with stronger 
entity theories were more likely to conclude that they had a fundamental inability to make 
friends. 
Humans by nature are social animals, requiring relationships to survive and reproduce 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Due to the centrality of relationships to our evolutionary 
success, it is not surprising that humans need positive relationships in order to flourish. Self-
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esteem, a major driver of human emotion and behaviour, has itself been theorised to be a 
form of social perception used to facilitate healthy social interaction (Leary et al., 1995). 
Humans react to social failures in similar ways as they do to physical pain (Eisenberger & 
Lieberman, 2004; Leary et al., 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Feeling connected to others 
is not just a contributor to wellbeing, but it is a fundamental psychological need (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000). As such, social domains are almost universally valued and cannot be devalued 
in the same way that other domains can be following failures. As much as people may try to 
supplant human relationships with drugs and computer games, a failure to connect with 
others eventually catches up with people (Kaczmarek & Drążkowski, 2014). While a ‘never 
give up’ attitude may have pros and cons in many domains, in the social domain giving up 
really is not an option and incremental theories may therefore be particularly important. 
Given the abundance of social failure available to us, it is important that people can recover 
from drops in self-esteem without becoming trapped in cycles of distress and hopelessness 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2007). Incremental theories may make people more resilient in the face of 
rejection and resultant low self-esteem by changing the way people perceive the self, such 
that failures are not interpreted as personally meaningful (Niiya, Crocker, & Bartmess, 
2004a). In addition, incremental theories may reduce the pressure felt during social 
interactions (Yeager, Lee, & Jamieson, 2016) thereby improving social functioning. 
Improving social functioning by promoting incremental theories 
Implicit malleability theories change the way we view others in the same way they 
change the way we view ourselves. Just as entity theories make us more likely to attribute our 
own behaviours and failures to stable aspects of the self, entity theories also make people 
more likely to cast rigid judgements about others based on their behaviour (Erdley & Dweck, 
1993; Levy et al., 1998). Erdley and Dweck (1993) found that entity theorists formed 
judgements about others more readily based on limited behavioural information. Learning 
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that another individual had stolen something made that person fundamentally a ‘thief’. This 
had a dehumanizing effect where entity theorists showed less empathy towards these 
individuals and recommended harsher punishments for transgressions. In addition, once these 
judgements were made, entity theorists were less able to change them even when faced with 
contradictory evidence. This propensity to make quick, inflexible judgements extends to 
broader attitudes. For example, entity theories are associated with stereotyping of others 
generally (Levy et al., 1998).  
While developing heuristics can often be useful, making these inflexible judgements 
causes some social problems for entity theorists. When another person transgresses against an 
entity theorist, they tend to diagnose a defect either in themselves, resulting in lower self-
worth, or in others, which may result in feelings of enmity (Yeager, Miu, Powers, & Dweck, 
2013; Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011). This means that even when 
ambiguous slights are made against entity theorists, they are more likely to respond with 
hostility (Yeager et al., 2011). While having someone collide with you in a corridor could 
signal all manner of things, a lot of them benign (like a lack of coordination in the other 
person), an entity theorist is more likely to conclude that the behaviour occurred due to one of 
the parties being defective and then desire vengeance (Yeager et al., 2014; Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013). This could set up spiralling hostility where innocent 
transgressions get interpreted as hostile, resulting in retaliation and further altercations. 
Incremental theories on the other hand can lead to prosocial responses in the face of 
victimisation. Yeager, Trzesniewski, et al. (2013) made high school students play a game of 
‘cyber ball’ where three subjects play virtual catch with each other. Unknown to the 
participant, the two other players were in fact computer controlled agents, who after a few 
rounds excluded that real participant and threw the ball only to each other. Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, et al. (2013) gave the participants an opportunity to retaliate. Following the 
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game, participants were told that the two other players would have to eat hot sauce and that 
the participant could decide how much to allocate and could also send a note along with the 
sauce. Entity theorists tended to allocate significantly greater quantities of hot sauce to other 
players and often sent vindictive notes such as “I gave you a lot because you do not like 
spicy!” Incremental theorists on the other hand allocated less hot sauce and were more likely 
to send prosocial messages (such as warnings or apologies for being forced by the 
experimenters to allocate any sauce at all). 
Incremental theories have also been found to promote pro-sociality between groups of 
people. Researchers studying the Israeli–Palestinian conflict found that people who held 
stronger incremental theories were also more likely to harbour positive attitudes towards the 
opposing side. Furthermore, merely reading an article which suggested that group attributes 
were malleable increased the willingness of participants to meet with members of the out-
group and discuss compromises (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011).  
Finally, incremental theories may play a role in reducing the extent to which social 
situations feel pressured. As entity theories make failure feel more meaningful, entity 
theorists may feel like they are constantly at risk of discovering some horrible secret about 
themselves while socialising. This is especially so in the teenage years where self-concept is 
still forming (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015) and teenagers are still learning about themselves and 
establishing themselves in dominance hierarchies. Belief that the self can change may take 
the pressure off these situations somewhat, because even if someone is not relating to others 
in the way they would like to now, they could always change in the future. Yeager et al. 
(2016) simulated social stress in teenagers by asking them to do a speech in front of others. 
Subjects with stronger incremental theories of personality had lower levels of cortisol 
following the speech and rated the situation as less stressful. In summary, incremental 
theories may improve social functioning by preventing trait attributions following social 
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failures, by stopping hostile intent being imputed by ambiguous slights, by promoting pro-
sociality, and by reducing the extent to which social situations are perceived to be stressful. 
Implicit malleability theories and wellbeing 
Social functioning is crucial to maintaining wellbeing (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). As 
incremental theories reduce stress in tense social situations (Yeager et al., 2016), and reduce 
hostility following conflict (Yeager et al., 2011), belief in self-malleability could promote 
mental health. While a wealth of research has shown the benefit of incremental theories for 
improving performance and self-efficacy in academic and sporting domains (Hong et al., 
1999), surprisingly little research has looked at the effects of implicit theories on wellbeing.  
When people experience mental ill-health, it can be very difficult to persist with self-
care and help-seeking behaviour. Even when one feels at their best, changing daily routines 
like starting running, or trying to eat less junk-food can be incredibly difficult. This problem 
is compounded many times over when people do not feel well. When people feel down just 
getting through the day can be a Herculaneum effort; trying to engage in additional self-care 
can feel impossible. Entity theories on top of this are likely to make the situation feel even 
more hopeless. If someone believes the self is fixed they may start doubting whether self-care 
will even make a difference. What is it about them that makes them feel this way when 
everyone else seems to be doing fine? If they decide that at their core they are defective, then 
it may seem futile engaging in such intense struggle. On top of that if they try really hard to 
engage in self-care and still do not recover they run the risk of revealing their perceived 
defectiveness to others causing embarrassment (Dweck, 2000). On the other hand if someone 
perceives the self as malleable, they may feel like their struggle is more likely to be rewarded 
with lasting change.  
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While research into this area is new, incremental theories do seem to relate to self-
care. Schroder, Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, and Moser (2014) asked undergraduate students 
how they would hypothetically treat an anxiety problem. As predicted, entity theorists who 
felt anxiety is a stable trait were not interested in lifestyle change or therapy, they just wanted 
to take medication. This suggests they were trying to fix something chemically wrong with 
themselves. On the other hand, incremental theorists were more drawn to behavioural 
interventions suggesting they felt their condition could change through effort and strategy. It 
also seems that once engaged, people with stronger incremental theories gain more from 
therapy. Valentiner, Jencius, Jarek, Gier-Lonsway, and McGrath (2013) showed that clients 
who perceive their level of anxiety as more malleable receive greater benefit from exposure 
therapy. This effect extends to other forms of structured self-care. Incremental theorists tend 
to be more engaged with weight loss programs. They report greater intention to change their 
lifestyles in meaningful ways (Beruchashvili, Moisio, & Heisley, 2014), persist longer 
following setbacks (Burnette, 2010) and have greater expectations of success (Burnette & 
Finkel, 2012). 
People with stronger perceptions of self-malleability tend to see more benefit in 
remediation (Hong et al., 1999), and as a result are more likely to be motivated to make 
changes in their lives. This focus on remediation may mean that people with incremental 
theories tend to have higher wellbeing. Rather than seeing sadness as a sign of personal 
defectiveness which needs to be hidden or medicated, they may be more orientated towards 
self-care. While research has shown that incremental theories may help prevent depression 
(Miu, Yeager, Sherman, Pennebaker, & Trzesniewski, 2014), the extent to which incremental 
theories related to positive aspects of mental health, e.g. wellbeing, has been largely 
unexplored and will be examined cross-sectionally in Chapters 4 and 5. The ability of 
incremental theories to recover from failures and re-engage in the project of self-building 
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may mean that they can help maintain adequate self-esteem and lessen the impact of low-self-
esteem when it arises. 
Viewing the self from two perspectives 
The model of self-esteem proposed by Shavelson et al. (1976) suggested that self-
esteem is not comprised of a single evaluation of the self, but rather a collection of 
evaluations in various domains. People can feel good or bad about multiple different aspects 
of the self. This model has been corroborated by much subsequent research (Marsh, 1986, 
1990b, 1993). But we hold many beliefs about the self in addition to whether our qualities are 
positive or negative.  
Implicit malleability theories and self-esteem can be seen as two ways of viewing the 
self. While self-esteem refers to the extent to which the self is perceived to be of high or low 
social value (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015; Leary & Baumeister, 2000), implicit malleability 
theories refer to the extent to which the self is considered to be fixed or flexible (Dweck et 
al., 1995). Despite operating in similar conceptual spaces, these constructs have mostly been 
studied separately. While research has shown how incremental theories change behavioural 
responses to specific events e.g. failure, little attention has been given to how implicit 
theories may change behavioural and emotional responses to low self-esteem. 
Theoretically, it is plausible that self-esteem and implicit theories would not operate 
in vacuums but would influence each other. As incremental theories reduce the extent to 
which failures are reflected onto stable aspects of the self (Erdley & Dweck, 1993), it is likely 
that failure is less damaging to incremental theorists’ self-concepts. In this way implicit 
theories may perform a buffering role where incremental theories do not directly raise self-
esteem, but make it more resilient to setbacks. As a result, self-esteem should on average be 
higher among those who more strongly endorse incremental theories. Accordingly some 
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researchers have shown that incremental theories and self-esteem are modestly related 
(Robins & Pals, 2002) although the exact magnitude of this relationship is not known. 
Further, as implicit theories and self-esteem are both domain specific constructs it is not clear 
how each domain of implicit theory relates to each domain of self-concept. The specificity 
matching principle (Swann Jr et al., 2007) would predict that more similar domains of 
implicit theories and self-esteem should be more strongly correlated. For instance implicit 
theories of intelligence should relate more strongly to academic self-concept (in the same 
domain) than to self-esteem (in different domains). Less ground work has been laid for how 
self-esteem may be felt differently based on implicit malleability theories. While prior 
research has shown that people tend to behaviourally respond differently to low self-esteem 
based on their implicit malleability theories (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), but it is not clear 
whether incremental theories can reduce the negative effects of low self-esteem more 
broadly. 
Previous research has shown that, following failures, people attempt to repair self-
esteem differently depending on their implicit theories. While those with stronger incremental 
theories tend attempt to repair self-esteem through remediation, those with stronger entity 
theories are more likely to engage in downward social comparisons (Nussbaum & Dweck, 
2008). This relationship is logical. When one’s self-esteem is threatened it means one’s 
perceived worth has been lowered relative to others. As incremental theorists perceive the 
self to be improvable, they are more likely to see remediation as being a way to repair their 
worth. In contrast to this, entity theorists’ failures are likely to be interpreted as being 
indicative of personal defects (Dweck et al., 1995), in which case, attempts to remediate 
would be ineffective and possibly open oneself up to further failure and embarrassment. As a 
result, those with stronger entity theories are more likely to be drawn to alternative ways of 
increasing relative worth such as drawing attention to the failures of others. 
48 
 
In summary, prior research has shown that incremental and entity theorists engage in 
different behaviour in order to repair self-esteem. Are thoughts and feelings of worthlessness 
the same in the context of incremental or entity theories? The interaction between self-esteem 
and implicit malleability theories has been little studied. 
Could implicit malleability theories buffer the negative effects of low self-esteem? 
One of the major problems with low self-esteem is that people tend to focus on short-
term survival. When challenges come, they shirk them or self-handicap to create more 
socially desirable excuses for failure (Eronen, Nurmi, & Salmela-Aro, 1998). That way they 
can avoid flagging their status to others. This behaviour pattern closely mirrors the way that 
entity theorists respond to challenges. Both are pre-occupied with the perception of others, 
rather than personal growth (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Among entity theorists with high 
self-esteem, this strategy may be effective in maintaining self-esteem. But for entity theorists 
with low self-esteem, constant comparisons to others may simply be a form of self-torture. 
Theoretically it would seem that low self-worth is a fundamentally different 
proposition depending on whether someone believes the self to be fixed or malleable (see 
Figure 1). In the prior chapter, I summarised research which showed that the consequences of 
thoughts changes depending on how believable a thought is. Thoughts which are not seen as 
literally true tend not have to have as dire effects (Masuda et al., 2004). Incremental theorists 
view the self flexibly (Dweck, 2000). To an incremental theorist, the thought “I am 
worthless” is likely to be less potent as ‘I’ is conceptualised as an unstable entity and ‘worth’ 
is perceived to be vulnerable to change. On the other hand, entity theorists are likely to see 
the self as highly stable and their worth to be a fixed quantity. As a result, the statement may 
be perceived as more likely to be true, or one which has more serious consequences. In this 
way incremental theories may reduce cognitive fusion of self-critical thoughts. 
49 
 
In addition to reducing cognitive fusion, incremental theories may help people to see 
their situation as more amenable to change. If one feels they have low social worth but also 
believes that they can change, then those feelings, while unpleasant, do not necessarily have 
any bearing on one’s future outlook. On the other hand, if one has low self-esteem and 
perceives the self to be unchangeable, that person may feel utterly helpless. Entity theorists 
may be more likely to interpret low self-esteem as a sign that they have permanent defects 
which mean on a deep level they will never be as good as other people. For these reasons it is 
likely that in people with low self-esteem, stronger incremental theories are likely to be 
associated with improved wellbeing and performance relative to entity theories. 
While incremental theories may lessen the harms of low self-esteem, they may confer 
little advantage to people with high self-esteem. Perceiving one’s attributes as malleable 
when one has high perceived worth is unlikely to be comforting as there may be little scope, 
or need, for improvement—when you are already at the top, the only way to go is down. On 
the other hand perceiving attributes as fixed could give people with high self-esteem a sense 
of security; they might think they are worthy because there is something about them that 
makes them superior to others. Such an outlook could even lead to higher wellbeing and 
achievement. 
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Figure 1. Intersection of implicit theories and self-concept 
 
If implicit theories and self-esteem do interact in this way, then it is likely than the 
benefit of incremental theories over entity theories will be most clear among those with lower 
self-esteem and less clear among those with high self-esteem. In other words, incremental 
theories may buffer, or reduce the extent to which low self-esteem leads to negative 
outcomes. Self-esteem may become a worse predictor of wellbeing, and general functioning 
in those with stronger incremental theories. 
Exploring the interaction of incremental theories and self-esteem 
In order to explore the relationship between self-esteem and implicit malleability 
theories, I look at the extent to which self-esteem and implicit theories interact to predict 
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outcomes. In Chapter 3, I present a meta-analysis looking at the strength of relationship 
between self-esteem and implicit theories and their interaction. In Chapter 4 I show how 
incremental theories moderate the relationship between self-esteem and both wellbeing and 
achievement in schools. In Chapter 5 I replicate findings in a large representative sample of 
American adults. 
 
Chapter summary 
Implicit malleability theories are beliefs about how fixed or fluid attributes are 
perceived to be. People who believe their attributes are more malleable, tend to see more 
value in learning and remediation following failure. This has been shown to be an important 
motivational and resiliency factor in educational and sporting settings. To a lesser extent, 
research has shown that implicit theories are also important for predicting how people 
respond to social failure and threats to self-esteem. It is likely that by preventing failures from 
being attributed to the self that incremental theories are related to higher self-esteem. They 
may also moderate the extent to which low self-esteem results in negative outcomes by 
reducing the extent to which thoughts of worthlessness are perceived to be literally true, and 
tied to permanent features of the self. Chapter 3 clarifies the magnitude of the relationship 
between implicit malleability theories and self-esteem with a meta-analytic synthesis of the 
literature. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
IMPLICIT THEORIES AND SELF-ESTEEM: A META-
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Chapters 1 and 2 outlined a case for why implicit malleability theories and self-
esteem are related constructs that should be considered together. I argued that through 
reducing trait attributions, implicit malleability theories may prevent drops in self-esteem. 
Additionally, I argued that implicit theories may moderate the relationship between self-
esteem and both achievement and wellbeing. As a first step, I clarify the results of prior study 
on this topic. Specifically I aimed to discover what the association is between self-esteem and 
implicit theories, and what work has been conducted looking at the interaction of these two 
constructs.  
 In Chapter 3, I use a meta-analytic synthesis of prior research to show that implicit 
theories and self-esteem are modestly correlated. Additionally, I show that scales which 
feature more incremental than entity items, and items which reference the self rather than 
people generally, were more strongly associated with self-esteem. In addition, I found that 
while prior work has looked at how self-esteem has been maintained by entity and 
incremental theories, no work has explored how implicit theories change the outcomes 
associated with low self-esteem. 
The need to synthesize prior research on self-esteem and implicit theories. 
While prior research has included both implicit malleability theories and self-esteem 
in broad correlational analyses, the relationship between these variables has rarely been the 
explicit subject of much work. Experimental research would suggest that by preventing trait 
attributions (Levy et al., 1998), incremental theories could buffer self-esteem from failures. It 
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is therefore reasonable to assume that self-esteem and incremental theories would be 
positively linked. While the correlation between these two variables has been reported in 
multiple studies, these effect sizes have been inconsistent. As a result the strength of this 
relationship and the source of this variation in effect sizes is unclear (i.e. heterogenity; 
Cheung, 2015). 
One possible for this heterogeneity may be due to the domains that self-esteem and 
implicit theories are measured in. Both self-esteem and implicit theories are considered to be 
domain specific. Prior research has shown that when the domain of self-esteem and the 
domain of an outcome are matched, the relationship between them tends to be stronger 
(Marsh & Craven, 2006). This may partly explain the heterogeneity seen in the effect sizes 
between implicit theories and self-esteem. If the domain specificity theory holds for both 
implicit theories and self-esteem, this may provide evidence that self-esteem and implicit 
theories are structured similarly. That is, that they may share similar hierarchal structures. 
This would be a boon to research into the psychometrics of implicit theories. While a 
substantial amount of research has clarified the hierarchical structure of self-esteem (Bong & 
Skaalvik, 2003; Marsh, 1993; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson et al., 1976), researchers 
have only begun trying to clarify how implicit theories relate to each other (e.g., Schroder, 
Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, & Moser, 2016). If the correlates of the domains of self-esteem 
are strongly related to the matching domains of implicit theories, it may make for future 
researchers to try and replicate the structure of self-esteem with implicit theories. 
Challenges in synthesizing prior research 
Different research methodologies 
One of the challenges with assessing the relationship between self-esteem and implicit 
theories is that they have traditionally used different research methods. While research into 
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implicit theories has benefited from a rich experimental tradition (Dweck, 2000), research 
into self-concept has been more heavily weighted towards self-report and psychometrics 
(Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). 
A substantial number of experiments have suggested that incremental theories are 
likely to be causally related to a wide range of interesting phenomenon. The ability to test the 
effects of incremental theories by manipulation has meant that implicit theory researchers 
have not had to rely on self-report in the way that self-esteem researchers have. While 
implicit theories have been measured, this has generally taken a back seat to direct 
manipulation of implicit theories. This presents challenges for exploring the relationship 
between implicit theories and self-esteem. 
Differing research methodologies may have limited the amount of work that has been 
done on implicit theories and self-esteem. The effects of self-esteem is difficult to study in 
lab-sessions. This is because long-term patterns of self-esteem are considered to be more 
important than the level at any particular moment in time (Kernis, 2005). As such, 
measurement of self-esteem may be more useful than manipulation. It is easy to cause a 
participant to have a momentary dip in self-esteem, but if it quickly returns to baseline after 
an experiment, this may not have broad consequences.  
The structure of implicit theory scales in unclear 
Research into implicit theories has not used a consistent battery of items in the way 
that self-esteem researchers have. This may make domain specific comparisons between 
implicit theories and self-esteem difficult. Self-esteem researchers have differentiated 
between global and specific factors of self-esteem. For instance, maths self-esteem is nested 
under academic self-esteem which itself falls under global self-esteem. In contrast, 
researchers studying implicit theories have often created new scales frequently every time an 
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experiment is conducting in a new domain of research. The first scales of implicit theories 
were developed using a range of techniques including factor analysis, and the careful 
mapping of scale to interview responses (Dweck et al., 1995). However, these original scales 
have been adapted numerous times resulting in a dizzying array of scales. As a result, a vast 
number of scales now exist which have not been placed into any sort of hierarchical structure 
and without clear separation of domains. For instance do the theories of anxiety and shyness 
scales form different factors, or are they both tapping into the same latent factor (Tamir, John, 
Srivastava, & Gross, 2007; Valentiner et al., 2013)? 
While some researchers have tried to create more robust models of implicit theories 
scales, these models are still in their early stages (Hughes, 2015; Schroder et al., 2016). Given 
that implicit theories and self-esteem both measure perceived attributes of the self, they may 
have similar hierarchical structures. Evidence for this could be found if similar domains of 
implicit theories and self-concept are more closely related than more distal ones. 
Are entity and incremental theories unidimensional? 
Another issue which needs to be clarified is whether entity and incremental statements 
form two ends on a bipolar scale, or map onto separate factors. The original scales as reported 
by Dweck et al. (1995) used only entity items, i.e., items where respondents rated agreement 
to statements suggesting their attributes are fixed, e.g., “You have a certain amount of 
intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it.” This was due to the fact that in early 
studies even participants who endorsed entity theories in interviews would respond with high 
levels of agreement to incremental items (Dweck et al., 1995). Dweck et al. (1995) argued 
that incremental statements were so compelling, that participants would agree with them, 
whether or not they actually corresponded to their implicitly held beliefs. It is possible, as 
Dweck et al. (1995) suggests, that this lack of a correlation is due to insensitive responding to 
incremental items. However, it is also possible that incremental and entity beliefs do not exist 
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on the same continuum and therefore should be treated as separate factors. Perhaps, 
incremental items and entity items somehow tap into different aspects of perceived 
malleability and so it is possible to have both high entity and incremental beliefs in a single 
domain. For instance one might believe that there is a strong genetic basis for intelligence and 
so would endorse entity statements, but they simultaneously believe that through strategy one 
might still be able to improve their performance and so would also endorse incremental 
items. The current evidence cannot rule out this possibility. As such, the assumption that 
scales which use exclusively entity items tap into people’s incremental theories requires 
scrutiny. In this chapter I examined this supposition by seeing if using entity vs. incremental 
items moderates the strength of the relationship between implicit theories and self-esteem. 
Self vs other focused items 
Finally, implicit theory measures tend to employ items which reference people 
generally, for example, “you have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can’t do 
much to change it” (Dweck et al., 1995). However it is possible that people hold different 
theories for themselves than they do for others. Someone might feel that while most people 
can improve their mathematical ability, there is something special about them that makes 
them a lost cause. To address this, De Castella et al. (2013) modified the format of implicit 
theory measures to make them self-focused, e.g., “No matter how hard I try, I can’t really 
change the emotions that I have”. De Castella and Byrne (2015b) claim that these self-
focused scales tap into the construct more effectively. 
In summary, Study 1 will attempt to clarify these concerns by exploring the extent 
that implicit theory and self-esteem domains mirror each other. This may provide clues as to 
whether the two constructs have parallel hierarchical structures. Attention will also be paid to 
the degree to which scales are composed of incremental and entity items. If scales composed 
of entity vs incremental items behave differently, it may make sense to treat incremental and 
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entity items as separate factors. Attention will also be paid to whether or not scales use 
personal variants of implicit theory scales as opposed to referencing people generally. 
Methodological issues: The advantage of meta-analyses 
When trying to calculate the true strengths of the associations between two variables, 
several biases must be taken into account. Due to resource limitations, it is rare that entire 
populations are surveyed; instead samples must be used. As samples are only a subset of a 
population of interest, they will tend to vary from their parent populations based on size, i.e. 
sample effect sizes will approach that of the true effect size as the size of the sample 
approaches the size of the parent population (Field, 2009). While larger studies are more 
likely to represent the effect size accurately, no single study will do so perfectly. One way to 
reduce sampling error is simply to study constructs using very large datasets (Marsh, 
Bornmann, Mutz, Daniel, & O’Mara, 2009). However, as study characteristics (e.g. 
demographics, instruments, time) and research methodologies (e.g. instruments, sampling 
techniques) can alter effect sizes, even a large sample may result in effect sizes which are not 
representative of the true population parameters.  
This is particularly pertinent for psychological research as a range of self-report 
measures can be used to study a single construct. Self-esteem and implicit malleability 
theories have both been measured by dozens of instruments, all with unique psychometric 
properties. Due to these psychometric differences, one would not expect each of these scales 
to behave identically in analyses.  
Systematic narrative review 
One way researchers have attempted to resolve these issues is to conduct a systematic 
review where every study is read by a researcher to estimate the magnitude of the effect size. 
This approach is potentially problematic as study characteristics are not taken into account in 
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a systematic way in the formation of impressions. In this methodology each study is 
effectively given a ‘vote’ towards the researcher’s conclusions regardless of magnitude, study 
quality, methodologies used and sample characteristics (Marsh et al., 2009). The extent that 
the findings of each study influence the researchers assessment depend on the researcher’s 
background and pre-conceptions. While narrative reviews can help synthesize research they 
are at risk for bias. 
Meta-analysis 
 Glass (1976) popularised the meta-analysis as a solution to these methodological 
issues. Provided that a field has an adequate number of studies, rather than conducting further 
sampling, secondary analysis can be conducted on existing research. This means that each 
study’s effect size essentially becomes a data point as a substitute for the original individual 
observations (Cheung, 2014b). The extent to which each study contributes to a global effect 
size is weighted based upon the variation in the measurement. This way, more accurate effect 
sizes are treated preferentially over ones with large confidence intervals. Pooled estimates are 
generally more accurate than that of any individual sample. By combining effect sizes across 
varying methodologies, each with their strengths and weaknesses, meta-analyses can also 
help identify features of the broader construct that researchers are attempting to tap into. 
Meta-analyses also allow researchers to account for sources of heterogeneity (Cheung, 2015).  
Issues with heterogeneity 
An issue with meta-analytic approaches to effect size estimation is that they assume 
homogeneity among effects, that is, that there is one true effect size. The reality is that often 
varying sample characteristics and methodologies will introduce systematic differences in 
effect sizes such that rather than being one true effect, there are multiple effects (Cheung, 
2015). For instance, it is possible that the relationship between implicit malleability theories 
and self-esteem would be stronger among girls than boys, or stronger in younger than older 
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samples. This heterogeneity can become problematic especially when studies have multiple 
effect sizes. As each study has its own unique features, studies which report multiple effect 
sizes are not truly independent, which can introduce bias in the interpretation of the 
population parameters (Cheung, 2014b). This must be assessed and controlled for to ensure 
that effect sizes are as accurate as possible (Cheung, 2015).  
Research Aims 
Study 1 aims to consolidate research on both self-esteem and implicit malleability 
theories using a meta-analytic synthesis of prior research. The primary aim is to measure the 
strength of the relationship between implicit theories and self-esteem. The secondary aim is 
to see the extent to which implicit theory domains match self-concept domains. The final aim 
is to identify prior work that has looked at the interaction between self-esteem and implicit 
theories. 
The current study 
As meta-analyses allow for the generation of effect sizes across a range of 
methodologies such that they are representative of a field of research, they are currently 
considered best practice for estimating the true relationship between two variables and as 
such will be utilised in study 1. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
What is the magnitude of the association between incremental theories and self-
esteem across all domains of both constructs (for example, academic, physical, and creative 
domains)? 
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Research Question 2 
Do self-concept and implicit theory scales in matching domains (e.g., implicit theories 
of intelligence and academic self-concept) correlate more strongly than scales in different 
domains? 
Research Question 3 
Do implicit theories and self-concept scales correlate more strongly when the implicit 
theory scales reference the self as opposed to people generally? 
Hypothesis 1 
Incremental theories will be positively related to both self-esteem and self-concept. 
By reducing trait attributions (Levy et al., 1998), incremental theories should make failures 
less likely to affect self-image resulting in higher self-esteem/ self-concept.  
Hypothesis 2 
Incremental theories will be most strongly related to self-esteem when the domains of 
each scale are similar. For example, incremental theories of intelligence should be more 
strongly related to academic self-concepts, than physical self-concepts or self-esteem 
generally. 
Hypothesis 3 
Correlations between incremental theories and self-concept will be stronger when 
implicit theory scales reference the self rather than people generally. Scales which refer to 
people generally will not adequately reflect perceptions of self-malleability. People may feel 
their attributes are more or less malleable than other people. 
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Method 
Eligibility criteria 
Studies were included which had quantitative measures, in any domain, of either self-
concept (including self-esteem) or implicit malleability theories as described by Dweck et al. 
(1995). Studies in which full texts in English could not be obtained were excluded to ensure 
data extraction was accurate. Only original research was eligible for inclusion, as such data 
presented in review papers and previous meta-analyses were excluded in order to ensure that 
each study’s results were only pooled once. Studies were accepted irrespective of cohort 
features (e.g. age, gender, socioeconomic status), which were assessed as moderators. 
Sources 
Four databases were used for finding eligible papers: ERIC, PsychINFO, Scopus and 
Web of Science. Additional papers were sourced from Google Scholar and included on 
advice from researchers in the relevant fields. 
Development of keywords 
In order to scope for relevant keywords, abstracts from all articles used in Chapter 1 
and 2 were loaded into the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 2018). Word 
frequencies were then inspected in order to extract relevant keywords. The use of word 
frequency analysis to identify keywords is not an established practice. This technique may 
help to identify terms used in a given field, which would otherwise be missed. Word 
frequencies are presented in Figure 2. This world cloud was produced in R using the 
‘wordcloud’ package (Fellows, 2012).  Keywords were further refined following a pilot 
search and based on feedback from senior researchers in related fields. 
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Figure 2. Word frequencies from literature review abstracts presented in a ‘word cloud’ 
Keywords 
Implicit theories was represented by variations of the term as follows: ‘implicit 
theory’ ‘incremental theorist’, ‘entity theorist’, ‘fixed mindset’, or ‘growth mindset’. ‘Dweck’ 
was also used as a keyword for implicit theories due to her prominence in the field of 
research (Dweck, 2000). Papers with self-esteem were located with variants of the following 
keywords: ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-concept’, ‘self-perception’, ‘self-appraisal’, ‘self-image’, ‘self-
worth’, or ‘self-attributions’. Papers were returned that featured at least one of these 
keywords from both the implicit theory and self-esteem set. 
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Study screening 
Eligible studies were imported into an Endnote library and duplicates were removed. I 
screened titles and abstracts with the assistance of two other researchers. Records were 
removed where all researchers unanimously agreed studies did not meet eligibility criteria. 
Full texts were obtained for all remaining records and then screened for eligibility. In cases of 
disagreements about the eligibility of certain studies, researchers discussed these cases until a 
unanimous decision could be made. 
Data extraction 
Data were extracted from the remaining studies into an Excel spreadsheet. Each row 
represented an effect size. In instances where multiple effect sizes were present in a single 
study, these effects were inputted on separated rows, and were linked by study ID. In this 
meta-analysis, studies only presented effect sizes as Pearson’s r. Accordingly, no effect sizes 
needed to be mathematically transformed.  Beyond effect size, other information was 
extracted about each study including publication year, cohort socioeconomic status, cohort 
gender ratio, mean age of subjects, the domain of the self-concept scale, which self-concept 
scale was used, the implicit theory domain, which implicit theory scale was used, whether the 
implicit theory scale referenced the self or people generally, the alphas of each scale, and 
finally, the effect size. 
Effect sizes 
Pearson’s r was used as a global effect size to measure the relationship between 
incremental theories and self-esteem/self-concept. As per common practice, .1 can be 
considered a small effect size, .3 as medium, and .5 as a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Where correlations were not reported, they were generated through mathematical 
transformations from other effect sizes. If correlations could not be calculated, the authors 
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were contacted with a request for the effect size. Once all correlations were extracted, 
variances were calculated by using Schmidt and Hunter’s (2014) method. This method 
calculates variances based on a pooled effect size which has been shown to make variances 
more accurate. While this methodology assumes homogenous effect sizes (one true effect 
size), it has been found to perform well even in cases where the effect sizes are 
heterogeneous (Aguinis, 2001). 
Analysis 
In this study, there potentially multiple sources of heterogeneity that would imply that 
there are multiple effects. To deal with this, moderators need to be confirmed and effect sizes 
calculated separately where appropriate. First, incremental theories and self-concept were 
measured across multiple domains. Second, even within domains, different measures were 
used across studies to measure incremental theories and/or self-esteem. Sample 
characteristics vary such that sample features may moderate the magnitude of effect sizes. 
Finally, in meta-analyses effect sizes are generally assumed to be independent. However, 
single studies often report multiple effect sizes which are not independent of each other due 
to common methodologies and sample features. To control for the dependence of effect sizes, 
Cheung (2014b) developed a form of structural equation modelling meta-analysis. This 
enables heterogeneity to be measured and controlled for at both between and within studies. 
All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2018) using the packages “metaSEM” 
(Cheung, 2014a) and “metafor” (Viechtbauer, 2010).  
Moderators 
A range of moderators were extracted from studies, including the gender ratio of the 
sample, cohort socioeconomic status (SES), age, ethnicity, cohort source e.g., college 
students or patients, whether the incremental theory scale was self-focused (e.g. “I am 
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malleable”) vs. other focused (e.g. “people are malleable”), whether the implicit theory scales 
were comprised of entity, incremental items, or both, whether the paper was published in a 
journal or was a dissertation, and whether the scales were validated. 
 
Study Characteristics 
 
Figure 3. Flow diagram of meta-analysis 
Records identified 
through database 
searching 
(n = 581) 
Additional records 
identified through other 
sources 
(n = 1) 
Records after duplicates 
removed 
(n = 376) 
Records screened 
(n = 376) 
Records excluded 
(n = 83) 
Full-text articles 
assessed for eligibility 
(n = 293) 
Full-text articles 
excluded 
(n = 259) 
See Appendix B for list 
of reasons for exclusion 
Studies included in 
quantitative synthesis 
(n = 34) 
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Results 
Thirty four studies were included in the quantitative synthesis which measured the 
association between incremental theories and self-esteem. The results presented below 
explore the association between self-esteem and implicit theories.  
In line with hypothesis 1, across all domains, incremental theories tended to be related 
weakly to self-concept r = .16, 95% CI [.11, .20]. See Figure 4 for a forest plot, which shows 
the effect size for each individual study as well as pooled effect sizes per domain of self-
concept. In order to look at intra-domain relationships, the domains of each mindset and self-
concept were collapsed into broader categories. “Self-esteem” included global self-concept, 
social self-concept, and self-esteem measures; “academic self-concept” included self-concept 
measures in the domains of mathematics, science, verbal ability and memory; and “physical 
self-concept” included self-concept measures of sporting ability, physical self-worth, and 
spatial abilities. With regards to implicit malleability theories, “intelligence” included 
implicit malleability measures in the domains of both mathematics and intelligence; 
“personality” included scales which referenced general characteristics or personality; “mental 
health” included scales which measured perceived malleability in emotions and anxiety; and, 
“physicality” included scales on sporting ability and physical characteristics, such as, weight. 
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Figure 4. Forest plot of effect sizes. 
Note. Pooled effect sizes demonstrate the correlation between incremental theories and the 
different domains of self-esteem. Many studies had multiple effect sizes. In this figure, 
multiple effect sizes are indicated where multiple points and confidence intervals are present 
in a single row. 
 
Relationship by domain 
Within domains the magnitude of the relationship between implicit theories and self-
esteem tended to vary. Implicit theories and self-concepts tended to be more strongly related 
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when in similar domains than when in different domains (see Table 1 for effect sizes based 
on domains of self-concept and implicit theories as well as the percentage of heterogeneity 
which is explained at level 2 and 3). 
Table 1. 
The links between specific domains of self-concept and implicit theories 
Domain k n r SE 
Lower 
95% 
CI 
Upper 
95% 
CI 
t2 I2 t2_3 I2_3 Q 
All 34 79 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.2 0.01* 0.58 0.01 0.32 1020.92 
Intelligence 21 48 0.16 0.03 0.1 0.21 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.54 731.19 
Mental health 2 5 0.31 0.04 0.24 0.39 0 0 0 0 5.22 
Personality 6 8 0.16 0.09 -0.02 0.34 0 0 0.05 0.86 46.05 
Physicality 4 10 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.93 0 0 131.04 
Creativity 2 8 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.02 0.91 0 0 70.58 
Self-esteem 
Intelligence 14 22 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.85 0 0 119.35 
Mental health 2 5 0.31 0.04 0.24 0.39 0 0 0 0 5.22 
Personality 6 7 0.17 0.1 -0.02 0.36 0 0 0.05 0.87 46.05 
Academic self-concept 
Intelligence 11 22 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.27 0 0.09 0.02 0.82 556.69 
Personality 1 1 0.17 0.09 -0.01 0.34 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 
Physicality 1 2 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.59 
Physical self-concept 
Intelligence 1 4 0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.22 0.01 0.67 0 0 12.18 
Physicality 3 8 0.09 0.07 -0.05 0.22 0.01 0.94 0 0 124.38 
Creativity            
Creativity 2 8 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.02 0.91 0 0 70.58 
Note. Bolded items indicate self-concept scales. k = number of studies, n = number of effect sizes. 
T2 = tau values, I2 = variation explained by heterogeneity rather than chance. ‘_3’ = heterogeneity 
indices measured at level 3. Significant tau values indicated with asterisks. 
 
While most domains of implicit malleability theories tended to correlate with pooled 
self-concept scales at similar levels, mental health malleability theories, e.g., implicit theories 
of anxiety had the strongest relationship, r = .31, 95% CI[.24, .39] and implicit theories of 
physicality was related the most weakly, r = .12, 95% CI [.08,.15]. This suggests that people 
with incremental theories about their mental health tended to have more positive self-
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concepts than those who had incremental theories in other domains. With regards to self-
esteem, implicit theories in more general domains (e.g. mental health and personality) were 
correlated more strongly than implicit theories in more distal domains (e.g. intelligence). 
Implicit theories of mental health correlated most strongly with self-esteem at the before 
mentioned level, followed by implicit theories of personality, r = .17, 95% CI[-.02, .36], I2_2 
= .87; although in this case there was a large degree of heterogeneity among effect sizes such 
that the confidence interval crossed zero. This could be due to a single (seemingly) aberrant 
effect size. While most effect sizes ranged from .1 to .2, one study recorded an effect size of -
.3. A lack of studies finding similar effects meant that the methodological or sampling 
reasons for this deviation from the norm could not be determined. Implicit theories of 
intelligence was correlated at a weaker, yet significant level r = .15, 95% CI [.08, .21]. 
For academic self-concept (ASC), 11 studies (22 effect sizes) correlated implicit 
theories of intelligence (ITI) with academic self-concept with a moderate pooled relationship 
r = .18, 95% CI [.09, 0.27]. Surprisingly, ASC appeared to be most strongly correlated with 
implicit theories of physicality r = .25 95% CI [.16, .33], but caution is needed while 
interpreting this result due to the dearth of studies testing this effect (k = 1). Unfortunately no 
other domains of incremental theories were studied with academic self-concept. This means 
that it is not possible to test hypothesis 2 within this domain of self-concept, i.e., that effect 
sizes will be stronger when the domain of implicit theory and self-concept is more similar. 
While the effect sizes between ITI and ASC tended to be stronger than effect sizes where ITI 
was matched with other domains of self-concept, confidence intervals intersected.  
With regards to physical self-concept, pooled associations were small and not 
statistically significant in all domains of implicit theories. Implicit theories of intelligence 
were not significantly related to physical self-concepts r = 0.08 95% CI [-0.05, 0.22], nor 
were implicit theories of physicality r = .09 95% CI [-0.05, .22]. Finally, eight effect sizes 
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across two studies showed that creative self-concepts and implicit theories of creativity were 
significantly correlated, r = .15 95% CI [.05, .25].  
Publication bias 
Publication bias was checked with funnel plots. Publication bias refers to cases where 
studies are more likely to be published when effect sizes are at a desirable level (e.g., inflated 
or aligned with expectations). If studies are being published irrespective of results, effect 
sizes will tend to fall symmetrically around the mean. Effect sizes should mostly be within 
the dotted confidence interval bounds with larger studies providing better estimates than 
smaller studies (Macaskill, Walter, & Irwig, 2001). If asymmetry in funnel plots is found, it 
may indicate that publication bias has occurred. For instance, smaller studies may only be 
published if they find an exciting (e.g., large) effect. Alternatively many effect sizes falling 
outside of the confidence intervals may indicate issues with heterogeneity (multiple true 
effect sizes) (Macaskill et al., 2001).  
The funnel plot for all pooled effects can be seen in Figure 5, in which no clear 
evidence of systematic publication bias can be observed. Larger studies tended to fall 
symmetrically around the estimate of the mean. Although a number of effect sizes fall outside 
of the 95% confidence interval bounds, they do not appear to bias results in any systematic 
direction. To formally test plot asymmetry, Egger’s test was performed (Egger, Smith, 
Schneider, & Minder, 1997). This test found no evidence of funnel plot asymmetry (p = .64). 
However, moderation analysis revealed that there was a systematic difference between 
studies which reported effect sizes relative to those which did not. Sixteen studies did not list 
a correlation between implicit malleability theories and self-esteem. Of these, five responded 
to a request for the respective data. The effects in these studies (r = 0.079, 95% CI [0.04, 
0.12]) were substantially smaller than those which listed effect sizes within their published 
reports (r = .17, 95% CI [0.13, 0.22]; p < 0.01). These results suggests that authors who 
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found smaller correlations may have been less likely to include them in their results, which is 
a potential source of bias. 
 
Figure 5. Funnel plot of all effect sizes 
 
 Due to the heterogeneity of effects, it’s possible that publication bias was present in 
some combinations of self-esteem and implicit theories, but not in others. To look at 
publication bias within different domains of self-concept and implicit theories, Figures 6 – 9 
were constructed. Each funnel plot is organised by the domain of self-concept, however the 
different domains of implicit theories are represented in each plot by varying symbols.  
Self-esteem 
Figure 6 shows the funnel plot for all effects where implicit theories were correlated 
with global self-esteem. All effect sizes generally fit within the dotted lines indicating little 
bias. Egger’s test did not find evidence of plot asymmetry (p = .78). There were however two 
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effects which were strongly negative. Interestingly these effects, if positive and with the 
magnitude, would have fit nicely inside the confidence intervals. It’s possible that these 
authors did not score their implicit theory measure in the correct direction. To prevent 
introducing a new source of bias they were not excluded from analysis.  
 
Figure 6. Funnel plot of effects between implicit theories and self-esteem 
In figure 6, the domain of implicit theory is represented by the shape of each point. This 
figure shows the implicit theories of mental health (represented as triangles) tended to be 
more strongly related to self-esteem, however the standard error for these studies was larger. 
Academic self-concept 
 Figure 7 shows the funnel plot for the correlation of incremental theories and 
academic self-concept. There was a clear outlier way outside of the bounds of the confidence 
intervals. Interestingly as standard error increased more effects fell to the left of the 
confidence intervals. This could potentially indicate publication bias, with smaller studies 
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tending to have larger effect sizes. However, an Egger’s test was not able to demonstrate plot 
asymmetry (p = .29). 
 
Figure 7. Funnel plot of effects between implicit theories and academic self-concept 
 
Physical self-concept 
 Figure 8 shows the funnel plot for the correlation of incremental theories and physical 
self-concept. Only two domains of implicit theories were studied with this self-concept. 
There were not many studies looking at the relationship between implicit theories and 
physical self-concepts. The few studies that did however, not show any signs of systematic 
publication bias (p = .40; Egger’s test). 
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Figure 8. Funnel plot of effects between implicit theories and physical self-concept 
 
 
Creative self-concepts 
 Figure 9 shows the funnel plot for the correlation of incremental theories and creative 
self-concepts. While a funnel plot was constructed for the domain of creativity (Figure 8), 
fewer than 10 effect sizes were available (n = 8). Prior authors have suggested that there is 
little point checking for plot asymmetry when there are so few effect sizes. This is because 
current methods lack sufficient power to detect asymmetry for small sample sizes (Sterne, 
Gavaghan, & Egger, 2000). Accordingly, Egger’s test was not performed as it would be 
uninterpretable. 
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Figure 9. Funnel plot of effects between implicit theories and creative self-concept 
 
 
Moderation 
Personal implicit theories. In the majority of studies, researchers used implicit theory 
scales which referenced people generally, e.g., “You can’t really change your level of 
intelligence” (k = 71). In five cases, researchers instead used personal variants of these items, 
e.g., “I can’t really change my basic level of intelligence”. Scales that used the self as the 
subject correlated with self-concept much more strongly r = .38, 95% CI [.21, .56] than those 
that focused on people generally r = .14 95% CI [.10, .17] p < 0.001. This suggests that 
people do hold multiple theories for themselves and for people generally.  
Entity vs incremental items. Whether implicit theories scales used exclusively 
incremental or entity items, or a combination of both, was found to be a significant moderator 
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of effect sizes (p < 0.00). Studies with more incremental items tended to report stronger effect 
sizes. Scales with only entity items tended to report the weakest correlations (r = .13, 95% CI 
[0.04, 0.21]), followed by scales that contained both entity and incremental items (r = .16, 
95% CI [0.10, 0.22]). Scales which used only incremental items reported the strongest 
correlations (r = .22, 95% CI [.15, .29]). If implicit theory scales were bipolar then 
incremental items should merely be the reverse of entity items and their presence should not 
change the magnitude of effect sizes.  
Age. To test if age was a moderator, four binary variables were created to cover 
children (13 or under, k = 11), adolescents (14-18, k = 14), young adults (19-25, k = 19), and 
adults (26+, k = 12). These categorical variables were used together as moderators in a three 
level meta-analysis. This model was not significantly different from the baseline model (p = 
0.34). The relationships between self-concept and implicit theories by age were as follows:  
children (r = 0.17, 95% CI [0.1, 0.24]), adolescents (r = 0.2, 95% CI [0.07, 0.33]), young 
adults (r = 0.19, 95% CI [0.14, 0.24]), and adults (r = 0.12, 95% CI [0.02, 0.22]). This shows 
that the relationship between implicit theories and self-esteem is not age dependent. 
Publication date. Publication date was not found to be a moderator (p > 0.9). Effect 
sizes were not significantly different regardless of whether they were from studies published 
in the 1990s (k = 1, n =1), 2000s (k = 14, n = 26) or 2010s (k = 18, n = 49). Effect sizes have 
been found at similar levels across recent decades. This eliminates several sources of 
potential bias due to changing scientific consensus or evolving methodologies. 
Reliability. Scales were identified as potentially unreliable if the alpha reliability was 
less than 0.7, or if it was not reported. Just under half of effects reported adequate reliability 
for each scale (k = 19, n = 31). However, the reliability of scales did not appear to moderate 
the strength of effects (p = 0.13). This was true regardless of whether the implicit theory scale 
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was unreliable (r = .15, 95% CI [.08, .23]), the self-concept scale was unreliable (r = .12, 
95% CI [.04, .20]) or when both scales were unreliable (r = .15, 95% CI [.11, .20]). These 
results show that the effect size between self-esteem and implicit theories was stable. Studies 
utilizing less reliable scales produced similar effect sizes to those with highly reliable ones. 
Gender. Three dummy codes were generated such that samples were considered 
mostly male when fewer than 33% of participants were female (k = 1, n = 2); mixed if the 
percentage of females ranged between 33% and 66% (k = 22, n = 57) and considered mostly 
female when the percentage of female participants exceeded 66% (k = 11, n = 16). Including 
gender as a moderator significantly improved the model over the baseline model (p = 0.01).  
Studies with mostly male samples (r = 0.24, 95% CI [0.16, 0.33]) tended to have stronger 
effect sizes than those with mixed genders (r = 0.17, 95% CI [0.12, 0.23]), which had 
stronger effects than those with mostly female participants (r = 0.12 95% CI [0.03, 0.21]). 
These results show that studies with more females in them tended to have smaller effect sizes.  
Education. The relationship between self-concept and implicit theories did not 
significantly change regardless of whether samples were from elementary schools, high 
schools, or universities (p > 0.9), suggesting that the relationship between implicit theories 
and self-esteem does not change substantially across educational phases.  
Direction of effects and interaction 
No studies were found which tested for an interaction between the constructs of self-
esteem and implicit theories. Further, prior work has not shown the relationship between 
implicit theories and self-esteem longitudinally. 
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Table 1. 
Meta-analysis results by moderator variables 
domain ANOVA p value k n r SE 
Lower 
95% 
CI 
Upper 
95% 
CI 
t2 I2 t2_3 I2_3 Q 
Implicit theory frame 0.00            
Self-theories  4 5 0.38 0.09 0.21 0.56 0 0 0.03* 0.86 38.64 
Other-theories  31 71 0.14 0.02 0.1 0.17 0.01* 0.76 0 0.1 435.16 
Implicit theory items 0.00            
Entity  18 35 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.21 0 0.05 0.03* 0.89 791.7 
Combined  14 24 0.16 0.03 0.1 0.22 0.01 0.51 0.01 0.32 107.79 
Incremental  9 17 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.29 0 0.06 0.01 0.78 60.91 
Age 0.34            
children  4 11 0.17 0.04 0.1 0.24 0 0.12 0 0.39 18.93 
adolescents  7 14 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.33 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.74 679.41 
young adults  10 19 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.24 0 0.52 0 0.19 66.48 
adults  5 12 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.86 0 0 78.64 
Decade 0.18            
1990s  1 1 0.47 0.11 0.26 0.68 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 
2000s  14 26 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.01 0.7 0 0.23 226.98 
2010s  18 49 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.01* 0.52 0.01 0.36 707.3 
Poor reliability 0.11            
neither  19 31 0.18 0.03 0.11 0.24 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.39 742.24 
implicit theories  15 33 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.63 155 
self-concept  14 39 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.2 0 0.2 0.02 0.69 173.99 
both  18 45 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.21 0 0.19 0.02 0.69 207.74 
Gender 0.01            
mostly male  1 2 0.24 0.05 0.16 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.59 
79 
 
mixed  22 57 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.01 0.59 0.01 0.31 873.22 
mostly female  11 16 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.60 94.6 
Education level 0.95            
elementary  4 12 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.25 0 0.13 0 0.39 22.38 
High school  7 13 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.31 0.01 0.2 0.03 0.78 665.32 
university  15 35 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.44 188.22 
Note. Bolded items indicate moderation analysis performed. k = number of studies, n = number of effect sizes. 
Significant tau values indicated with asterisks. ANOVAs compare models with moderation to baseline model. 
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Discussion 
Overview 
The current study examined the relationship between implicit malleability theories 
and self-concept using a meta-analytic approach. By synthesizing 79 effect sizes nested 
within 34 studies, this study demonstrated that self-esteem and self-concept are consistently 
related to implicit malleability theories across studies (r = .16; hypothesis one). Effects were 
consistent across age and educational level. However, we found four important moderation 
effects. First, there were strong implicit-theory frame effects. Implicit theory measures that 
focused on the self, had much stronger links to self-esteem than implicit theories focused on 
others. Second, there was some evidence for domain specificity, with general self-concept 
being more strongly linked to implicit theories of mental health than to implicit theories of 
intelligence. Third, measures that focused on incremental theories tended to have stronger 
links to self-esteem than those focused on entity theories or that combined entity and 
incremental theory items.  Fourth, there were gender effects: Studies that had cohorts mostly 
composed of males found stronger links between self-concept and implicit theories compared 
to mixed and majority female cohorts. 
The content of implicit theory measures 
II found that incremental items related more strongly to self-concept than entity items. 
There has been some debate in the field regarding whether incremental items should be used 
at all. Dweck et al. (1995) has suggested that entity and incremental items exist on the same 
bipolar spectrum and so rejection of incremental theories equates to endorsement of entity 
theories and visa-versa. In this study, it appears as though the relationship between implicit 
theories and self-concepts does differ in strength depending on whether scales used 
exclusively entity items, incremental items, or a combination of both. If these items were 
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truly mirror images of each other than their relationship to other variables should not greatly 
differ. Future research is needed to clarify why incremental items do not mirror each other in 
their correlates. It may be that people hold more complex views of themselves that originally 
thought. For example, perhaps they view some aspects of their personality as changeable and 
other aspects as unchangeable. This could lead them to say that they are both fixed and 
capable of change. 
This study also found evidence showing that implicit theory scales that refer to the 
self (e.g., “my attributes are malleable”) related more strongly to self-esteem than those 
which referred to people in general (e.g., “your attributes are malleable”). Although the focus 
of research into implicit malleability theories has been on the extent to which individuals 
believe their own attributes are malleable, scales have not echoed this faithfully. By using 
scales that reference people generally, researchers have assumed that people have only one 
set of implicit theories for everyone. The results of this meta-analysis imply that people may 
hold separate theories for themselves than they do for people in general. Future researchers 
should use implicit theory items which reference the self unless they are interested in the 
participant’s perceptions of the malleability of other people. 
Domain specificity 
Some evidence was found that similar domains of self-concept and implicit theories 
were more strongly related. There was clear support that self-esteem was more strongly 
related to implicit theories of mental health, than to intelligence. However, in other domains 
the pattern was less clear. This may be partly due to a lack of studies where the domains of 
implicit theories and self-concept do not match. This could be demonstrative that researchers 
are already be employing the specificity matching principle between implicit theories and 
self-concept domains. 
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Gender effects 
I found evidence that effect sizes varied depending based on the composition of males 
and females in each study cohort. Implicit theories tended to be more strongly related to self-
esteem when study cohorts had more males than females. While causal orderings are unclear, 
this finding raises the question of whether incremental theories provide more benefit to males 
than to females. If this is the case, it is likely that the benefit of incremental theories is 
moderated by other variables which may be missing from current models. 
Issues with causal ordering 
No research was found where implicit theories were intervened on and self-esteem 
change measured (or visa-versa), which met eligibility criteria. While one paper measured 
self-esteem following an implicit theory intervention, no baseline was recorded, nor did the 
authors find a significant difference between treatment and control in mean level of self-
esteem at follow up (p = 0.13) (Miu et al., 2014). As such, this meta-analysis was unable to 
establish the direction of effects between implicit theories and self-esteem. Arguments could 
be made for incremental theories being an antecedent or consequence of positive self-
concept. Research has demonstrated that people with stronger incremental theories are less 
likely to make trait attributions (Levy et al., 1998; Robins & Pals, 2002; Yeager et al., 2011), 
and reduce self-relevant emotion following failure (Hu et al., 2015). It is possible that 
incremental theories serve as a buffer for self-esteem, reducing the extent to which failures 
can change one’s self-image. Rather than raising self-esteem, they may make it more resilient 
in the face of negative feedback, which is consistent with the evidence that incremental 
theorists have higher levels of self-esteem than entity theorists on average. However, an 
argument could be made for entity theories being beneficial for self-esteem in some context. 
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For example, although entity theorists tend to leave domains in which they are failing, they 
also compensate by improving effort in other domains (Park & Kim, 2015), which may also 
serve a function of self-esteem repair. It is not clear the extent to which these strategies would 
be successful in maintaining higher self-esteem. However, entity theorists’ responses to 
failure might be classed as avoidance-based coping, which itself has been found to be related 
to lower self-esteem (Eisenbarth, 2012). In summary, it is plausible that implicit malleability 
theories could lead to higher self-esteem. 
A case could be made for implicit theories being the consequence of high self-esteem. 
However, the limited research that is available is not consistent with his possibility.  Failure, 
presumably associated with a drop in self-esteem, has been found to prime people to more 
readily adopt incremental theories (Leith et al., 2014). When one is feeling bad about oneself, 
the idea that change is possible could be a welcome message. As a result, low self-esteem 
individuals may be more receptive to cues which suggest the malleability of traits leading to 
rises in the extent to which they will endorse incremental theories. On the other hand, those 
with high self-esteem may be more resistant to cues suggesting the malleability of the self. If 
one feels superior, the fact that your worth could go down relative to others is not necessarily 
a comforting message and may be more likely to be rejected. As a result, high self-esteem 
individuals could be drawn to the adoption of entity theories and those with low self-esteem 
drawn to incremental theories. No evidence was found to directly support this model 
however.  
Limitations 
While the structural equation modelling approach to meta-analysis allows for the 
clustering of effect sizes to be controlled for, it also requires moderation analyses to be 
performed on categorical variables (Cheung, 2014a). This conversion of continuous variables 
(for example, mean age) to categorical variables (for example, 14-18 years) is a limitation of 
84 
 
this approach as it reduces the variance of these variables making the analysis underpowered. 
However, due to the hierarchal clustering of effects, alternative techniques such as meta-
regression could give biased results (Hedges, Tipton, & Johnson, 2010). 
Due to the lack of experimental and longitudinal studies, it was not possible to 
establish causal orderings. Future research should use cross-lag models and experimental 
studies to establish the extent to which implicit theories and self-esteem reciprocally cause 
each other. Further, no studies considered the interaction between self-esteem and implicit 
theories. The association between self-esteem and implicit theories was only small. This 
means that both entity and incremental theorists experience high and low self-esteem. But 
this is only a limited picture of the relationship between these two constructs. In the 
introduction, I argued that implicit theories may change the relationship between self-esteem 
and a range of outcomes. I argued that perceiving the self as malleable self, would help 
people see low self-worth as a temporary condition. This would mean that incremental 
theories would reduce the extent that low self-esteem is associated with poorer wellbeing. 
Additionally incremental theories may help people to stay engaged with their goals. This may 
be evident in low self-esteem not being associated with reduced achievement in people with 
stronger incremental theories. Future research needs to establish if implicit theories and self-
esteem moderate each other’s relationship on outcomes. In Chapter 4, I explore these 
hypotheses cross-sectionally. In an Australian sample of female high school students, I show 
that implicit theories moderate the relationship between self-esteem and both wellbeing and 
achievement. 
Chapter Summary 
Study 1 has shown that implicit theories and self-esteem are modestly related. 
Stronger incremental theories tend to be associated with more positive self-esteem and self-
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concepts. Some evidence was found that these relationships followed the specificity matching 
principle. Implicit theories tended to be more strongly related to self-concepts when the 
domains were similar. These relationships were moderated by various variables. Implicit 
theory scales which referenced the self were more strongly related to self-esteem and self-
concept. Samples with higher proportions of males showed stronger effects. Finally scales 
with more incremental items tended to correlate more strongly to self-esteem and self-
concept scales. Future research should utilise experimental and longitudinal designs to 
demonstrate the direction of effect between implicit theories and self-esteem. In Chapter 4, I 
explore how implicit theories and self-esteem interact to predict academic achievement and 
wellbeing in a sample of Australian high school girls. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLICIT THEORIES AS A 
MODERATOR OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SELF-
ESTEEM AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES IN FEMALE 
HIGHSCHOOLERS 
Introduction 
Study 1 showed that implicit malleability theories and self-esteem are modestly 
related. Individuals with stronger incremental theories tend to have higher self-esteem, but 
the modest correlation indicates substantial unshared variance. This suggests that some 
people may have strong incremental theories while also having low self-esteem, and others 
may show a reverse pattern. Thus, given these variables are not redundant with each other, it 
is possible that implicit theories might moderate the known link between low self-esteem and 
poor well-being (Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, & Rosenberg, 1995). In Chapter 1, I 
argued that incremental theories are likely to change the believability of thoughts of 
worthlessness, and keep people focused on remediation and self-improvement. As such 
incremental theorists may be less likely to be affected by low self-esteem. People with low 
self-esteem who also believe they can change, are likely to feel more able to improve their 
predicament. As a result, they may be more engaged with remediation and be less likely to 
descend into helplessness. In contrast, those with low self-esteem who believe their qualities 
are fixed may feel that their low social status is permanent and so may be generally 
disengaged and have poorer wellbeing. To date, no researchers have studied how these two 
variables interact to predict outcomes. 
In this second study, I aim to rectify this gap in the literature. I examined how implicit 
malleability theories moderate the link between self-esteem and outcomes. In particular I 
looked to see if the links between self-esteem and wellbeing, and self-esteem and 
achievement would be weaker in people with stronger incremental theories. 
87 
 
Wellbeing, self-esteem and implicit theories  
Self-esteem is related to a wide range of problems including substance abuse, suicidal 
ideation (Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1997), and depression (Crocker & Park, 2004). These 
consequences of low self-esteem are consistent with the hypothesis that low self-esteem is an 
emotional alarm which signifies social instability (Leary et al., 1995). People with low self-
esteem may experience high degrees of stress because they are on high alert due to being 
more socially vulnerable. This increased stress may explain why people with lower self-
esteem also tend to have lower wellbeing (Paradise & Kernis, 2002). They are experiencing 
stress because they are currently more vulnerable due to low social rank. As a result, or 
perhaps in addition, lower self-esteem tends to be related with lower wellbeing (Paradise & 
Kernis, 2002). Wellbeing can be defined as the tendency to feel positive emotions, feel 
connected to others and that life is meaningful (Keyes, 2006b; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). 
Part of this connection between self-esteem and wellbeing may be due to the way that 
an individual is cognitively appraising their current situation. I argued in Chapter 2 that 
individuals with stronger entity theories may be more likely to see their condition as 
permanent leading to hopelessness. This would indeed reduce the extent to which life is seen 
as meaningful and may result in reduced wellbeing. However incremental theories may help 
people to cognitively re-appraise their predicament such that wellbeing is maintained to a 
greater extent. 
Achievement, self-esteem and implicit theories 
Implicit theories may also be related to achievement. When life feels meaningless it 
may be more difficult to persist with challenges and reach one’s potential. What’s more 
students can get trapped in cycles where poor academic performance leads to lower self-
esteem, which leads to even worse performance (Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, & Baumert, 
2006). However research on the links between self-esteem and achievement has been 
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inconsistent. In some samples there is a clear link and in others there is not (Marsh, 1993). 
Perhaps this heterogeneity of effects is partly explained by differences in implicit theories. As 
they believe they can improve (Dweck et al., 1995), incremental theorists may stay engaged 
with academic study even when they are experiencing low self esteem 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In order to test these ideas, I conducted cross-sectional research among Australian 
female high school students.  This sample was chosen because of convenience and also 
because of the availability of fairly objective indicators of performance, namely, grade point 
average.  I expected that the associations between self-esteem and the outcomes would be 
strongest among students with stronger entity theories. In line prior research (e.g. Schroder et 
al., 2016), I expected that these effects would be domain specific – implicit malleability 
theories would most strongly moderate the links between self-esteem and outcomes when the 
domain of the implicit theory (e.g. intelligence) matches the domain of the outcome (e.g., 
academic achievement).  
Research Question 1 
Are implicit theories related to wellbeing? 
Research Question 2 
Is low self-esteem as strongly related to lower wellbeing in students with strong or 
weak incremental theories? 
Research Question 3 
Is low self-esteem as strongly related to lower grades in students with strong or weak 
incremental theories? 
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Hypothesis 1 
Incremental theories will be related to improved wellbeing. As incremental theories 
have been shown to reduce trait attributions (Levy et al., 1998) and have more positive 
emotional (Hu et al., 2015; Tamir et al., 2007) and behavioural (Hong et al., 1999) responses 
to failure, it is likely they will on average have improved wellbeing. 
Hypothesis 2. 
The links between self-esteem and both wellbeing and achievement will be moderated 
by implicit theories. Self-esteem will be a stronger predictor of wellbeing and achievement 
among students with stronger entity theories. By perceiving their low self-worth to be 
temporary and amenable to effort (Dweck, 2000), it is likely incremental theorists with low 
self-esteem will feel more optimistic about improving their current predicament, and be more 
engaged in remediation resulting in higher wellbeing and achievement.  
Hypothesis 3 
Implicit theories and self-esteem will interact more strongly when the domain of the 
outcome matches the domain of the implicit theory. The review in the previous chapter and 
prior research has shown the importance of domain matching (Schroder et al., 2016). The 
effects of implicit theories tend to vary by domain. As such different domains of implicit 
theories should behave differently. Specifically, for the outcome of grades, implicit theories 
of intelligence should interact with self-esteem more strongly than implicit theories of 
personality. The previous chapter also showed that self-esteem was more closely related to 
implicit theories of wellbeing and personality, than to implicit theories of intelligence. As 
such, implicit theories of personality may be a stronger moderator of the relationship between 
self-esteem and wellbeing than implicit theories of intelligence. 
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Method 
Participants and procedure        
 Study 2 consisted of a convenience sample of 489 female high school students in 
grades 7 to 11 (age: M= 14.7, SD = 1.5). The sample was drawn from an Australian private 
girls’ school located in an affluent neighbourhood. Students completed an online survey 
administered by the teaching staff during school hours.  
Instruments 
Implicit theories. Two scales assessing implicit malleability theories were included. 
The implicit theory of intelligence (ITI) (Dweck et al., 1995) and the implicit personality 
theory scale (ITP) (Erdley et al., 1997). Example items for the ITI are: “Your intelligence is 
something about you that you can’t change very much,” and “You can learn new things, but 
you can’t really change your basic intelligence.” (α = 0.89, for this sample). For the ITP, 
example items are: “You have a certain personality, and that is something that you can’t do 
much about” and “Your personality is something about you that you can’t change very 
much” (α = 0.84, for this sample). Responses for both the ITI and ITP were recorded on 6-
point Likert scales ranging from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 6 “Strongly agree”. Both scales 
were reverse scored such that higher scores indicated stronger incremental theories. 
Wellbeing. The mental health continuum short-form (Keyes, 2006a) was used to 
measure positive aspects of mental health. This scale has been frequently used and found to 
be both reliable and valid (Keyes, 2006b; Lamers, Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, & 
Keyes, 2011). The 12 items were averaged to generate a single variable (α = 0.92, for this 
sample). Example items are: “In the past month, how often did you feel good at managing the 
responsibilities of your daily life?” and “In the past month, how often have you felt interested 
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in life?” Responses were indicated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Never” to 6 
“Every day”. 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured with Rosenberg’s (1979) widely used 10-item 
Self-Esteem scale (RSE). Example items include: “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
failure” and “I feel that I have a number of good qualities” (α = 0.90, for this sample). 
Responses were indicated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 6 
“Strongly agree”. 
Academic achievement. Student grade point average (GPA) was used as a metric of 
academic achievement. GPAs were received directly from the school and could range 
between 0 and 5; higher scores indicated stronger academic performance. GPAs were 
averaged across all subjects and reflected student performance during the entire school year.  
Results 
Intercorrelations 
Intercorrelations were produced using the ‘Conigrave’ package in R (Conigrave, 
2017). Consistent with previous research (Keyes, 2006b), self-esteem and wellbeing were 
highly correlated as shown by Table 3. The ITI and ITP were moderately related to each 
other, replicating findings by Schroder et al. (2016). The ITI and ITP were weakly related to 
self-esteem, which was consistent with previous research (De Castella et al., 2013). The ITI, 
ITP and self-esteem were weakly correlated with GPA. Wellbeing and GPA were unrelated – 
high achieving students are not necessarily the happiest students. Finally, in line with 
hypothesis 1, both the ITI and ITP were positively related to improved wellbeing, which is a 
novel finding as little research has looked at the relationship between implicit theories and 
wellbeing previously. 
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Table 2. 
Summary of intercorrelations means and standard deviations (study 2) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
1. ITP -     3.89 1.19 
2. ITI .40** -    4.40 1.17 
3. Self-esteem .23** .24** -   4.27 0.93 
4. Wellbeing .23** .23** .67** -  4.45 0.95 
5. GPA .20** .19** .16** .09 - 3.94 0.66 
Note. ITP = implicit theory of personality; ITI = implicit theory of intelligence;  
*p<0.05. **p<0.01. 
Implicit theories, self-esteem and wellbeing 
I utilized regression analyses to test the hypothesis that incremental theories would 
moderate the links between self-esteem and wellbeing. Two separate multiple regression 
models were conducted, for ITP and ITI, respectively. All coefficients were standardized. In 
the first model self-esteem had a substantial main effect predicting wellbeing (β = 0.67, SE = 
0.03, t = 20.15 95% CI [0.61, 0.74]), as did ITP (β = 0.08, SE = 0.03, t = 2.32 95% CI [0.01, 
0.14]), which were qualified by an interaction between self-esteem and ITP (β = -0.08, SE = 
0.03, t = -2.71 95% CI [-0.14,-0.02]). Simple slopes analysis was performed using the car 
package in R (Fox & Weisberg, 2010) that allowed us to test the relationship between self-
esteem and wellbeing when ITP was low and high (-1 and +1SD respectively). Interactions 
were plotted using the ‘Conigrave’ package in R (Conigrave, 2017). As depicted in Figure 
10, self-esteem was a stronger predictor of wellbeing for individuals who were low in ITP (β 
= 0.72, SE = 0.04, t = 11.95, 95% CI [0.64, 0.81]) than for individuals high in ITP (β = 0.57, 
SE = 0.05, t = 16.30, 95% CI [0.47, 0.66]).  
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Figure 10. ITP moderating the link between self-esteem and wellbeing. 
ITP = Implicit Theories of Personality. 
 
In the second model, both self-esteem (β = 0.68, SE = 0.03, t = 19.92, 95% CI [0.61, 
0.75]) and the ITI (β = 0.07, SE = 0.03, t = 2.02, 95% CI [0.00, 0.13]) uniquely predicted 
wellbeing but I found no evidence of an interaction between the ITI and self-esteem (β = -
0.01, SE = 0.03, t = -0.20, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.05]).  
These results support hypothesis 2, that self-esteem is a stronger predictor of 
wellbeing amongst people with strong entity theories. This means that drops in self-esteem 
are associated with greater drops in wellbeing for people who perceive the self to be more 
fixed. Individuals with high self-esteem tended to have similar levels of wellbeing 
irrespective of whether they viewed the self as fixed or malleable. In contrast, individuals 
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with low self-esteem tended to have substantially higher wellbeing if they had stronger 
incremental theories.       
Implicit theories, self-esteem and academic grades 
To test the hypothesis that incremental theories of intelligence will be related to 
improved academic performance in individuals with low self-esteem, I ran two regression 
models for each domain of implicit theory. All coefficients were standardized. In the first 
model, ITP and self-esteem were both found to have substantial main effects predicting 
academic performance (β = 0.15, SE = 0.05, t = 2.89, 95% CI [0.05, 0.25]; β = 0.12, SE = 
0.05, t = 2.24, 95% CI [0.01, 0.22]; respectively) but, as expected, I found no evidence of an 
interaction between self-esteem and ITP (β = -0.01, SE = 0.05, t = -0.26, 95% CI [-0.10, 
0.08]). In the second model, only the ITI had a main effect predicting GPA (β = 0.18, SE = 
0.05, t = 3.41, 95% CI [0.08, 0.28]). While self-esteem had no main effect (β = 0.09, SE = 
0.05, t = 1.63, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.19]), it predicted GPA, as expected, through an interaction 
between self-esteem and ITI (β = -0.10, SE = 0.05, t = -2.12, 95% CI [-0.19, -0.01]). I reran 
the analysis controlling for school year and confirmed that this effect could not be explained 
by clustering of students within year groups (those results are reported in Appendix E). 
As illustrated in Figure 11, simple slopes analysis showed that amongst individuals 
with low ITI (-1 SD) a significant positive relationship was found between self-esteem and 
GPA (β = 0.18, SE = 0.06, t = 3.02, 95% CI [0.06, 0.30]). However, in individuals high in ITI 
(+1 SD), the relationship between self-esteem and academic grades was non-significant (β = -
0.01, SE = .08, t = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.14]). 
These findings support Hypothesis 2. Self-esteem was a predictor of academic grades 
in those with stronger entity theories — individuals with lower self-esteem tended to receive 
worse grades. However, among individuals with stronger incremental theories, self-esteem 
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and grades were not associated. In other words, students with strong incremental theories 
achieved similar grades regardless of whether they perceived their worth to be high or low.  
 
Figure 11. ITI moderating the link between self-esteem and GPA. 
ITI = Implicit theories of intelligence. 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, I found that implicit malleability theories moderate the links of self-
esteem with wellbeing and academic achievement in female high school students. 
Incremental theories provided little benefit to students with high self-esteem. However, 
among students with low self-esteem (-2 SD), relative to those with weaker incremental 
theories (-2 SD), students with stronger incremental theories (+2 SD) scored 32.5% higher on 
measures of wellbeing, and achieved 28.8% higher grades. 
As expected, these relationships were domain specific. Implicit theories of personality 
moderated the effects of self-esteem on wellbeing, while implicit theories of intelligence 
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moderated the effects of self-esteem on academic achievement. These findings suggest that 
implicit malleability theories not only prevent the formation of negative self-evaluations, as 
shown in past research (Erdley et al., 1997; Mueller & Dweck, 1998), but may also be related 
to the extent to which those evaluations are associated with negative outcomes once formed. 
Prior research has shown that incremental theories provide a framework with which to 
interpret the meaning of external events such as failures (Miu et al., 2014). The results of 
Study 2 suggest that they may also change the way that negative evaluations are interpreted 
and related to the self. 
Limitations 
As this research is cross-sectional, causal inferences cannot be made. It is not clear if 
implicit theories are changing the relationship between self-esteem and the outcome variables 
or if the opposite is true. Longitudinal or experimental studies are required to establish the 
direction of effects. Further, as this sample included only female high school students, it 
remains to be seen whether these results would generalise to males or beyond educational 
settings to adults. These results need to be replicated in a more diverse sample. 
Chapter summary 
I found that in high school girls, implicit theories are not only associated with higher 
self-esteem, but they also interact with self-esteem to predict a range of outcomes. Incremental 
theories are most strongly associated with improved wellbeing and academic achievement in 
those with low self-esteem. In Chapter 5 I replicate and extend these findings in a large 
representative sample of American adults of both genders. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICIT THEORIES AS A MODERATOR 
OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-ESTEEM AND 
NEGATIVE OUTCOMES IN ADULTS 
Introduction 
In Study 2, I found that implicit malleability theories and self-esteem interact to 
predict wellbeing and academic performance. The extent to which self-esteem was related to 
wellbeing was weaker for those with stronger incremental theories. For academic 
achievement, self-esteem was only related to student GPA among those with weaker 
incremental theories; in students with stronger incremental theories, self-esteem had no 
relationship to performance. When it came to wellbeing, the extent to which lower self-
esteem was associated with lower wellbeing was stronger for those with stronger entity 
theories.  
As this study relied on a sample of affluent high school girls, its findings cannot be 
generalised to the broader population. It is possible that the moderating role of implicit 
theories only works during adolescence when self-images are less stable (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 
2015). In order to replicate and extend these findings of Study 2, I test these relationships in a 
large representative sample of American community members. Specifically I measure the 
extent to which implicit theories moderate the relationship between wellbeing and progress 
on personal goals. In this instance progress on personal goals is a proxy for achievement. As 
the population for Study 3 is a community sample no metric of academic achievement was 
available. This is because standardized testing is only available in educational populations.  
I hypothesised that the effects found in Study 2 would generalise to a broader sample 
of Americans. Specifically, that incremental theories would be related to improved wellbeing 
and progress on personal strivings, and that implicit theories would moderate the relationship 
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between self-esteem and both wellbeing and achievement. Age and gender were not expected 
to affect the interactions between implicit theories and self-esteem. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
Do the findings in Study 2 generalise to a representative sample of adults? 
Specifically, in adults of both gender, will implicit theories moderate the relationship between 
self-esteem and wellbeing, and self-esteem and achievement? 
Hypothesis 1 
I hypothesized that the findings in Study 2 generalise to a representative sample of 
adults?  Specifically, the links between self-esteem and both wellbeing and achievement are 
expected to be moderated by implicit theories. Self-esteem will be a stronger predictor of 
wellbeing and achievement among students with stronger entity theories. 
Method 
Participants and design         
 Study 3 utilised a nationally representative sample of Americans (N=7,884; 52% 
females; age: M=47.9, SD=16). Participants completed an online survey administered by a 
professional survey company. The initial part of the survey consisted of a demographics form 
and a measure of personal strivings. The remaining survey employed matrix sampling or a 
planned missing data design (Graham, Taylor, Olchowski, & Cumsille, 2006; Schafer, 1997), 
such that each participant received a random set of 60 items and each item had responses 
from at least 21% of the sample (1655 participants). Since the data were missing-completely-
at-random, multiple imputations (implemented in the R package, Amelia II (Honaker, King, 
& Blackwell, 2011) were used to account for missing data uncertainty. The random set of 60 
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items that each participant completed was selected from a larger pool of items consisting of 
different measures suited for separate studies, some of which have been published (Ciarrochi 
et al., 2014; Sahdra et al., 2016; Sahdra, Ciarrochi, & Parker, 2016). For the purposes of the 
current study, I focused on the following instruments:  
Instruments 
Implicit theories. Three scales assessing implicit theories were included. The theory 
of intelligence (ITI) and morality scales (ITM) (Dweck et al., 1995) both contained three 
items (Dweck et al., 1995). Items for the ITI were the same as in Study 2 (α = 0.78, for this 
sample). Example items for the ITM were “A person’s moral character is something very 
basic about them and it can’t be changed very much” and “There is not much that can be 
done to change a person’s moral traits” (α = 0.68, for this sample). Two items from the 
Implicit Person Theory scale (Dweck et al., 1995) were included “The kind of person 
someone is is something very basic about them and it can’t be change very much” and 
“People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t really be 
changed” (α = 0.58, for this sample). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with these statements using a rating scale ranging from 1 “Strongly agree” to 6 “Strongly 
disagree”. The third item of this scale was omitted due to a clerical error (two items were 
repeated). This omission may have resulted in the poor internal consistency which was 
observed. This low alpha reliability raises the possibility that these two items do not 
adequately represent the target construct. In order to investigate this, factor analysis was 
performed (reported in supplementary materials, S2). This analysis suggested that the items 
from the implicit theory of morality and personality scales loaded onto the same factor, 
whereas the implicit theory of intelligence items loaded onto a separate factor. All analyses 
were completed for the two-item implicit person theory measure, and the combined person 
and morality measure. As the results of these regressions were identical, for simplicity I only 
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report the outcomes of the combined measure here (ITP) (α = 0.78, for this sample), but see 
the supplementary materials for the full analyses and replication involving only the implicit 
theory of personality items. 
Wellbeing and self-esteem. I utilized the same self-esteem (α = 0.70, for this sample) 
and wellbeing measures (α = 0.86, for this sample) described in Study 2. Flourishing 
responses were indicated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 “Never” to 6 “Every day”. 
Responses to the RSE were indicated on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 “Very strongly 
disagree” to 9 “Very strongly agree”. 
Achievement. In the absence of any variables measuring academic achievement, I 
utilized a measure of progress on personal strivings as a generalised metric of achievement. I 
employed an idiographic measure of personal strivings (Emmons & McAdams, 1991) in 
which respondents were asked to list four personal strivings and rate how satisfied they were 
with the progress they had made on those goals in the last ten weeks. Participants indicated 
their responses using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Disagree strongly” to 6 “Agree 
strongly” (α = 0.69 across all four strivings in this sample). 
Multiple imputation and pooling of results 
Multiple imputation resulted in 25 complete versions of the same dataset. Simulation 
studies have shown that that when data is missing completely at random, results obtained 
from multiple imputed datasets accurately reflect those that would be obtained from the 
theoretically complete dataset (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). Multiple imputation is an effective 
way of dealing with missing data, however the resulting set of datasets presents some 
challenges for analysis. Any analysis must be repeated on each dataset separately, and then 
the results pooled to produce a single set of statistics. The resulting statistics are then 
interpretable as if they had come from a single dataset. However, due to the different 
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structure of this data, most of the regular functions in R will not work with multiply imputed 
data. As a result researchers need to use two sets of functions for the same tasks depending on 
whether they are working on multiply imputed data, or a standard dataset. In order to improve 
this workflow I wrote an R package “Conigrave”. This package was written specifically for 
this study. It is hosted on the Central R Archive Network (CRAN) and may be accessed by 
anyone for free. This package includes functions to prepare correlation matrices and 
interaction plots. The functions automatically detect the structure of the dataset, apply the 
appropriate methods, and present the results in a form ready for publication. This way the 
same set of functions can be used on lists of multiply imputed datasets and regular datasets. 
This package was used to generate the correlation matrices in this thesis, as well as the 
interaction plots. This package relied on functions from three other packages: ‘ggplot2’ (for 
plotting interactions; Wickham, 2016); ‘mitools’ (for pooling regression results; Lumley, 
2006); and ‘miceadds’ (for pooling correlations; Robitzsch, Grund, & Henke, 2014). 
Results 
Demographics 
 Participants were 7884 Americans (52.4% female, n = 4136). Ages ranged from 18 to 
99 (M = 49, SD = 17.0). Participants represented a broad cross-section of the population. The 
majority of the sample were in relationships (64.8%; n = 2774). Just over half the sample had 
finished a college degree (51.4%; n = 51.4%). Roughly half of the sample was Caucasian 
(51.5%; n = 4062), 7.3% were African American (n = 573), and 5.6% were Hispanic (n = 
442). 
Intercorrelations 
Intercorrelations were produced using the ‘Conigrave’ package in R (Conigrave, 
2017).  Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4. ITI and ITP were 
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moderately correlated with each other and weakly to self-esteem and wellbeing at similar 
magnitudes as was found in Study 2, and in prior research (as demonstrated in Study 1). Self-
esteem was moderately correlated with both wellbeing and striving progress. Both implicit 
theory measures had a mean past the midpoint, suggesting that the participants tended to have 
stronger incremental theories. 
 
Table 3. 
Summary of intercorrelations, means and standard deviations (Study 3) 
  1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
1. ITP -    
 
3.59 1.00 
2. ITI .45* -   
 
3.92 1.23 
3. Self-esteem .10* .17* -  
 
6.52 1.54 
4. Wellbeing .22* .19* .55* - 
 
3.81 0.88 
5. Progress .17* .13* .31** .44** - 4.40 1.04 
Note. ITP = implicit theory of personality; ITI = implicit theory of intelligence; SE = 
self-esteem; Progress = Subjective progress on personal strivings. 
*p<0.05. **p<0.01. 
 
Implicit theories self-esteem and wellbeing 
To replicate my original finding that implicit malleability theories moderate the 
relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing, I utilized regression analysis. Regressions 
results for each imputation were combined using the R package ‘mitools’ (Lumley, 2006). To 
test whether the effects observed in Study 2 (female adolescents) apply to both males and 
female participants (of all ages), I added age and gender as moderators. Preliminary analyses 
showed that age did not moderate the key test of interaction between self-esteem and implicit 
malleability theories, and therefore age is omitted from the models reported here to simplify 
the presentation of findings. Standardized regression coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals are reported below in Table 4.  
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Table 4. 
Wellbeing predicted by implicit theories of personality, self-esteem and gender 
  β SE t 95% CI 
Intercept 0.01 0.02 0.48 [-0.03, 0.04] 
ITP 0.22 0.03 7.80 [0.16, 0.27]* 
SE 0.48 0.02 27.54 [0.45, 0.52]* 
Female 0.00 0.03 0.06 [-0.05, 0.06] 
SE * ITP -0.09 0.02 -5.18 [-0.13, -0.06]* 
SE * Female 0.10 0.02 4.43 [0.05, 0.14]* 
ITP * Female -0.09 0.02 -3.84 [-0.14, -0.04]* 
SE * ITP * Female 0.06 0.02 2.52 [0.01, 0.1]* 
Note. ITP = implicit theory of personality, SE = self-esteem. 
*p < 0.05 
 
These findings replicate those found in Study 2; both self-esteem and ITP showed substantial 
main effects predicting wellbeing, which were moderated by the interaction of ITP and self-
esteem. This two-way interaction was qualified by gender in a three-way interaction between 
self-esteem, ITP and gender (Figure 12). Consistent with Study 2, simple slopes analysis 
showed that self-esteem was a stronger predictor of wellbeing among females with low ITP 
(β = 0.61, SE = 0.02, t = 26.04, 95% CI [0.56, 0.66]), compared to females with high ITP (β = 
0.54, SE = 0.02, t = 23.53 95% CI [0.50, 0.59]). This relationship was also found for males 
but the moderating effect ITP had on self-esteem was much stronger. Among males, self-
esteem was more strongly related to wellbeing when ITP was low (β = 0.57, SE = 0.02, t = 
24.28, 95% CI [0.53, 0.62]) than when ITP was high (β = 0.39, SE = 0.03, t = 15.03, 95% CI 
[0.34, 0.44]).  
 These findings confirm those found in Study 2. In those with low self-esteem people 
with stronger incremental theories of personality have substantially improved wellbeing. In 
contrast, among those with higher self-esteem, people had similar levels of wellbeing 
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irrespective of their implicit theories. This dynamic was even more exaggerated in male 
participants. This raises the question, are incremental theories more important for males 
compared with females? 
 
Figure 12. ITP moderating the link between self-esteem and wellbeing by gender 
Note. ITI = Implicit theories of intelligence. 
 
Next, I examined the relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing including the 
ITI as a moderator. I found evidence for a main effect of ITI (β = 0.11, SE = 0.02, t = 5.81, 
95% CI [0.07, 0.14]), a main effect of self-esteem (β = 0.53, SE = 0.01, t = 39.40, 95% CI 
[0.51, 0.56]), and an interaction between incremental theories and self-esteem (β = -0.05, SE 
= 0.01, t = -4.49, 95% CI [-0.07, -0.03]). I found no evidence that the 2-way interaction was 
moderated by gender or age. Simple slopes analysis showed that the link between self-esteem 
and wellbeing was weaker in individuals with higher ITI (+1 SD) (β = 0.48, SE = 0.02, t = 
29.82, 95% CI [0.45, 0.52]), than in individuals with lower ITI (-1 SD) (β = 0.58, SE = 0.02, t 
= 31.83, 95% CI [0.54, 0.62]).  
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Taken together, this set of results show that incremental theories of intelligence and 
personality are related to improved wellbeing. Additionally, both these implicit theories 
moderate the relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing. Further, the moderating effect 
of implicit theories on the relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing was stronger when 
the domain of implicit theory was more closely matched to the domain of the outcome. 
Implicit malleability theories, self-esteem and striving progress 
Finally, I examined the link between self-esteem and incremental theories on striving 
progress. In the first model, I found that there was a main effect of ITI (β = 0.08, SE = 0.02, t 
= 3.70, 95% CI [0.04, 0.12]) and a main effect of self-esteem on striving progress (β = 0.29, 
SE = 0.02, t = 16.89, 95% CI [0.26, 0.33]), but I found no evidence for an interaction between 
ITI and self-esteem (β = -0.02, SE = 0.01, t = -1.50, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.01]). In the second 
model, I found that both self-esteem and ITP had substantial main effects in predicting 
progress on strivings (β = 0.29, SE = 0.02, t = 16.92, 95% CI [0.26, 0.33], β = 0.14, SE = 
0.02, t = 7.94, 95% CI [0.10, 0.17], respectively; which were moderated by an interaction 
between self-esteem and ITP (β = -0.03, SE = 0.01, t = -2.32, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.00]). Simple 
slopes analysis showed that self-esteem was more strongly related to striving progress for 
individuals with low ITP (β = .32, SE = 0.02, t = 14.81, 95% CI [0.28, 0.36]), than for 
individuals with high ITP (β = .26, SE = 0.02, t = 12.41, 95% CI [0.22, 0.30]). 
Discussion 
I found that belief in the malleability of one’s attributes was associated with improved 
progress on personal strivings. Self-esteem was not as strong a predictor of striving progress 
when people felt their personality was more malleable. In this case, the perceived malleability 
of one’s intelligence was not found to be relevant. While cross-sectional, these findings 
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suggest that incremental theories could potentially help people stay engaged with their goals 
when they have poorer self-esteem. 
While much research has demonstrated that incremental theories prevent the 
formation of negative self-evaluations (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Erdley et al., 1997; Mueller 
& Dweck, 1998; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), Study 3 has supported the results of Study 2 
that incremental theories also moderate the extent to which low self-esteem is associated with 
negative outcomes. The interaction effect was replicated in a sample of adults and found to be 
even stronger in adult males. In addition, while low self-esteem was associated with poorer 
academic performance in the student sample, this relationship was eliminated in students with 
stronger incremental theories of intelligence. In Chapter 6 I discuss these findings and 
contextualise them in the literature. 
Limitations 
Due to the cross-sectional nature of these results, causal orderings cannot be 
established. To demonstrate that incremental theories buffers the negative effects of low self-
esteem, researchers would need to use longitudinal, cross-lag, or experimental designs. 
Chapter summary 
In Chapter 5, I replicated the results of Study 2 in a large representative sample of 
American adults. I found that while incremental theories were not associated with much 
benefit in those with high self-esteem, in those with low self-esteem incremental theories 
were associated with improved wellbeing and progress on valued strivings. In Study 3, I 
noted that for wellbeing, the moderating effect of implicit theories on self-esteem was much 
stronger in males than females. In Chapter 6, I provide a general discussion of how the results 
of study 1 - 3 inform research into both implicit theories and self-esteem. Further I discuss 
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the potential for scalable incremental theory interventions to improve wellbeing in large 
populations.  
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CHAPTER SIX: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
 In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 I presented the findings of my thesis. Specifically, in Chapter 3 
I presented results that showed implicit theories and self-esteem are positively associated 
with each other. In Chapters 4 and 5, I demonstrated in two large cross-sectional samples, 
that implicit theories moderate the relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing, and 
between self-esteem and achievement, as measured both objectively (i.e., grades) and 
subjectively (i.e., perceived striving progress). This is the first body of research that has 
demonstrated that implicit theories and self-esteem interact to predict outcomes cross-
sectionally. 
In this final chapter I discuss these findings and contextualise them within the broader 
psychological literature. I argue that implicit malleability theories and self-esteem should be 
considered together. While self-esteem is a primary driver of human affective states and 
behaviour, the effects of low self-esteem depend on context (internal and external). The 
findings of this thesis suggest that implicit theories may be an important contextual factor that 
change the effects of self-esteem. I argue that while the benefits of implicit theories may be 
small relative to other constructs due to the scalability of implicit theory interventions, they 
could prove to be a useful tool to interventions seeking to reduce the harms of low self-
esteem. 
Do incremental theories lead to higher self-esteem? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, raising self-esteem is not necessarily a desirable goal in 
and of itself. Self-esteem may be a form of social perception that indicates social safety 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Low self-esteem may be a state of stress resulting from threats 
of social exclusion. As such the problem may be the fact that someone is not well socially 
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integrated, rather than that they currently feel bad about themselves. This means that 
programs which improve social connectedness resulting in higher self-esteem, may be 
superior to those which just try to make people feel good, without improving the relationships 
between people. Incremental theories may serve both these functions. As outlined in Chapter 
2, research has shown that when people perceive their characteristics to be malleable, they are 
more likely to engage in self-improvement. This dynamic has led many theorists to claim that 
incremental theorists may be better able to learn from failure and reach their full potential 
(e.g. Dweck, 2006). If this is the case, incremental theorists should be able to respond 
effectively to threats of exclusion, and through remediation, improve their self-esteem. 
However, this was not supported by the findings presented in Chapter 3. In a meta-analysis, I 
showed that there is only a weak positive association between self-esteem and incremental 
theories. If incremental theorists really do constitute learning superheroes, they do not let it 
go to their heads. So why is the association between self-esteem and implicit theories so 
small? Perhaps entity theories have their own strategies for self-esteem repair which are 
effective in their own right. 
Incremental and entity theories – strategies for social dominance 
Incremental theorists tend to respond differently to failure compared with entity 
theorists. Rather than avoid challenges, incremental theorists approach them with a view to 
learn and improve. Researchers have referred to this emphasis on learning as a mastery 
orientation (Ames, 1995). In contrast, entity theorists often react poorly to failure because 
they are preoccupied with being seen to perform well. This has been referred to as a 
performance orientation (Ames, 1995). This makes entity theorists more focused on hiding 
perceived defects rather than learning. They will even self-sabotage if it will help explain 
away failures in socially acceptable ways (Ommundsen, 2001). If this is the case, why are 
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incremental theories not associated with substantially higher self-esteem? Shouldn’t a focus 
on learning rather than performance protect the self from failures and disappointments? 
Perhaps, but incremental theorists may be just as forgiving of the failures of others, meaning 
that they stay level headed. 
Self-esteem is based on social comparisons (Marsh et al., 2015). People tend to have 
higher self-esteem when they judge themselves as being more competent and socially 
accepted relative to others (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Marsh & Hau, 2003). Incremental 
theorists tend to have an optimistic orientation towards failure. However this optimism is not 
restricted to the self, but also afforded to one’s rivals (Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007). As a 
result, incremental theories cause people to become more forgiving of their own failures. But, 
any benefit to incremental theorists’ self-esteem may be lost as their forgiving orientation is 
extended to others. For example, an incremental theorists may discover following a test that 
they are a poor performer at mathematics. Because they see their attributes as malleable, they 
might think that this poor performance is due to a lack of effort rather than a permanent 
defect. However, this favourable interpretation wouldn’t make them think that they’re any 
better at the test relative to other students. After all, those other students can improve their 
performance as well. As a result, despite this positive outlook, the poor performing 
incremental theorists may still experience a drop in self-esteem. Incremental theorists are 
likely to still be sensitive to social comparisons, even though they view themselves and others 
flexibly. Indeed, the intense drive to remediate shown by incremental theorists may 
demonstrate that they still find failure threatening (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008; Park & Kim, 
2015). 
Perhaps the growth orientation of incremental theorists is a strategy for achieving 
social dominance, and acceptance by others, rather than being evidence of incremental 
theorists rising above external comparisons. The responses to failure that incremental and 
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entity theorists exhibit, may have similar aims. Entity theorists may hide deficits to maximise 
their social value. Incremental theorists may focus on remediation for the same purpose. It 
may be that failure is just as motivating for entity theorists as it is to incremental theorists; 
they may just be motivated to engage in different activities.  
This would fit nicely with a study performed by Park and Kim (2015). Park and Kim 
(2015) induced failure in subjects and then gave them a new task. They told subjects that this 
new task measured skill in either the same domain they had failed in, or that it measured skill 
in a new domain. When subjects were told the domain was the same as the one in which they 
failed, incremental theorists had improved performance relative to entity theorists. However, 
when they were told the same task was in a novel domain, entity theorists outperformed 
incremental theorists. It was almost as if incremental theorists could not move on once they 
had experienced failure. They needed to put it right. In contrast, while entity theorists did not 
seem to enjoy repeating tasks where they had experienced failure, they could completely 
engage with tasks in other domains. This finding suggests that entity theorists may not shut 
down following failure, they may apply just as much effort in other areas of their lives. 
These dynamics have been missed in many lab-based studies. A typical protocol used 
in research in implicit theories gives students a task, provides subjects with failure feedback, 
and then has them repeat the task in which they failed (e.g. Mueller & Dweck, 1998). The 
autonomy of entity theorists to move on to other tasks is restricted in order to maintain 
experimental controls. This may make entity theorists appear more hopeless than they would 
when they are granted greater freedom. When unconstrained, entity theorists may utilise 
forms of self-esteem maintenance which are currently not well known. Nussbaum and Dweck 
(2008) for instance discovered that entity theorists will engage in downward social 
comparisons following failure. This strategy may be successful in maintaining reasonably 
higher self-esteem, yet may also come with other drawbacks such as feelings of enmity to 
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others, or reduced self-compassion which may help explain the findings seen in Chapters 4 
and 5 i.e. (stronger incremental theories are linked to higher wellbeing among subjects with 
low self-esteem.) 
In summary, the results of the meta-analysis in Chapter 3 suggest that incremental 
theories are only modestly associated with higher self-esteem. It’s likely that entity and 
incremental theorists both have strategies which are effective in maintain feelings of social 
acceptance. Entity theorists tend to focus on downward social comparisons, and 
demonstrating competence in other domains (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), while incremental 
theorists tend to engage in remediation.  It may not make sense to think of incremental 
theories as always beneficial, and entity theories as always harmful. However what are the 
results of these two strategies of self-esteem maintenance? While both strategies may be 
reasonably effective at maintain self-esteem, do they come with any drawbacks? The results 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that incremental theorists tend to maintain higher 
wellbeing and achievement during times when self-esteem is low. 
The interaction of self-esteem and implicit malleability theories 
Implicit theories appear unlikely to be a major factor which leads to higher self-
esteem. Incremental and entity theorists both have complicated methods of self-esteem repair 
(Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008; Park & Kim, 2015). The meta-analysis presented in Chapter 3 
showed that incremental theories were associated with slightly higher self-esteem. But this 
association was not strong enough that one would expect to find that either construct would 
reliably drive change in the other. But what are the consequences of the self-esteem repair 
strategies that incremental and entity theorists employ? 
In Chapter 2 I hypothesised that implicit theories may change the extent to which low 
self-esteem is associated with negative outcomes. In Chapters 3 and 4 I found evidence that 
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supported this hypothesis. Implicit theories moderated the links between self-esteem and both 
wellbeing and achievement. Subjects with high self-esteem had similar levels of wellbeing 
and achievement, irrespective of implicit theories. However in those with low self-esteem 
incremental theories were associated with greater wellbeing and achievement. While the 
causal ordering is still unclear, cross-sectionally, implicit malleability theories appear to 
flatten the relationship between self-esteem and negative outcomes. Low self-esteem was not 
as strongly associated with lower wellbeing, poorer grades or with perceived achievement 
among individuals with higher incremental theories.  
Wellbeing 
In Chapters 3 and 4, across two large and diverse samples, I found that self-esteem 
and implicit theories interacted to predict wellbeing. Wellbeing is an extremely important 
construct. Mental health and wellbeing are essential for societal functioning. In Australia the 
annual costs of poor mental health are estimated to be as high as $28.6 billion dollars in 
combined direct and indirect costs; and an additional $12 billion a year in lost productivity 
(National Mental Health Commission, 2014). Nearly every facet of life is affected by our 
wellbeing. Without good mental health we struggle to turn up to work, care for ourselves or 
connect with loved ones. Maintaining adequate mental health is not merely a hedonistic 
concern, but necessary for engaging with life, caring for our friends, families, and broader 
communities.  
The link between self-esteem and wellbeing is strong (r > .55 in these samples). 
When people feel like they are of low social value, they also tend to feel broadly 
disconnected and unhappy and like life has little meaning. This connection between low self-
esteem and low wellbeing is particularly odious and may drive many of the complications 
experienced with low self-esteem. For instance, the drop in wellbeing could be a driver of 
suicidal ideation which is associated with low self-esteem (Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1997). 
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The results in Chapter 4 and 5 showed that the link between self-esteem and wellbeing is 
dependent on implicit theories. The slope between self-esteem and wellbeing was shallower 
in participants with stronger incremental theories. Individuals with high self-esteem had 
similar levels of wellbeing regardless of their implicit theories. However, among those with 
low self-esteem, people with stronger incremental theories had substantially higher levels of 
wellbeing. Perhaps relative to entity theorists, incremental theorists with low self-esteem 
have improved wellbeing as their modes of self-esteem repair are more adaptive. 
Research into aspirations has shown that focusing on self-promotion or social 
recognition tends to be extrinsically motivated, and results in lower wellbeing (Kasser & 
Ryan, 1996). Conversely, focusing on personal growth tends to be intrinsically motivated and 
has been found to predict improved wellbeing. Threats to self-esteem tend to result in self-
esteem maintenance behaviours which vary based on people’s implicit theories (Nussbaum & 
Dweck, 2008). The way that higher self-esteem is pursued may moderate the extent that low 
self-esteem leads to negative outcomes (Crocker & Park, 2004). Incremental theorists may be 
intrinsically motivated to remediate following failures. This may mean that while low self-
esteem is still stressful for incremental theorists, the process of improving oneself could be 
rewarding. In contrast entity theorists may worry about how they are perceived, may become 
competitive and try to put others down in order to look better (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). 
On top of the stress that comes with low self-esteem, this extrinsically motivated strategy of 
self-esteem repair may reduce feelings of connection to others, resulting in lower wellbeing. 
Academic grades 
In Chapter 4, I showed that self-esteem and grades tended to be positively associated. 
That is, entity theorists with lower self-esteem tended to receive poorer grades. However, this 
main effect of self-esteem on grades was totally eliminated by the interaction between self-
esteem and implicit theories. In students with stronger entity theories of intelligence, there 
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was a clear positive relationship between self-esteem and grades. In contrast, for students 
with stronger incremental theories, there was no relationship between self-esteem and grades 
whatsoever, the slope was indiscernible from being flat. In this sample, incremental theorists 
with the lowest self-esteem were just as likely to perform as well as those with the highest 
self-esteem. Among students with low self-esteem, this dynamic resulted in substantially 
better grades for participants with strong incremental theories. On average students with low 
self-esteem and strong incremental theories received grades were 28.8% higher than students 
with low self-esteem and strong entity theories. Why might this be the case? 
It is possible that incremental theories have utility in keeping people engaged with 
school work at times when they feel low. Entity theorists with low self-esteem may begin to 
disengage from school when they feel that they are not good as others. Their low status 
relative to others may be interpreted as being permanent resulting in hopelessness. Entity 
theorists may even anticipate failure and as a result engage in self-handicapping in order to 
generate excuses for poor performance (Ommundsen, 2001). If people see that you don’t try 
at school, then failure can be blamed on a lack of interest, rather than a lack of natural ability. 
In contrast, the results of Chapter 4 suggest that incremental theorists may find low self-
esteem less disruptive to their academic performance. As they believe the self to be 
malleable, they may be more likely to see point in trying to improve themselves. As a result 
they may stay engaged with activities like schoolwork may not have their performance 
hampered to the same degree.  However, as this is cross-sectional research, a few causal 
orderings are possible. Before conclusive statements can be made, these causal orderings 
need to be assessed with experimental and longitudinal research. For instance, poor grades 
could cause lower self-esteem. In this case, perhaps incremental theories are buffering the 
extent that self-esteem falls, rather than improving academic achievement. 
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Striving progress 
Incremental theories also moderated the association between self-esteem and 
perceived achievement in adults. In adults, striving progress was used as a proxy for 
achievement. Self-esteem was not as strongly associated with progress on strivings among 
individuals with stronger incremental theories. A major problem with low self-esteem is that 
it makes people shy away from challenges (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). Because people 
feel worthless they feel any attempt to try anything new will end poorly causing others to 
realise that they are defective.  
The interaction of self-esteem and implicit theories on striving progress suggests that 
incremental theories could be important in keeping people engaged with valued goals. Low 
self-esteem may broadly make people feel hopeless, making people disconnect from personal 
projects. However, perceptions of self-malleability may combat feelings of hopelessness. In 
this way, appreciation for the ability to change could help people to stay engaged with goals. 
This could have a wide range of positive effects depending on the nature of the goal. But 
regardless of the goal type, people have a fundamental need to feel competent (Deci & Ryan, 
2000). Just being able to complete a goal, even a simple one, may improve people’s 
wellbeing and help build confidence for them to try other challenges. 
In summary, I found that the relationship between self-esteem and wellbeing, and 
self-esteem and achievement is moderated by implicit theories. For incremental theorists, 
self-esteem may be merely an uncomfortable transient experience which helps them focus on 
personal growth. As a result, incremental theorists may be intrinsically motivated in their 
efforts to repair their self-esteem. This may protect their wellbeing and achievement relative 
to entity theorists (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). In contrast, low self-esteem may cause entity 
theorists to become focused on putting down others in order to maintain their appearance 
(Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). This mode of self-esteem repair may be extrinsically motivated 
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and result in lower wellbeing. While low self-esteem is often pathologised, the outcomes of 
low self-esteem may vary depending on whether the self is perceived to be fixed or 
malleable. Rather than trying to eliminate low self-esteem, promoting incremental theories 
may limit the extent that low self-esteem results in negative outcomes. In this way 
incremental theories may buffer people from the negative effects of low self-esteem enabling 
them to focus on personal growth. If the moderating effect of incremental theories on the link 
between self-esteem and wellbeing, and self-esteem and achievement, can be demonstrated 
causally, incremental theories may have utility in mental health interventions. But is everyone 
likely to benefit from incremental theories to the same degree? This thesis uncovered 
evidence that among those with low self-esteem, incremental theories may provide more 
benefit for males than females. 
Self-esteem, self-enhancement and gender 
In Chapter 5, I showed that the moderating effect of incremental theories was weaker 
in females than males. While incremental theories were still more strongly associated with 
wellbeing among women with low self-esteem than with high self-esteem, the effect was not 
as large as it was for males. This finding was unexpected. In this section I discuss ways in 
which this gender effect may be understood in future research. I will introduce two 
admittedly speculative explanations for this effect. Based on studies of attraction, I suggest 
that males may have more to gain from improved social status. I will also discuss an 
alternative (or complementary) explanation that females may be less able to gain social status 
due to social inequalities. I suggest that due to these dynamics, among people with lower self-
esteem, males may be more likely to feel reassured and (or) motivated by perceptions of self-
malleability than females. 
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The need to understand gender effects 
 Research has found that males and females are similar across most dimensions. Even 
on traits where men and women have been shown to differ, e.g. on the personality trait 
agreeableness, or empathy (Ciarrochi, Parker, et al., 2016; Nyhus & Pons, 2005), the majority 
of these distributions overlap, and large differences are only seen in the tails. Because men 
and women are so similar it rarely makes sense to include gender in casual models. This is 
because, gender effects are usually better explained by other constructs which may not have 
been measured. For instance, males are incarcerated at a much higher rate than females 
(Freeman, 1996). However it is almost certain that these individuals are not in prison because 
of their gender, but rather because, relative to the general population, they are higher in traits 
such as impulsivity and aggressiveness. It just so happens (for a variety of reasons), that there 
are more males than females who are very high in these traits (Komarovskaya, Loper, & 
Warren, 2007). Accordingly, gender effects highlight ways in which models are incomplete 
and warrant further exploration. In the next two sections I speculate why, among low self-
esteem individuals, incremental theories may result in higher wellbeing for males than 
females. In line with expectancy value theory (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), I suggest that males 
may receive more benefit from incremental theories as they may have more to gain from 
acquiring social status. I also offer an alternative explanation that males may find incremental 
theories more motivating, as they perceive status to be easier to acquire. 
Social status and interest in self-enhancement 
 
Implicit theories may buffer the negative effects of low self-esteem to the extent that 
acquiring social status is valued. As discussed in Chapter 1, self-esteem has been theorised to 
be a form of social perception. High self-esteem may indicate higher social status (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). High self-esteem individuals tend to be motivated, experience positive 
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affect, respond better to failure, and are more likely to engage with challenges (McFarlin & 
Blascovich, 1981; Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1997; Rosenberg et al., 1995). This may be due to 
high status individuals being safer, such that they can afford to take more risks. They have a 
social buffer protecting them from a wide range of external threats (Leary & Baumeister, 
2000). Having low social status on the other hand is both dangerous and costly (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). 
 In our evolutionary history, low status individuals were more likely to be ostracised, 
leaving them vulnerable to starvation and attack from other humans and animals (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). As higher status equates to greater social security, it is likely to be valued 
similarly by both sexes. Regardless of sex, individuals need to maintain good social bonds 
with others to protect themselves from the chaos of nature. So why did the results from 
Chapter 5 show that perceptions of self-malleability in low self-esteem individuals were more 
strongly associated with improved wellbeing and achievement among males relative to 
females? Perhaps, low social status tends to be more costly for males. Or perhaps they desire 
it more, and losing it is experienced as more costly.  Incremental theories may buffer the 
effects of low self-esteem more when acquiring social status is more strongly desired. The 
literature on human sexual attraction may illustrate how low status can be particularly costly 
to males. 
While men and women both value physical attractiveness in mates, women tend to 
consider a wider range of traits when judging the suitability of sexual partners (Buss, 1989). 
Theorists suggest this is due to the relatively higher investment females must make in 
reproducing (Buss, 1989). Males can end their investment in offspring immediately following 
copulation. Females however, cannot reproduce again for the duration of their pregnancy. 
Even after parturition, they are incentivised to continue investing in their child, as otherwise 
it will not survive, and the evolutionary cost of rearing that child would not be returned 
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(Dawkins, 2016). Due to this dynamic, reproduction tends to be more costly to females than 
males across many species. As females invest more in children, they also tend to be more 
discriminating about when they have a child, and with whom (Buss, 1989). 
Evolutionary theorists have argued that females tend to be more discriminating on a wide 
range of traits in partners, as they are not only looking for healthy partners, but also for 
partners who can and will dedicate more resources to raising their children (Buss, 1989; 
Ciarrochi & Heaven, 2009; Ciarrochi, Parker, et al., 2016; Dawkins, 2016). One trait that 
females tend to discriminate potential partners on is social status (Chu, Farr, Muñoz, & 
Lycett, 2011). This is thought to be a desirable trait because high status men may have more 
resources to draw upon in helping to raise children (Buss, 1989). Additionally, any genetic 
pre-disposition for acquiring and maintaining status may be passed down to their offspring 
who may also be more likely to pass on their genes.  
As status is found to be more appealing by females than by males (Buss, 1989; Wang et 
al., 2018), low self-esteem should be experienced as more threatening to males (all else being 
equal). Not only are low status males vulnerable to physical threats of social exclusion, but in 
addition they are also less likely to find a mate (Chu et al., 2011), or retain one (Buss, Goetz, 
Duntley, Asao, & Conroy-Beam, 2017). The ability to rise in social status may therefore be 
more comforting or motivating for males than females.  
Perhaps incremental theories are only reassuring to people with low self-esteem, if they 
desire more status. Even though low self-esteem individuals currently may not have access to 
security or the resources they might wish to have, if they believe that change is possible, then 
through effort they may expect a more positive outlook. Given that males may have more to 
gain from increases in social status, the value placed on acquiring more status, when status is 
low, may be greater. As a result, incremental theories may be more reassuring for males 
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compared with females, and accordingly lead to disproportionately improved wellbeing and 
academic performance. 
This hypothesis could be tested relatively easily. If true, then the gender effect should 
disappear after controlling for interest in self-improvement, or desire to acquire status. Other 
variables of interest may include current romantic status, and perceptions of how sexually 
desirable they perceive themselves to be. In this section I have speculated about why males 
with low self-esteem might value self-enhancement more, and as a result receive more benefit 
from incremental theories. A second possible explanation for this gender effect, is that 
incremental theories may provide greater comfort to individuals who perceive acquiring 
status to be easier. I discuss this alternative explanation for this gender effect in the next 
section. 
Status, implicit theories and internal locus of control 
 Expectancy value theory suggests that people are more likely to engage in behaviours 
not only when they place more value on the outcome, but also when they perceive success to 
be more likely (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). In the previous section, I argued that males may 
value rising up social ranks more than females because they are penalised more for having 
low status. However, it is possible that men and women value status similarly but, due to 
social inequalities, higher status is perceived to be more difficult for women to obtain. I argue 
in this section that perceptions of self-malleability may not be as comforting in individuals 
with an external locus of control. 
Social-constructivists have claimed that differences between men and women emerge 
largely due to social processes (e.g. Lorber & Farrell, 1991). For instance, adults have been 
observed to play differently with infants based on their sex. (Frisch, 1977). Specifically, some 
adults have been observed to be more encouraging with infants they perceive to be boys even 
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when the true sex of the child was female (Frisch, 1977). Theorists have argued that due to 
different treatment, girls are not taught to expect to inhabit high status positions in society. 
This in turn is thought to reduce the extent to which women engage with careers which are 
likely to be highly paid (Arulampalam, Booth, & Bryan, 2007; Schwanke, 2013). 
(Arulampalam et al., 2007). Further, some theorists have claimed that due to historical sex 
differences in industries, male-dominated cultures have been created in some high status 
industries which disadvantage women (e.g. Reskin, 1993). 
Historical segregation on the basis of sex has meant that in many sectors females have 
been prevented from inhabiting positions of power. This may mean that females are less 
likely to pursue high status positions as they are perceived as being less obtainable. For 
instance, women are less likely to sign up to STEM courses at university, and less likely to 
persist once entered (Griffith, 2010). Experimental evidence suggests that this may partly be 
due to stereotype threat (Flore & Wicherts, 2015). Stereotype threat refers to psychological 
stress induced by fear about confirming a negative stereotype associated with an aspect of 
one’s identity (Smith, 2004). Theorists have suggested that women are less likely to enter into 
STEM careers because they have been socialised to believe those careers are better suited to 
men. As a result, they may be less likely to expect success (Cheryan, Siy, Vichayapai, Drury, 
& Kim, 2011). The threat of confirming these stereotypes compromises the performance of 
those who successfully enter STEM fields. This has been shown experimentally. Men have 
typically been found to perform better in mathematics tests (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). 
However this may partly be due to stereotype threat. In one study merely telling participants 
that a math test had never shown gender differences in the past, totally eliminated the gap in 
male and female performance relative to controls (Spencer et al., 1999). A meta-analysis of 
similar studies confirmed the presence of stereotype threat, however, it also found evidence 
of publication bias which has called such findings into question and raised the need for large 
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scale replication studies (Flore & Wicherts, 2015). Regardless, both expectancy value 
(Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), and self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1982) would predict that the 
extent to which gender stereotypes contribute to expectations of success, is likely to 
contribute to career decisions.  
While we live in a society where gender norms are currently shifting. It is still true 
that positions of power are currently dominated by men. This may have the effect of reducing 
the extent to which females feel they are able, or likely, to acquire status. In other words, 
when it comes to pursuing self-esteem, females may be more likely to have an external locus 
of control. Females may not feel that their low self-esteem is due to any personal deficiency, 
but rather due to the way that others are treating them. In other words, while they perceive the 
self to be malleable, they still have an external locus of control. In other words, if females 
believe their low self-esteem is not due to their personal qualities, then belief in the ability to 
change is unlikely to be comforting or motivating. This may cause enduring hopelessness 
despite a sense of personal malleability. 
These two explanations are admittedly speculative. Gender has been linked with large 
effect sizes in a wide range of research. However the effect of gender is often highly 
contextual (Hyde, 2005) and the underlying mediational pathways behind these effects may 
be complex. To establish why gender moderates the interaction between self-esteem and 
implicit theories, more research needs to be done. To discredit the first of my hypotheses 
(men have more to gain from status so may find self-malleability more reassuring or 
motivating), one could see if the extent to which social status is valued mediates this gender 
effect. To discredit the second hypothesis (that women perceive structural barriers preventing 
the acquisition of status), one could see if this interaction can be explained by internal locus 
of control.  
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Promoting incremental theories, a better way to respond to low self-esteem?  
This thesis has focused on the role of incremental theories in improving wellbeing and 
achievement in individuals with low self-esteem. But in these models, the contribution of 
incremental theories relative to self-esteem tended to be modest. For instance, in Chapter 4, I 
showed that strong incremental theories were associated with wellbeing scores which were 
32.5% higher in individuals with low self-esteem. But, given the large correlation between 
self-esteem and wellbeing (r = .67 and r = .55 in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively), one could 
argue that it is simpler just to focus on self-esteem and forget incremental theories entirely. 
There are a few problems with this approach. 
First, while the overall impact of incremental theories may be small, some individuals are 
likely to benefit more than others. The interaction between self-esteem and implicit theories, 
shows that self-esteem has different consequences depending on implicit theories. While the 
results presented have shown that having high self-esteem is almost always associated with 
positive outcomes, the inverse is not true for low self-esteem. The outcomes associated with 
low self-esteem are contextual (Marshall et al., 2015; Metalsky et al., 1993). The results 
presented in this thesis suggests that incremental theories may buffer people from the harms 
of low self-esteem. The effects of incremental theories may modest across populations, but 
benefits of these theories may be concentrated among individuals who are the most 
vulnerable. 
Second, self-esteem may be a poor intervention target. While targeting specific self-
concepts has been shown to improve academic outcomes (Marsh & Craven, 2006), self-
esteem is based on social comparison (Marsh, 1990a; Marsh & Hau, 2003), which means that 
self-esteem may be difficult to change at population levels. This may explain why 
interventions aiming to improve global self-esteem have not been successful (Baumeister et 
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al., 2003). As such, even if self-esteem constitutes a causal behemoth, if it cannot easily be 
intervened on at a population level, it may be important to consider the positive effects of 
other mutable constructs like implicit theories (Miu & Yeager, 2015; Yeager, Miu, et al., 
2013). 
The power of interventions on mutable constructs 
It is natural to assume that the most potent constructs make for the best intervention 
targets. Theoretically this may well be true. All else being equal, one is more likely to 
successfully influence an outcome of interest, if an intervention targets a central node in a 
causal model. Interventions which target constructs more distally related to outcomes are less 
likely to be impactful. Practically, the strongest predictors of outcomes may not always be the 
best intervention targets. For instance, IQ has been found to be an incredibly good predictor 
of a wide range of desirable outcomes. IQ is associated with less crime, and greater income 
(Neisser et al., 1996). And yet, general intelligence is stable over time (Neisser et al., 1996) 
and so may be a poor intervention target. Similarly, the five factors of personality explain an 
incredible amount of variance in most psychological phenomena. But like intelligence, 
personality tends to not be responsive to interventions (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012). 
Many of the most predictive constructs in psychology are also the most stable. This 
may be the case for the present constructs. Self-esteem may be more predictive of outcomes, 
but implicit theories, due to its mutability (Yeager et al., 2014), may be a better intervention 
target. The mutability of implicit theories is somewhat surprising given how resistant most 
beliefs are to reassessment. In the next section I discuss why implicit theories may be 
responsive to intervention. 
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Implicit theories can be changed 
Generally, once established, explicitly held beliefs become resistant to change (Baron, 
2008). This is because we tend to have a lot riding on our beliefs. They are not just a 
framework with which to understand the world, but also offer us access to social orders 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Political beliefs, for instance, demarcate tribes. A 
change of opinion may not merely represent a new understanding of the external world, but a 
breaking of important social bonds. Research by Cohen (2003) found that people tend to be 
more supportive of policies from their self-identified political party, even if the content of 
that policy is contrary to their political values. Cohen (2003) suggests that when it comes to 
politics, people often blindly follow the party line because it is easier to adjust their own 
political instincts than to have their membership in their political tribe threatened. 
In addition to giving us access to social orders, beliefs provide information about 
ourselves. Beliefs can often be an indicator of worth. For instance confusion around basic 
scientific or literary concepts may make someone appear inadequate to others (Baron, 2008). 
To reappraise a closely held belief is to reappraise yourself (Bem, 1967). This means that we 
tend to have a lot riding on the way we view the world. For this reason, having your beliefs 
challenged can be highly threatening. Psychologically, dealing with this amount of 
dissonance is a big task. The simple solution is to reject the new information, or to seek 
opposing views in a process called confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). 
Implicit theories may be more vulnerable to re-evaluation than explicit beliefs 
Due to confirmation bias, it would be reasonable to expect that implicit malleability 
beliefs would, like other beliefs, be highly resistant to change (Nickerson, 1998). An entity 
theorist who encounters information about neuroplasticity should attempt to find contrasting 
evidence in order to support their perspective that human attributes are static. This would 
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mean that in experimental conditions, attempts to alter implicit theories would not be 
effective, or be short lasting. This however does not seem to be the case (Miu & Yeager, 
2015). Research has shown that implicit malleability beliefs are vulnerable to reappraisal.  
Implicit theories can be changed, at least in the short term, simply by exposing people 
to new information. Incremental interventions have helped people respond better to failure in 
a broad number of domains (Dweck, 2000). Researchers have been able to change 
participants resilience in the face of failure through effort versus ability praise (Mueller & 
Dweck, 1998), by having subjects read scientific articles on the flexibility of traits (Halperin 
et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2007; Niiya et al., 2004a; Park & Kim, 2015; 
Yeager, Miu, et al., 2013), or having participants read single paragraphs which suggestive 
that human traits are malleable (Burkley et al., 2014; Halperin et al., 2011; Hong et al., 1999; 
Hu et al., 2015; Martocchio, 1994; Park & Kim, 2015; Schroder et al., 2014; Wood & 
Bandura, 1989). 
It is possible that malleability beliefs are more vulnerable to alteration as they have 
never been vocalised. People find making mistakes in public domains highly threatening and 
will argue furiously for a previously stated belief in order to not find themselves on the wrong 
side of the ‘truth’ of the matter (Baron, 2008). But what if you never vocalised your opinion? 
Would these same cognitive biases come into play? Research by Asch (1956) suggests that 
people are quite able to disregard their points of view if they have not been argued for. Asch 
(1956) instructed participants in a group to identify which of a series of lines was shortest. He 
found that while participants could easily tell which line was shortest, if they were among a 
group of confederate participants who all voiced the incorrect answer, participants would 
conform to the views of the group. Even though these participants almost certainly had the 
ability to see which line was shortest, they were able to easily adjust their point of view in 
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order to align with the group consensus. This may happen because they had not vocalised 
their perspective, meaning changing their view did not cause social embarrassment. 
Similarly, implicit theories tend to be unspoken and so may be adjusted without 
causing cognitive dissonance. While perceptions of malleability can be important 
motivational factors, many people may never have considered whether or not they believe 
their traits to be fixed or malleable. While someone may have an underlying concept of 
having either fixed or malleable traits, if they have never argued this point, they may not be 
defensive or embarrassed when their implicit theories are challenged. In some cases being 
challenged on these implicit assumptions has even been shown to be welcome. 
People with low self-esteem may be susceptible to incremental theory interventions 
Failure tends to be a painful experience as it can be used as evidence that you lack 
certain competencies. Failure is all the more threatening however, if one believes their traits 
to be fixed. In this case, their state of incompetence may be a permanent one. Leith et al. 
(2014) found that, following failures, people become more receptive to messages promoting 
incremental theories. The idea of being able to change, or be reborn may be a good news 
story to those with feelings of inadequacy. If this is indeed the case, then the effects of an 
incremental theory intervention may be highly potent for low-self-esteem individuals. People 
with low self-esteem may be highly receptive to messages that their predicament is 
temporary. When people are dissatisfied with themselves, the idea that they could change 
may be a highly attractive idea (Leith et al., 2014). The evidence in this thesis also suggests 
that part of the benefit to incremental theory interventions is in reducing the harmful effects 
of low self-esteem. If proven longitudinally this would mean that low self-esteem participants 
are likely to disproportionately benefit from incremental theory interventions. 
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In summary, unlike most beliefs, implicit malleability theories may be especially 
vulnerable to re-appraisal. This means that unlike self-esteem, incremental theories are highly 
mutable. Implicit theories may be even more vulnerable to re-appraisal in low self-esteem 
individuals (Leith et al., 2014). Coupled with research in this thesis which show that implicit 
theories moderate the negative effects of low self-esteem, incremental theory interventions 
could prove to be a powerful way to manage problems associated with low self-esteem. 
Implications for incremental theory interventions in educational settings  
The potential for incremental theory interventions to reduce the negative effects of 
low self-esteem has direct implications for the educational system. Teenagers are a 
particularly vulnerable demographic with one of the highest burdens of mental illness 
(Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003). Teenagers are also constantly testing 
the limits of their abilities (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Steinberg, 2007) and need to be 
able to recover quickly from failures. As incremental theories can promote more adaptive 
responses to failure, teenagers may benefit greatly from implicit theory interventions. For 
these reasons high schools have been an active testing-ground for implicit theory research 
(e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Miu et al., 2014; Paunesku et al., 2015; 
Yeager et al., 2014; Yeager et al., 2016; Yeager, Miu, et al., 2013). Schools however have 
limited time to host interventions, meaning that interventions compete with each other for 
airtime. In this section I discuss how incremental theory interventions relate to the needs of 
education systems, and why they may be attractive to policy makers.  
Adolescence is a critical developmental period 
Adolescence and young adulthood are key developmental periods. The brain over 
produces dendrites with a peak in grey matter at the age of 11-12 (Johnson, Blum, & Giedd, 
2009). This results in increased neuroplasticity, with the increased interconnectivity of the 
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brain being selectively pruned based on behaviour. (Johnson et al., 2009) The adolescent 
brain remains in this heightened state of neuroplasticity until full development is reached in 
ones early to mid-twenties (Pujol, Vendrell, Junqué, Martí‐Vilalta, & Capdevila, 1993). This 
intense learning helps reform adolescents into their adult roles. But it also means that bad 
habits can quickly take root causing lasting difficulties (Chambers, Taylor, & Potenza, 2003). 
Habits can include overt behaviours such as addiction to drugs and alcohol, as well as more 
subtle behaviours like patterns of thought. Problematic ways of relating to the self and others 
learned in adolescence can endure and cause distress and social difficulties. For these reasons 
adolescence is considered both a critical, and difficult transition period (Ciarrochi, Parker, 
Kashdan, Heaven, & Barkus, 2015). 
In addition to this, adolescents face rapidly changing social roles as they transition 
from of children to adults (Arnett, 2000). This makes their social hierarchies unstable and 
competitive. Rather than being placed in social networks which centre on their families, they 
increasingly identify with their network of peers which are generally less nurturing and more 
competitive (Hayes & Ciarrochi, 2015). This is a high stakes and stressful process. 
Adolescents are essentially discovering what their capabilities are, how they compare to, and 
are connected with others; in essence, who they are. These processes may partly explain why 
adolescents and young adults have the highest burden of mental illness in western 
populations. In the United States of America, one in every five teenagers suffers from some 
form of mental illness in any given year (Merikangas et al., 2010). As teenagers progress 
through this period they tend to experience drops in self-esteem (Heaven & Ciarrochi, 2008; 
Marshall et al., 2014), mental health and hope (Ciarrochi et al., 2015). The ways in which 
individuals respond to drops in self-esteem during this period vary. While some adolescents 
are able to recover, others may enter downward spirals, with lower self-esteem leading to 
worse wellbeing, which in turn leads to lower self-esteem (Ciarrochi et al., 2007). 
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Competition for integration with the education system 
Due to the increased burden of mental illness and the lasting importance of positive 
change, adolescents are highly-sought targets for interventions. Successful interventions 
among this population are generally highly cost-effective. This is because positive change not 
only resolves short-term distress, but may prevent the development of more serious 
conditions later in life (Kessler et al., 2009). For this reason, many researchers try to engage 
with high-schools to target this demographic. In addition to giving access to this sought after 
group, the educational system is sought after as it constitutes a captive audience. That is, 
while most sample pools are made up of voluntary members, all people must pass through the 
school system (Bartlett, 1981). This means that entire generations can participate in 
interventions delivered by educational systems. However, as a result the educational system 
often is faced with a lot of pressure to host many different types of interventions. The 
challenge for researchers is then not merely to make interventions which are effective. After 
all, countless effective interventions have already been developed by psychologists and 
researchers in other fields. Instead, the challenge is to create interventions which are both 
effective and appeal to politicians and to school administrators.  
Schools have only limited resources. Any time given to one intervention prevents the 
pursuit of another, as well as impacts the conduct of day to day operations. Interventions 
must help schools meet their own aims efficiently, in addition to meeting any independent 
aims which researchers see as desirable. While promoting characteristics such as empathy or 
self-compassion may seem like desirable aims, if they do not impact a key performance 
indicator for a politician or a school administrator, an intervention is unlikely to be adopted. 
Incremental theory interventions may have an advantage in this regard as there is some 
evidence that they improve academic performance (e.g. Blackwell et al., 2007; Yeager et al., 
2014) 
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 Another issue with many interventions being widely adopted is their economics. 
Many psychological interventions require a lot of babysitting. Workshops as described in 
journals are often closely overseen by trained researchers, or require one-on-one interactions. 
In some cases these workshops do not replicate, or have much weaker effects when applied to 
new contexts, or without the original researcher’s guidance (McDonald, Keesler, Kauffman, 
& Schneider, 2006). Even if these programs fulfil their stated aims, the cost of administration 
at scale can dwarf any return on positive outcomes. This makes them unlikely to be broadly 
adopted. In summary, in order to be broadly adopted, successful interventions must be cost 
efficient, scalable, and improve outcomes that are desirable to policy makers. 
Incremental theory interventions in schools 
While some incremental theories fall into the traps described above, others have 
proven to be scalable and of interest to schools. In this section I describe existing incremental 
theory interventions, and how they may be relevant to policy makers. In particular I draw 
attention to the fact that incremental theory interventions can be delivered electronically and 
have been shown to have longitudinal effects lasting more than nine months. This may make 
them cost effective ways for combating the harmful effects of low self-esteem. 
In addition to short-term priming effects, interventions which try and teach 
incremental theories have been found to have lasting changes. A range of interventions have 
been developed with varying success in many domains. The most intensive programs have 
been workshops. Workshops have been used to target a range of outcomes such as mental 
health, improved grades, and social skills. Workshops typically provide information about the 
malleability of traits. This is achieved either through the promotion of scientific concepts 
such as neuroplasticity. Or through providing participants with case studies, where people 
appeared to have hit a wall, and then later improved (e.g. Burnette & Finkel, 2012). For 
instance, Blackwell et al. (2007) taught participants that the brain was like a muscle which 
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can grow and change through effort. Incremental theory workshops have been found to have 
enduring effects for a range of outcomes. For instance Yeager, Trzesniewski, et al. (2013) 
found that high school students (grade 9 & 10) exhibited fewer conduct problems three 
months after a workshop which promoted incremental theories of personality. In the domain 
of weight-loss, an incremental theory workshop has been found to provide protection against 
setbacks. Three months following a five-session workshop, participants who were taught 
about the malleability of the self were less affected by previous weight-loss failures relative 
to a health education condition (Burnette & Finkel, 2012). Workshops have also been found 
to improve grades relative to controls for up to one year (Blackwell et al., 2007). 
Workshops can be costly however and are limited by scalability. Unless very strong 
effect sizes are obtained, they are unlikely to be rolled out as part of national policies. 
Incremental theories interventions have also shown promise with less costly designs. For 
instance, computer based modalities have been developed which can be completed in one to 
two sessions. For example Miu and Yeager (2015) utilised a self-directed intervention which 
blended psychoeducation on neuroplasticity with case studies, and then asked students to 
write an email to another student arguing that the self can be changed based on their 
experience. This twenty-five minute intervention was found to reduce rates of depression in 
the intervention group by 40% nine months later. This pen-pal paradigm has previously been 
shown to improve grades one year later, especially for disadvantaged black students 
(Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002). Similar interventions have also been shown to reduce 
aggressive desires (Yeager, Miu, et al., 2013), and improve academic grades (Yeager et al., 
2014) relative to controls, one year later.  
A common trend behind these effects is that they tend to be greater when the subjects 
are disadvantaged or facing challenge (Blackwell et al., 2007; Burnette & Finkel, 2012). On 
some level, change must be needed for perceptions of malleability to be beneficial. This may 
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explain why incremental theories and self-esteem interact to predict outcomes. High self-
esteem individuals may be less likely to want to make personal changes, and so a perception 
of self-malleability is not particularly beneficial.  
In summary, incremental theory interventions have been found to have promise. 
Implicit theories are malleable and their promotion has been found to have enduring effects in 
a wide range of domains. Future incremental interventions may be more potent if they are 
designed for disadvantaged students e.g. those with low self-esteem. But are these effects 
large enough to attract the attention of policy makers? While incremental theory workshops 
are resource intensive, and in many cases impractical for widespread distribution, more 
scalable modes have been developed. As discussed, 15-30 minute computer-based reading 
and writing tasks have in many cases have proven to be just as effective as workshops (David 
S Yeager, Miu, et al., 2013). This mode of transmission is highly scalable. Policy makers 
could potentially concentrate resources into building a robust online platform once, rather 
than constantly training and redesigning workshops. These online platforms could then be 
widely dispersed at low additional cost. 
Doubt over the mechanism behind incremental theory interventions 
As described, prior work suggests that incremental theory interventions can have long 
lasting effects. They can be cost effective, being able to be delivered online. While the 
research in this thesis is preliminary, this may mean that incremental theory interventions 
could be good ways to manage the negative effects of low self-esteem. However more work 
needs to be done. While incremental theory interventions have been successful in improving 
a wide range of outcomes in schools, the mechanisms behind these interventions is not 
perfectly understood. For instance, a recent meta-analysis found that while many incremental 
theory interventions do improve academic performance, in many cases this was happening 
even when manipulation checks failed, or were not reported (Sisk, Burgoyne, Sun, Butler, & 
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Macnamara, 2018). In other words, the effectiveness of these interventions may not actually 
be due to a change in one’s implicit malleability theories. Instead they may be working 
through some other mediational pathway. This ambiguity as to how successful incremental 
theory interventions are working is a limitation for the field of research. Without 
understanding exactly how incremental theory interventions work, it will be difficult to 
develop protocols which are reliably effective. One of the more consistent findings of 
incremental theory manipulations is that they encourage persistence (Mueller & Dweck, 
1998). But the value of persistence depends on the nature of the task.  
Is persistence always good? 
Persistence for its own sake is often glorified, particularly in the west (Wrosch, 
Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). The idea that you can achieve all your hopes and dreams 
just as long as you never give up is deeply appealing to many. However, one only has to 
watch a couple of minutes of any reality TV show where people compete for singing careers 
to see that sometimes letting go of current aspirations isn’t always a bad outcome (especially 
for those around you). Persistence is not always desirable. In cases where there is no hope of 
remediation persistence merely results in wasted effort (Baumeister et al., 2003; Wrosch et 
al., 2003).  
Although giving up has negative connotations, in some cases it can also open up new 
opportunities. A good example of this is presented by MacAskill (2015). In the early 2000s a 
charity rose to prominence called ‘Play Pumps International’. The idea behind the charity was 
to build roundabouts in poor communities in South Africa. These roundabouts would pump 
water from wells while children played on them (using a mechanism similar to how 
windmills operate). Advertising on the equipment would pay for maintenance. The idea was 
to ‘kill two birds with one stone’ — ensuring children had play equipment and communities 
had access to clean water. In reality however, nobody wished to advertise to poor 
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communities, the equipment frequently broke down, and the children didn’t find them fun to 
play on due to the force required to turn them. As a result the old women of the villages were 
forced to push the play equipment around to pump water. Unfortunately these ‘play pumps’ 
were far more expensive, and took up to five times as much physical exertion to operate than 
simple hand pumps (MacAskill, 2015). Despite these fatal flaws ‘Play Pumps International’ 
continues to operate and collect money. Misplaced persistence can be damaging. In some 
cases it is better to try something new rather than apply further effort. 
This double edged nature of persistence has been shown to negatively affect 
incremental theorists. In the domain of beauty entity theorists seem to be fairly accepting of 
their physical features. In contrast, incremental theorists tend to place more of their self-
worth on their appearance, have increased appearance related anxiety and more interest in 
cosmetic surgery (Burkley et al., 2014). Similarly incremental theories can cause issues in 
some relationships. While incremental theorists can initially be very understanding with the 
flaws of their partners (as they assume their partner can easily be improved on), they can be 
resentful if their partner fails to change (Kammrath & Peetz, 2012). Similarly, incremental 
theories can lead people to be more judgemental of people with obesity (Hooper, Crumpton, 
Robinson, & Meier, 2018) or of those who experience repeated failures (Ryazanov & 
Christenfeld, 2018). So while incremental theories can help people persist following failure, 
the value of persistence is highly contextual. It depends on what you’re persisting with, and 
what the opportunity costs you are suffering. Sometimes giving up and trying something new 
is not maladaptive. As such, the mechanisms behind incremental theory interventions need to 
be further studied.  
By helping people see themselves more fluidly, incremental theories may change the 
way people relate to the self and their failings. While incremental theories across the board 
seem to have positive effects, more attention needs to be paid to whether they can sometimes 
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cause psychological inflexibility. Incremental theory interventions may be improved if more 
is known about how implicit theories in specific domains, affect specific outcomes. This 
research would benefit from improved understandings of the hierarchical structure of implicit 
theories. 
The psychometrics of implicit theory scales 
While implicit theory research has a rich experimental tradition, the psychometrics of 
implicit theories are still developing. In many interventions, incremental theory 
manipulations effectively change outcomes, and yet manipulation checks based on these 
scales fail (Sisk et al., 2018). In other words, while the intervention had the desired effect, it 
is not clear if implicit theories were effectively changed. It is not clear if this inconsistency is 
due to the interventions targeting other mediating factors, e.g. hope, or if current scales of 
implicit theories are not adequately representing the broader construct as described by the 
literature. In this section I discuss the psychometric limitations of implicit theory scales, and 
potential future directions. 
Are implicit theories entity and incremental theories unidimensional? 
 Implicit theory researchers have long assumed that implicit theory scales put people 
on a single scale with stronger entity theories on one end, and stronger incremental theories 
on the other. For instance, many studies have used median splits to compare the attributes of 
incremental and entity theorists. Certainly this approach has a great deal of face validity. It is 
hard to imagine a participant who could reject an entity theory statement e.g. “my attributes 
are fixed”, who would not simultaneously endorse an incremental theory statement e.g. “my 
attributes are malleable”. And generally, entity items and incremental items tend to be 
strongly negatively correlated. In one study they were found to be related between r = -.69 
and -.86 (Hong et al., 1999; Levy et al., 1998). This means that disagreement with entity 
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statement related to endorsement of incremental statements. However, other studies have 
found the relationship between incremental and entity items to be weaker. Dweck et al. 
(1995) explained this phenomenon by suggesting that incremental items may be so socially 
desirable that, everyone agrees to incremental items regardless of their true implicit beliefs. 
This would mean that responses to incremental items were meaningless. But in Chapter 3 I 
showed that contrary to this, incremental items were better predictors of self-esteem than 
entity items. 
The fact that the association between both entity and incremental items and self-
esteem were substantially different was unexpected. This draws into question the uni-
dimensionality of incremental and entity items. Are entity and incremental theories separate 
constructs? Can someone be an implicit theory compatibilist? That is, is it possible to 
simultaneously believe that an attribute is both fixed and malleable? As all attributes are 
multi-faceted to some degree, participants could consider traits to be simultaneously fixed 
and malleable. Intelligence is an example of this. 
Intelligence seems to have a strong, genetic basis. Intelligence testing has found that 
performance is highly heritable with estimates ranging from .5 to .8 (Plomin, 1990). Further, 
IQ tend to be highly stable over time (Neisser et al., 1996). Intelligence quotients measures 
many aspects of intelligence. And while IQ itself is stable, through effort its component parts 
tend to be malleable to some degree. For instance, the ability to mentally rotate objects has a 
large genetic basis, and yet experimental studies have shown that it can be improved through 
interacting with video games (Terlecki, Newcombe, & Little, 2008). Further, some aspects of 
intelligence tend to be drawn from experience rather than pure natural talent. Theorists have 
drawn a distinction between the basic mechanics of people’s intelligence which enable them 
to learn (fluid intelligence) and then the content which is learned (crystalized intelligence). 
While fluid intelligence on the whole is mostly stable (although it declines as we age), 
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crystallized intelligence is composed of facets such as general knowledge and vocabulary 
which, through our behaviour, may expand to different degrees (Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). 
As all our abilities are nuanced such as this, entity and incremental items may tap into our 
theories about different facets of a trait. Is intelligence stable? Yes it is. Can it be improved 
through effort? Yes, some aspects of it can. It is not clear how people think about their traits 
when responding to these items.  
When someone strongly disagrees with an entity item like “People can do things 
differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t really be changed”, they may merely 
be stating emphatically that personal change is possible. The ease of that change, or the 
degree that the respondent believes they can change may not have been addressed. They may 
simultaneously believe that achieving that change is incredibly difficult or rare. To try and 
adjust for this some items ask about the ease of change rather than the possibility. Perhaps 
incremental items relate more closely to self-esteem, because they tap into people’s 
confidence in being able to change. In contrast, entity items may only tap into whether 
change is perceived to be possible (even if change is simultaneously considered to be 
unlikely). 
Self vs other focused items 
Most research on implicit theories has focused on personal achievements, that is, on 
how belief in self-malleability helps people respond to failures. The extent to which it is 
believed that others are malleable is also relevant as people are constantly coming into 
contact with others. If traits are fixed, then people will tend to make trait attributions to others 
(Levy et al., 1998). This has direct implications for how people respond to transgressors. If 
someone believes a person who has wronged them has fixed traits, then that witnessed 
behaviour is more likely to be used to paint that transgressor as intrinsically bad (Yeager et 
al., 2011). But do people hold different malleability theories for selves and others? Is it 
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possible that a respondent could believe other’s to be fixed, but themselves to be malleable, 
or visa versa? Could someone believe that disadvantaged youth are full of potential, but a 
violent criminal is beyond remediation? Would this effect the way they treat these 
individuals? 
In Chapter 3 I found that studies which used self-focused scales of implicit theories, 
reported stronger relationships between incremental theories and self-esteem. Unfortunately, 
only a few studies have used these scales, making it hard to make reliable assessments of 
their effectiveness. Regardless, these studies suggest that by asking only about the 
malleability of people generally, the field of research may be missing meaningful variance. 
For instance, as discussed earlier, prior research suggests that incremental theorists tend to be 
more interested in behavioural treatments for mental illnesses (Schroder et al., 2014). In 
contrast, entity theorists are more interested in pharmaceutical interventions. It would follow 
from this research that an intervention which tries to each people about the malleability of the 
self may increase engagement with behavioural therapy. But it may be possible for people to 
believe that while most people can change, that there is something special about them that 
means that their predicament is uniquely hopeless. For example, someone might understand 
research into neuroplasticity, while also feeling that they have been so previously traumatised 
that they are a lost cause. Scales which only reference people generally (which are in wide 
usage) may miss this dynamic. 
Ironing out these issues may have benefits for psychometricians and interventionists 
alike. There is a clear need for large scale studies which examine the structure of implicit 
theories. While there has been a rich experimental tradition in this field, psychometrically the 
field is lagging behind other mainstream constructs. Future research is needed to clarify the 
structure of implicit theories. What is its hierarchical structure? Is there a global factor? To 
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what extent do people hold multiple theories for various people and groups? And how do 
implicit theories relate to other psychological constructs like self-esteem? 
The politics of growth mindset 
It is clear that while implicit theories is an exciting area of research, more work still 
needs to be done. Experimentation has shown that incremental theory interventions may be 
an effective way to improve resilience in schools. But exactly who benefits and why is not 
clear. This thesis has helped show that while incremental theories may be protective, that they 
are not always going to be helpful in every context. Specifically, I found that incremental 
theories were more strongly linked with wellbeing and achievement among individuals with 
low self-esteem. Belief in a malleable-self seemed to offer little advantage when people had 
high self-worth. These results fit nicely with prior research that have shown that incremental 
theories offer more benefit to people who are disadvantaged (Aronson et al., 2002) 
 The limitations of incremental theories has however often been missed by the lay 
community. Accordingly, one of the greatest risks to research into implicit malleability 
theories is its popularity. ‘Growth mindset’ as this construct is more broadly known has 
become a hot topic, especially in educational institutions. It is lauded on television and radio, 
and promoted in schools with near religious fervour (Gross-loh, 2016). This is both a blessing 
and a curse. On the one hand, interest in incremental theories by schools means that 
researchers can more easily engage with school systems to leverage resources to conduct 
studies. But on the other, enthusiasm from the general public means that impoverished 
understandings of the construct can travel broadly, presenting strawmen to be struck down by 
critics. 
Researchers have claimed that these enthusiastic promoters of growth mindsets have 
misunderstood the research (Gross-loh, 2016). Rather than promoting notions that the self is 
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malleable, some teachers have reportedly begun praising effort, even when it is not exhibited, 
expecting students’ mindsets magically improve (Gross-loh, 2016). This inattention to detail 
and broad popularity is in some ways reminiscent of the self-esteem movement. 
Perhaps this fervour around growth mindset is partly because the concept broadly gels 
well with the excesses of both sides of the political landscape. On the political left, the 
malleability of traits can be taken to mean that everyone has the same basic set of attributes, 
and poorer performance is due to disadvantage or some form, or trauma. On the right, the 
malleability of attributes can be used to suggest that struggling students are in some way lazy 
or just have the wrong attitude. In reality, incremental theories cannot be used in either way. 
This is because the benefit of incremental theories is contextual (Yeager & Walton, 2011). 
When used appropriately, incremental interventions may be powerful ways to improve social 
functioning, wellbeing and achievement (Yeager et al., 2014). However, incremental theories 
cannot be considered to be a complete explanation of success or failure. In order to maximise 
the value of incremental theories, their limitations must also be acknowledged. In this vein, in 
the next section I discuss the limitations of this thesis. 
Limitations 
In this thesis, I have shown that implicit theories moderate the relationship between 
self-esteem and wellbeing, and between self-esteem and achievement. The association 
between low self-esteem and negative outcomes was weaker in individuals with stronger 
incremental theories. This is novel research as little work has studied the relationship between 
the constructs of self-esteem and implicit theories. However, this research is far from 
conclusive and has limitations which must be appreciated. In this section, I map out the 
limitations of this body of work and make suggestions for future directions. 
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The links between implicit theories and various self-concepts needs to be explored 
Researchers have theorised that the majority of benefit received from higher self-
esteem arises from specific domains of self-concept (e.g. Marsh, 1993). This means that any 
mechanism found to involve self-esteem may actually be better explained by a specific self-
concept. In Chapters 4 and 5 I showed that self-esteem and implicit theories interact to 
predict wellbeing and achievement. As specific domains of self-concept were not included, it 
is not clear if these models are best described with self-esteem. For instance, in Chapter 4, I 
found that self-esteem and incremental theories interact to predict GPA. Are implicit theories 
moderating the effects of self-esteem, or is this relationship due to another unmeasured 
variable such as academic self-concept? If the latter, then interventions seeking to make use 
of this mechanism would be more effective if they targeted individuals with low academic 
self-concept, rather than self-esteem.  
To clarify this, future studies would be improved if they examined the relationship 
between specific domains of self-concept and implicit theories, as opposed to merely global 
self-esteem. In Chapter 3 I explored the association between implicit theories and self-esteem 
across domains. I hoped to show that implicit theories and self-esteem were more strongly 
associated in more similar domains. While this was true in some domains, across the board 
this pattern did not conclusively emerge. This was partly due to a lack of studies measuring 
both implicit theories and specific self-concepts. This meant that the domain specificity 
principal could not be fully explored. In future work the inclusion of specific self-concepts 
into theoretical models may help researchers understand how implicit theories are beneficial. 
Use of entity items which referenced people generally 
 In Chapter 3, I presented meta-analytic evidence that incremental items were more 
closely related to self-esteem than entity items. This finding was not anticipated. 
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Additionally, the results of my first study suggest that items which reference the self rather 
than people generally are more strongly related to self-esteem. 
These findings suggest that for the study of self-esteem, implicit theory scales which 
include more incremental items, and which reference the self may be more appropriate. If 
these items had been used, it’s possible that the interactions between self-esteem and implicit 
theories would have been stronger. Unfortunately the datasets used in this thesis were 
opportunistically collected prior to the completion of this moderation analysis. As a result, 
only entity items were used. These items were selected as they mirror those which are 
commonly used by researchers studying implicit theories. However, future research into this 
topic would benefit from using scales with incremental items, and which reference the self 
rather than people generally.  
Cross-sectional research prevented assessment of causal relationships 
A clear limitation of this work is that it is cross-sectional in nature. This means that it 
is impossible to clarify causal orderings in the models presented. While this work has shown 
that implicit theories and self-esteem are positively related, it is impossible to conclusively 
say why. Do beliefs in self-malleability make people feel more positive, resulting in higher 
self-esteem? Does higher self-esteem result in beliefs that personal change is easy? Or, is this 
association better explained by another unmeasured variable? Theory may provide clues 
about which one of these scenarios is more likely, but data is required to clarify these points. 
Similar questions arise when assessing the interaction of self-esteem and implicit theories. 
Are incremental theories less valuable to people with high self-esteem? Or are the 
consequences of low self-esteem buffered by incremental theories? Are other mediating 
constructs behind these interactions? Future longitudinal research using cross-lag models may 
be able to clarify these points. 
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Striving progress 
 In order to replicate the moderating effect of incremental theories on the relationship 
between self-esteem and achievement in adults, striving progress was used. This was not an 
ideal proxy. There are clear differences between academic grades obtained in the school 
system and the progress one makes upon their goals. For one, academic success is defined 
similarly for all people within a school. Success conditions are generally clearly defined to 
enhance objectivity. The finding that low self-esteem individuals generally reported making 
more progress on personal strivings was important in its own right; but further replication is 
required to confirm both of these effects.  
Need for a scale of implicit theories of status 
Finally, this thesis investigated the psychometric relationship between implicit 
theories and self-esteem. This work found that they are weakly related, yet interact to predict 
wellbeing and achievement. To conduct this work I tried to identify existing scales of implicit 
theories which would broadly map on to self-esteem. To this end I relied upon implicit 
theories of personality. Implicit theories of personality were selected as they cover broad 
aspects of the self and so may be more relevant to self-esteem. The analogue is however not 
perfect. If people believe their status in their social hierarchies is fixed, then whether or not 
their personal features are malleable may be somewhat irrelevant. 
Given the importance of social status, and acceptance to self-esteem (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000), an implicit theories scale which addressed these facets of the self would 
have been optimal. While such a scale is not currently in common usage, this would be an 
interesting idea to test in future research. Such a scale would best be devised in the context of 
building a more hierarchical structure of implicit theories. The tendency for researchers to 
create implicit theory measures on an as needed basis has resulted in a confusing array of 
subscales. These subscales, of which there are countless variants, have not been related to any 
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broader construct. Ideally, the creation of further implicit theory scales would also involve a 
consolidation and restructuring of previous scales and items, rather than treating it as a 
separate enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Self-esteem and incremental theories should be considered together 
This thesis has presented original research that shows cross-sectionally, that implicit 
theories and self-esteem tend to be associated with each other. While the correlation is small, 
incremental theorists tend to have higher self-esteem than entity theorists. More importantly, 
I demonstrated in this thesis that implicit theories moderate the link between self-esteem and 
wellbeing, and self-esteem and achievement.  
Low self-esteem remains a serious issue with wide ranging consequences (McGee & 
Williams, 2000). However, this thesis has demonstrated that the effects of low self-esteem are 
context dependent. Low self-esteem does not tend to be associated with negative outcomes as 
strongly, when people perceive the self to be more malleable. This may provide future 
researchers and interventionists with additional ways to manage low self-esteem. It is 
possible that incremental theories are buffering the negative effects of low self-esteem. In 
which case, interventions which boost incremental theories may be especially beneficial to 
people with low self-esteem.  
Conversely, this thesis has also shone light on the limits of incremental theories. The 
interaction between self-esteem and implicit theories suggests that incremental theories are 
not likely to be beneficial in every situation. Incremental theories were associated with little 
benefit among people with high self-esteem. As a result, future research may confirm if 
implicit theory interventions are more effective when targeted at individuals with low self-
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esteem. In order to better understand the limits of incremental theories, and the mediational 
pathways which account for their positive effects, more work remains to be done. 
Experimental designs have been key in establishing that implicit theories can be manipulated 
to positive effect. But the exact mediational path that leads to positive effects is still being 
unpacked (Sisk et al., 2018). To aid this, the field would benefit from more work exploring 
the relationship between implicit theories and other constructs. While the research in this 
thesis has started some of this work, far more needs to be done. 
The importance of self-views 
In conclusion, it is clear that self-esteem plays a critical role in human emotions and 
behaviours (Guindon, 2009; Marsh, 1990b). Self-esteem is a major driver of human 
wellbeing and behaviour. And yet, the promotion of positive self-concepts is complex. 
Because self-esteem relies on social comparisons (Marsh et al., 2015), it is hard to improve 
one individual’s self-image without lowering that of another. The promotion of self-concept 
may inflexible clinging to one’s sense of specialness or importance (Mueller & Dweck, 
1998), resulting in maladaptive behaviours when those self-concepts are challenged (Dweck, 
2000; Neff, 2009). Such pitfalls can perhaps be avoided by promoting positive self-concepts 
while also helping people to recognise personal malleability.  
The results in this thesis suggest that incremental theories are especially protective 
among individuals with low self-esteem. Perhaps in some way, self-critical thoughts lose 
their potency when the self is viewed flexibly. While low self-esteem was experienced by 
students and adults high and low in incremental theories, the extent to which low self-esteem 
was tied to lower wellbeing and achievement was lessened for those with stronger 
incremental theories. Having incremental theories is unlikely to stop people from 
experiencing hard times. Even when people know they can change, not fulfilling their 
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potential may still be painful. However, by seeing the self as malleable, incremental theories 
may help people realise that pain passes and that things can get better. Belief in self-
malleability may help people foresee a positive future in times of distress, thereby preventing 
drops in wellbeing and helping people stay engaged with the things that they care about.  
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APPENDIX A 
Search terms for meta-analysis 
The search terms below were used to extract references from their respective databases. 
Eric 
("implicit theory" OR "implicit theories" OR "incremental theory" OR "incremental theorist" 
OR "entity theorist" OR "entity theory" OR "entity theories" OR "Dweck" OR "fixed 
mindset" OR "growth mindset") AND ("self-esteem" OR "self esteem" OR "self-concept" 
OR "self concept" OR "self-perception" OR "self perception" OR "self-perceptions" OR "self 
perceptions" OR "self-appraisal" OR "self-image" OR "self image" OR "self-worth" OR 
"self-worth" OR "self-attribution" OR "self attribution") 
Psych info 
(implicit-the* OR incremental-theor* OR entity-theor* OR fixed-mindset OR growth-
mindset OR Dweck) AND (self-esteem OR self-concept OR self-perception OR self-
appriasal OR global-self-esteem OR self-worth OR self-attributions OR self-image) 
Scopus 
("implicit theories" OR "implicit malleability theories" OR "incremental theories" OR 
"incremental theory" OR "incremental theorist" OR "entity theory" or "entity theorist" OR 
"Dweck" OR "fixed mindset" OR "growth mindset") AND ("self-esteem" OR "self esteem" 
OR "self-concept" OR "self concept" OR "self-perception" OR "self perception" OR "self-
perceptions" OR "self perceptions" OR "self-appraisal" OR "self-worth" OR "self worth" OR 
"self-attributions" OR "self attributions" OR "self-image" OR "self image") 
Web of science 
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("implicit theories" OR "implicit malleability theories" OR "incremental theories" OR 
"incremental theory" OR "incremental theorist" OR "entity theory" OR "entity theorist" OR 
"Dweck" OR "fixed mindset" OR "growth mindset") AND ("self-esteem" OR "self esteem" 
OR "self-concept" OR "self concept" OR "self-perception" OR "self perception" OR "self-
perceptions" OR "self perceptions" OR "self-appraisal" OR "self-worth" OR "self worth" OR 
"self-attributions" OR "self attributions" OR "self-image" OR "self image") 
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APPENDIX B. EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
1. Includes implicit malleability theory and self- concept measures  
Studies were included provided they had at least one quantitative measure of implicit 
malleability theories in any domain AND at least one measure of self-esteem including 
measures of self-concept in any domain. Constructs must not be mixed with items from other 
measures, such as, composite measures of academic self-concept combined with academic 
achievement. 
2. Full-text English language available 
Articles were excluded when full-text English copies were not available as reliable 
translation services were not available. 
3. Original data 
To prevent including data sources multiple times only research which presented new 
findings was considered. 
4. Publication date 
No restrictions were placed on publication date. 
5. Publication Type 
Published and unpublished research articles, conference papers and research theses were 
eligible for inclusion. 
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Table S1. 
Reasons for exclusion (Study 1) 
Reason n 
Both constructs missing 105 
No self-esteem 70 
Not original research 32 
No implicit theories 22 
Effect sizes not reported 12 
Implicit theories manipulated before measurement 6 
Constructs mixed with other measures 4 
Constructs not measured in same participants 2 
Implicit theories treated as a categorical variable 2 
Not available in English 2 
Qualitative research 2 
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APPENDIX C. MODERATOR CODING 
 
Table S2. 
Moderator coding (Study 1) 
Moderator Categories 
Implicit theory frame 1. Personal e.g. “my attributes are malleable” 
2. People e.g. “your attributes are malleable” 
Implicit theory item 
content 
1. Entity items 
2. Both entity and incremental items 
3. Incremental items 
Effect sizes not listed 1. Effect sizes provided in published material 
2. Effect sizes requested from author 
Mean age 1. Children: < 12 
2. Adolescents: 12 – 18 
3. Young adults: 18 – 25 
4. Adults: > 25 
Decade Study published: 
1. 1990 - 1999 
2. 2000-2009 
3. 2010 - 2017 
Reliability Alpha: 
1. > = .7 
2. < .7 or not reported 
Gender Proportion of females: 
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1. < 0.33 
2. 0.33 - 0.66 
3. > 0.66 
Education Population drawn from: 
1. Elementary school 
2. High school 
3. University 
4. Other 
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APPENDIX D. STUDY 2 & 3 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
*(R) indicates reverse items 
Implicit theory of intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995): Study 2 & 3 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it 
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much 
3. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence 
 
Implicit theory of personality (Erdley et al., 1997): Study 2 
1. You have a certain personality, and it is something that you can’t do much about 
2. Your personality is something about you that you can’t change very much 
3. Either you have a good personality or you don’t and there is really very little you can 
do about it 
Implicit theory of person & morality (Dweck et al., 1995): Study 3 
1. The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can’t be 
changed very much 
2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t really 
be changed 
3. A person’s moral character is something very basic about them and it can’t be 
changed much 
4. Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their 
personality. It cannot be changed very much 
5. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits (e.g. 
conscientiousness, uprightness and honesty.) 
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Wellbeing (Keyes, 2006a): Study 2 & 3 
During the past month how often did you feel: 
1. Happy 
2. interested in life 
3. satisfied with life 
4. that you had something important to contribute to society 
5. that you belonged to a community (like a social group, your neighbourhood or school) 
6. that our society is a good place, or is becoming a better place, for all people 
7. that people are basically good 
8. that the way our society works makes sense to you 
9. that you liked most parts of your personality 
10. good at managing the responsibilities of your daily life 
11. that you had warm and trusting relationships with others 
12. that you had experience that challenged you to grow and become a better person 
13. confident to think or express your own ideas and opinions 
14. that your life has a sense of direction or meaning to it 
Self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965): Study 2 & 3 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
2. At times, I think I am no good at all. (R) 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (R) 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. (R) 
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth at least on an equal plane with others. 
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8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. (R) 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (R) 
10. I take a positive attitude towards myself. 
Personal strivings (Emmons & McAdams, 1991) 
“In this part of the questionnaire, we would like you to describe some of your personal 
strivings. You can think of personal strivings as the goals that you typically try to obtain in 
your life. For example, two strivings might be: Trying to be physically attractive or trying to 
seek new and exciting experiences. Spend a few minutes thinking about your goals as 
personal strivings, then enter them in the space provided. Try not to make them too specific 
(e.g., I will clean the car today) but a little more general like the examples given above. For 
each striving that you list, please answer the questions that follow…” 
1. In the past 10 weeks I have made progress on this striving 
*repeated for four separate strivings 
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APPENDIX E 
SUPPLEMENT TO STUDY 3 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that self-esteem and implicit theories interact to predict 
grades. However these effects are nested under school cohorts. I demonstrate in Table S2 that 
this effect persists even when school cohort is controlled for. 
Table S3. 
GPA as predicted by ITI and Self-esteem controlling for school year 
Item Β SE t 95% CI 
Intercept -0.06 0.12 -0.49 [-0.28, 0.17] 
ITI 0.18 0.05 3.41 [0.08, 0.28]* 
SE 0.09 0.05 1.70 [-0.01, 0.2] 
year 8 0.11 0.15 0.72 [-0.19, 0.41] 
year 9 0.22 0.16 1.36 [-0.1, 0.54] 
year 10 0.19 0.17 1.10 [-0.15, 0.53] 
year 11 0.10 0.17 0.59 [-0.23, 0.43] 
ITI*SE -0.09 0.05 -2.06 [-0.18, -0.00]* 
Note. ITI = implicit theory of intelligence, SE = self-esteem. 
*p<0.05. 
 
  
159 
 
APPENDIX F 
STUDY 3 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Clarification of implicit theory scale structure 
In Chapter 5 a clerical error meant that only two items from the implicit theory of 
personality measure were included. The alpha reliability of this scale was poor in the current 
sample (α = 0.58). The implicit theories of personality and morality scales are conceptually 
similar. For instance wouldn’t your moral qualities partly depend upon features of your 
personality? I tested the factor structure and demonstrated that a two factor solution, was 
superior to a three, or one factor solution. That is, theories and personality and morality 
loaded onto one factor, and theories of intelligence items loaded on the other. The resulting 
scale was a more reliable construct. 
Method 
Instruments 
Implicit theory items were included from Chapter 5. 
Analysis 
To test this hypothesis a series of confirmatory factor analyses were performed (Table 
S2). Three models were tested. Model A loaded all items on their original factors (i.e. three 
items on implicit theory of intelligence, two on implicit theory of personality, and there on 
implicit theory of morality. Model B tested the hypothesised model i.e. intelligence items on 
implicit theory of intelligence, and morality and personality on the second factor labelled 
‘implicit theory of personality’. Finally Model C tested a one factor solution. 
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Results 
All results are presented in Table S2. The only model which did not provide adequate 
fit was the 1 factor solution, Model C (RMSEA = 0.04; CFI = 0.88; TLI = 0.83). Model A 
and B were very similar, but Model B the simpler solution was slightly improved (△BIC = 
17). As such, Model B (Figure S1) was selected for analysis.  
Table S4. 
Fit statistics for implicit theory models. 
     
     
Model X2 df BIC RMSEA CFI TLI △BIC 
△RMSE
A 
△CF
I △TLI 
A 37.11 17 47205 0.01 0.99 0.98      
B 38.07 19 47189 0.01 0.99 0.98 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C 229.41 20 47371 0.04 0.88 0.83 183 0.03 0.11 0.16 
Note. Model A = 3 factors; Model B= 2 factor with ITP and ITM combined; Model C = 1 factor model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Path model of Model B 
Note. I = Implicit Theories of intelligence items, P =Implicit theory of personality items, M = 
Implicit theories of morality items. 
 
  
Implicit 
theory of 
intelligence 
Implicit 
theory of 
personality 
I1 I2 I3 P1 P2 M1 M2 M3 
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Study 3 results replicated with ITP items only 
A two-factor solution that loaded personality and morality items onto a single factor 
was preferred. However, it is important to note that the results hold even if the two 
personality items are used in place of the psychometrically superior combined measure. 
Results from Chapter 5 are not substantially changed using a three factor model of implicit 
theories rather than the superior 2 factor model. In this section all analyses in Chapter 5 are 
repeated for ITP using only the two implicit theory of personality items.  
Table S5. 
Summary of intercorrelations means and standard deviations for variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
1. ITP -    
 
3.49 1.09 
2. ITI .39* -   
 
3.92 1.23 
3. Self-esteem .09* .17* -  
 
6.52 1.54 
4. Wellbeing .22* .19* .55* - 
 
3.81 0.88 
5. Progress .15* .13* .31* .44* - 4.40 1.04 
Note. 
*p<0.01 
       
 
     
Table S6. 
Wellbeing as predicted by implicit theories, self-esteem and gender 
  β SE T 95% CI 
Intercept 0.01 0.02 0.37 [-0.03, 0.04] 
ITP 0.23 0.03 8.87 [0.17, 0.28]* 
SE 0.48 0.02 27.87 [0.45, 0.52]* 
Female 0.00 0.03 0.10 [-0.05, 0.06] 
SE * ITP -0.10 0.02 -6.09 [-0.14, -0.07]* 
SE * Female 0.09 0.02 4.32 [0.05, 0.14]* 
ITP * Female -0.10 0.02 -4.05 [-0.15, -0.05]* 
SE * ITP * Female 0.07 0.02 3.09 [0.03, 0.12]* 
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Note. ITP = implicit theory of personality, SE = self-esteem. 
*p < 0.05 
 
Table S7. 
Striving Progress as predicted by implicit theories and Self-esteem 
Item β SE T 95% CI 
Implicit theory of personality    
Intercept 0.00 0.01 0.26 [-0.02, 0.02] 
ITP 0.13 0.02 7.21 [0.09, 0.16]* 
SE 0.30 0.02 16.74 [0.26, 0.33]* 
ITP * SE -0.03 0.01 -2.73 [-0.06, -0.01]* 
Note. ITP = implicit theory of personality, SE = self-esteem. 
*p < 0.05. 
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